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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
FRAMING INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND U.S. PUBLIC OPINION
by
Mita Saksena
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Paul A. Kowert, Major Professor
The United States has been increasingly concerned with the transnational threat
posed by infectious diseases. Effective policy implementation to contain the spread of
these diseases requires active engagement and support of the American public. To
influence American public opinion and enlist support for related domestic and foreign
policies, both domestic agencies and international organizations have framed infectious
diseases as security threats, human rights disasters, economic risks, and as medical
dangers. This study investigates whether American attitudes and opinions about
infectious diseases are influenced by how the issue is framed. It also asks which issue
frame has been most influential in shaping public opinion about global infectious diseases
when people are exposed to multiple frames.
The impact of media frames on public perception of infectious diseases is
examined through content analysis of newspaper reports. Stories on SARS, avian flu, and
HIV/AIDS were sampled from coverage in The New York Times and The Washington
Post between 1999 and 2007. Surveys of public opinion on infectious diseases in the
same time period were also drawn from databases like Health Poll Search and iPoll.

vi

Statistical analysis tests the relationship between media framing of diseases and changes
in public opinion.
Results indicate that no one frame was persuasive across all diseases. The
economic frame had a significant effect on public opinion about SARS, as did the
biomedical frame in the case of avian flu. Both the security and human rights frames
affected opinion and increased public support for policies intended to prevent or treat
HIV/AIDS. The findings also address the debate on the role and importance of domestic
public opinion as a factor in domestic and foreign policy decisions of governments in an
increasingly interconnected world. The public is able to make reasonable evaluations of
the frames and the domestic and foreign policy issues emphasized in the frames.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons and bloc rivalry dominated the foreign
policy and security agenda of the United States government.1 Issues such as public health
and infectious diseases were considered to be “low politics.”2 Although the 1981-89 era
saw the discovery of a new plague (HIV/AIDS), it was not seen as a security or foreign
policy concern within the United States. With the end of the Cold War, as old military
threats from other states waned, some scholars alleged that rather than originating from
rival states, threats were either domestic or transnational (i.e., non-state) or the state itself
posed a challenge to its citizens.3 Not only was the origin of threats different, the nature
of threats differed as well.4 Some international relations theorists focused attention on
threats arising from political, environmental, and societal sectors.5 Scholars argued that in
an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, events such as civil wars,
environmental degradation, infectious diseases, migration of refugees, international
narcotics, and terrorism were transnational threats that could not only threaten the

1

Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance in Security Studies,” International Studies
Quarterly 35, 2 (1991): 211–39.
2

David P. Fidler, “Health as Foreign Policy: Between Principle and Power,” The
Whitehead Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy 179 (2005): 179–94.
3

Ayoob Mohammed, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective,” in Critical
Security Studies, ed. Keith Krause (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
4

Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for
Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 71–161.
5

Ibid., 61-171.

1

internal stability of states but also the security of other states. These transnational issues
were security issues to be addressed by foreign policy officials.
While twentieth century scholars argued about whether poverty, degradation of
the environment, climate change, and other concerns should be treated as security issues,
it was HIV/AIDS that was declared a security threat by the United Nations Security
Council and United States security agencies in 2001.6 With globalization and increased
migration, air travel, and food and animals trade, infectious diseases could emerge
anywhere in the world and spread quickly to other parts of the world, including the
United States. Threats could arise not only from naturally occurring diseases but also
from deliberate use of microbes as weapons. Policy makers grew increasingly concerned
about the threat of bioterrorism.7 Infectious diseases were not just the concern of public
health officials and a domestic issue of any one country but a foreign policy concern as
well. The potential danger posed by infectious diseases required coordination among
national health agencies, investment in disease surveillance, and close cooperation among
international agencies. This dissertation explores the reaction of the public to this new
foreign policy and security issue—one that traditionally was a biomedical and
humanitarian issue. While the focus of this work is on the public response to framing
infectious diseases as security threats, this study also adds to the larger debate regarding

6

National Intelligence Council, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its
Implications for the United States (National Intelligence Estimate 99-17D, January 2000),
at http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/infectiousdisease/infectiousdiseases.pdf,
last accessed August 1, 2011.

7

David P. Fidler, “Public Health and National Security in the Global Age: Infectious
Diseases, Bio-terrorism, and Realpolitik,” George Washington Law Review 35, 4 (2003):
787–856.

2

domestic public opinion as a factor that affects the foreign policy decisions of
governments in an increasingly interconnected world. 8 A body of scholarly work has
debated the role of public opinion in foreign policy decision making in democratic
societies. The debates have centered on the role of the public in foreign policy decision
making (i.e., whether public opinion follows, determines, or sets some limits on leaders
who avoid making policies that might later evoke “public retribution”). 9 With the
increased importance of issues such as immigration, infectious diseases, and the
environment, the policy making elite increasingly feel the pressure to consider and
respond to domestic public opinion and popular preferences. 10 The study of public
opinion on a transnational issue like infectious diseases also contributes to the existing
debates on the theory of international relations. In a world faced with pressing nonmilitary issues and with domestic and transnational actors linked to these issues,

8

James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International
Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998): 289–313; Philip J. Powlick,
“The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials,” International
studies Quarterly 39,4(1995): 427–51; Thomas Risse Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic
Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” World Politics 43, 4 (1991): 479–
512; Bruce Beuno de Mesquita, “Domestic Politics and International Relations,”
International Studies Quarterly 46, 1 (2002): 1–9; Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y.
Shapiro, Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic
Responsiveness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 3-27.
9

Josh N. Price, “Identifying Conceptions of the Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,”
in A Dialogue on Presidential Challenges and Leadership: Selected Papers of the 20082009 Presidential Fellows, eds. In Alex J. Douville and Jessica L. Zapf (Washington
D.C.: Center for the Study of The Presidency and Congress, 2009), also available online
at http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2009/Price.pdf, last visited
July 7, 2011.
10

Paul Berstein, “Bringing the Public Back in: Should Sociologists Consider the Impact
of Public Opinion on Public Policy?” Social Forces 77, 1 (1998): 27–62.

3

international behavior could be the result of a “multiplicity of motives, not merely the
imperative of systemic power balances.”11
An extensive literature on the nexus between public opinion and foreign affairs
exists. The literature, however, is limited to an understanding of traditional security
issues. Much of the early literature from the two decades after the Second World War, as
represented by the works of Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, and Gabriel Almond,
posits a rather pessimistic view of public opinion on domestic and foreign policy issues.
Studies on public opinion on foreign policy issues were concerned mainly with issues
such as war, military intervention abroad, nuclear arms policy, international trade,
defense spending, and foreign aid. Policy makers perceived these issues to be far
removed from peoples’ lives, and the public was seen as disinterested in these issues.
Added to this was the belief that some of the foreign policy issues required secrecy,
speed, and flexibility in the use of classified information.12 Decision makers, therefore,
felt that there was little need to engage public opinion, which they considered to be
erratic, unstable, emotional, and volatile.13
The Vietnam War was a turning point at which policy makers began to
understand that public opinion was important. Subsequent studies by liberal theorists,
including Richard Aldrich, Benjamin Page, Robert Shapiro, Ore Holsti, John Mueller,
11

Ole R. Hosti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Revised Edition,
Analytical Perspectives on Politics (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 339.
12

Ole R. Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 36
(1992): 439–466.

13

Almond A. Gabriel, “Public Opinion and National Security,” Public Opinion Quarterly
20, 2 (1956): 371–78.

4

and Bruce Jentleson, suggested that the public did have stable views and was capable of
addressing serious foreign policy issues. In the post-Cold War era, researchers such as
Richard Sobel, James Larson, Bruce Jentleson, Rebecca Britton, Eugene Wiittkoph,
Miroslav Nincic, Bruce Russett, Ronald Hinckley, Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi,
Kenneth Scheve, Matthew Sloughter, Richard Eichenberg, and Elisabeth Neuman studied
issues like public tolerance of war causalities, international trade, and military
involvement. Although no consensus exists amongst these scholars as to what determines
people’s attitudes towards these problems, most scholars “understand the public as
reasoned and reasonable.”14
Within the context of this persistent debate, there was agreement among scholars
of public opinion and foreign policy about the sources of information about international
events and foreign policy issues and the accessibility of this information to the public.
Because many ordinary citizens were inattentive to international issues and foreign news,
public opinion about foreign policy issues often was activated through elite discourse
(e.g., policy making elite and opinion leaders) and by the media.15 Extensive research has
shown that the media is most able to activate opinion when these elite debates are
presented as “frames” to which people are particularly receptive and which seem to have

14

Christopher Gelpi, “Performing on Cue? The Formation of Public Opinion towards
War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, 1 (2010): 88–116. For a detailed review on this
subject read John H. Aldrich, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin
Thompson Sharp, “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection,” Annual Review of
Political Science 9 (2006): 477–450.
15

Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates? Mass Media in American Society (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1996), 1-17.

5

an impact on people’s lives.16 Framing may be seen as an attempt by leaders and other
actors to insert into the policy debate organizing themes that will affect how the public
and other actors such as the media will perceive an issue.17 Political actors, who perceive
the importance of media coverage in influencing policy outcomes, often try to advance
their policy positions via greater media coverage and engage in what has been called
“framing wars.” 18 The assumption here is that widespread discussion of issues in the
media will activate public opinion.
My dissertation focuses on a non-traditional security threat—infectious disease—
that has significant impact on the daily lives of people.19 On this issue, the relationship
between public opinion and foreign policy in United States takes on “added rather than
diminished significance,” in two distinct ways, and the public is likely to “play a more
autonomous role.” 20 First, although scholars agreed that while some issues, such as
military conflicts and resulting domestic costs and war causalities, attracted intense
public attention, public opinion was, in general, considered to be important only in so far

16

Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz, “Defining the American Public
Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” Mershon International Studies Review 42, 1 (1998): 36.
17

Alex Mintz and Steven B. Redd, “Framing Effects in International Relations,”
Synthese 135, 2 (1997): 193-213.
18

Robert E. Entman, “Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal
of Communication 43, 4 (1993): 51–8.
19

Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International
Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47, 4 (2003): 511–31.
20

Ole R. Hosti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Revised Edition,
Analytical Perspectives on Politics (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2004).

6

it had electoral implications.21 The public was assumed to be more easily manipulated on
issues of wars and military crises abroad, than on domestic issues, that affected them
directly.22 The need for speed and secrecy in issues of war and military confrontation
often was used as justification by policy makers for denying public engagement in
foreign policy decision making. The same justification, however, cannot be used for
policy making on an issue such as infectious diseases. On the contrary, on this issue
policy makers consider an active, informed, and engaged public to be important, and
public cooperation is actively sought. Infectious diseases are a major source of concern to
people and government alike. They are potentially transferable from one person to the
other and can cause death and disability, impose high health care costs, lead to loss of
productivity, and thereby cause social and economic disruption.

23

Due to the

transmissibility of infectious diseases and their direct impact on people, any public health
intervention, support for surveillance, or policy decisions regarding funding, prevention,
and control of global infectious diseases requires the active engagement of the American
public.

21

Philip B. K. Potter and Matthew A. Baum, “Democratic Peace, Democratic Audience
Costs and Political Communication,” Political Communication 27, 4 (2010): 461.
Vincent Price and John Zaller, “Who Gets the News: Alternative Measures of News
Reception and their Implication for Research,” Public Opinion Quarterly 57, 2 (1993):
133–64.
22

David Domke, Erica S. Graham, Kevin Coe, Sue Lockett John, and, Ted Coopman,
“Going Public as Political Strategy: The Bush Administration, an Echoing Press, and
Passage of the Patriot Act,” Political Communication 23, 3 (2006): 291–312.
23

World Health Organization, WHO Global Burden of Disease: 2004 update. Available
from:www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/2004_report_update/en/index.html,
last visited January 2, 2011.

7

Secondly, on issues of war and military crisis, local actors, including the
executive branch of the government, members of the Congress, interest groups, media,
and often academia, have traditionally dominated the elite discourse.24 Challenges arising
out of the spread of infectious diseases, however, have put focus on actors beyond the
national states. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the World
Health Organization, and the World Bank have become increasingly prominent. These
organizations have drawn attention to the impact of infectious diseases on human rights
and economic development of countries and have urged collaboration and pooling of
resources to fight the increased threat of epidemics. Many organizations that transcend
national boundaries, including multinational corporations, pharmaceutical companies,
epistemic communities, and civic society organizations, also have entered the debate on
global and national health policies.25 Multinational corporations are worried about the
implications of infectious diseases on the growth of the economy, tourism, trade, and
travel. Pharmaceutical companies are concerned that issues relating to health and
medicine are influencing policies on trade, particularly trade negotiations with other
countries and with multilateral organizations.26 Health challenges have given rise to a
new set of actors as well. For example, transnational groups and civic society
24

A growing body of research documents how public support for military intervention
increases if the public feels that the action had the approval of international organizations.
See Joseph M. Grieco, Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, Peter D. Feaver, “Let’s Get a
Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War,”
International Studies Quarterly 55, 2 (2011): 563–83.
25

Rene. Loewenson, Civil Society Influence on Global Health Policy (Training and
Research Support Center ,Zimbabwe: World Health Organization: 2003) available at
http://www.tarsc.org/WHOCSI/pdf/WHOTARSC4.pdf, last accessed 08/06/2011

26

Ibid.

8

organizations (e.g., Health Action International) have also enriched and participated in
the debate on global and national health policies.27 Transnational civic groups’ at the
global level have given consideration to field of pharmaceuticals and equal access to
treatment. To influence public opinion and enlist support for their proposed policies,
these organizations emphasize different dimensions of infectious diseases (e.g., human
rights and economic and biomedical issues) and frame issues in ways that strategically
emphasizes their political positions.28 On this issue, therefore, the public is exposed to
frames espoused by domestic, transnational, and international organizations.
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to enhance our understanding of
“framing effects,” meaning changes in decisions or judgments resulting from different
ways of presenting an issue, by exploring the ways in which public opinion responds to
shifts in media framing. This study further explores the linkages between public opinion
and domestic and foreign policy and assesses whether the public is able to make
reasonable evaluations of the frames and the policy issues emphasized in the frames. This
research is rooted in the broad literature proposing that the public responds in systematic
and prudent ways to information presented on domestic and foreign policy issues.29

27

Gill Walt, Louisiana Lush, and Jessica Ogden, “International Organizations in Transfer
of Infectious Diseases: Iterative Loops of Adoption, Adaptation, and Marketing,”
Governance 17, 2 (2004): 189 –210.
28

Matthew C. Nisbet and Bruce V. Lewenstein, “Biotechnology and the American
Media: the Policy Process and the Elite Press 1970-99,” Science Communication 23, 4
(2002): 162.
29

Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion
on the Use of Military Force,” International studies Quarterly 36, 1 (1992): 49–74.

9

To examine the impact of issue framing on public attitudes towards infectious
diseases, I studied three infectious diseases: Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV),
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and the avian flu and four ways of framing
them: biomedical, economic, security, and human rights problems. On June 5, 1981, the
United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued the first warning of
HIV/AIDS in United States. SARS was first identified in Guangdong Province in
Southern China in November 2002. Since then, it has spread to many countries in
Southeast Asia and to Canada. In the United States, fewer cases of SARS have been
reported. While the global spread of SARS was contained within 3 months, it had
tremendous economic and political fallout and generated many debates about human
rights issues. The avian flu refers to a highly contagious influenza A virus usually found
in birds. Since 1997, confirmed cases of infection in humans have been reported in many
countries outside the United States. In the United States, only poultry has been affected to
date, and no cases of infection among humans have been reported.30 Scientists and public
health officials in the United States, however, fear that if the virus mutates to allow for
transmission among humans, it could have devastating results.31Avian flu has affected the
poultry industry in the United States. For example, in 2005, because of a Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (the “molecular” nonlethal HPAI) outbreak on a single
United States farm in the summer of 2004, more than fifty countries imposed a ban on
30

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Key Facts about Avian Influenza
(Bird Flu) and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/facts.htm, last accessed February 12, 2011.
31

Julian Palmore, “A Clear and Present Danger to International Security: Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza,” Defense and Security Analysis 22, 2 (2006): 111–21.
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United States poultry that resulted in a 3% decrease in total United States poultry exports
for that year.32 This clearly scared the 2.5 billion dollar poultry industry in the United
States.
These three diseases were chosen as case studies for two primary reasons: They
have greatly affected the United States, and they have their origins outside the United
States. These infectious diseases have spread from countries in Africa and China to the
United States and have raised serious biomedical, human rights, economic, and security
concerns in the United States. Public health officials, international organizations,
government agencies, and many non-governmental groups have drawn attention to the
impact of infectious diseases on human rights and the economic development of countries,
and they have urged global collaboration and pooling of resources to fight the increased
threat of epidemics.
Although similar frames are present for all three diseases, the patterns of framing
effects are different, and some frames are more influential than the others. For example,
the security frame greatly influenced public concern about HIV/AIDS but not SARS and
avian flu. The three diseases differ in terms of their origins, patterns of transmission,
consequences for human health, and potential to inflict damage. These factors could also
influence the response of the public to different conceptualizations of the infectious
diseases studied.

32

Council for Agricultural science and Technology (CAST) .2006. Avian Influenza:
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The secondary purpose of this dissertation is to use frames as conceptual
instruments to analyze important changes in public health policy towards infectious
diseases in United States in the post-Cold War era. Infectious diseases and epidemics are
not new, but their “incidence in humans has increased within the past two decades or
threatens to increase in the near future." 33 Infectious diseases are specified as “those
caused by pathogenic microorganisms, such as bacteria, viruses, parasites or fungi; the
diseases can be spread, directly or indirectly, from one person to another.” 34 Newly
emerging infectious diseases are those “infections that have newly appeared in a
population.” In addition to SARS and HIV/AIDS, which are new infectious diseases,
other examples of emerging diseases in different parts of the world include Rift Valley
fever, which is found in Africa and was identified in Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 2000;
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, which was first recognized in an outbreak in the
southwestern United States in 1993; and hemolytic uremic syndrome, a food- or
waterborne infection caused by certain strains of the common bacterium Escherichia coli,
which were identified for the first time in 1982 in the United States. Influenza also
remains a persistent concern, with worldwide epidemics (pandemics) of novel influenza
varieties occurring, on average, several times in a century.35 Avian influenza of subtype
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Addressing Emerging Infectious Disease
Threats: A Prevention Strategy for the United States. (Atlanta: U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Public Health Service, 1994).
34

World Health Organization, Health Topics: Infectious Diseases, available at
http://www.who.int/topics/infectious_diseases/en/, last accessed January 21, 2011.
35
Stephen S. Morse, “SARS and the Global Risk of Emerging Infectious Diseases,”
(Zurich, Switzerland: International Relations and Security Network (ISN), 2006),
available at Columbia International Affairs Online: Case Studies.
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H5N1 (the so-called bird flu) was discovered after an outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997,
with 18 human cases and 4 deaths reported.36 Since then, H5N1 has continued to evolve
in Asia. Infection has spread from infected poultry to humans in several countries,
including Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and China. Reemerging diseases are
those “that have been around for decades but have now occurred in a different form or in
a new geographic location.”37 Some examples of infectious diseases that have reemerged
are monkey pox in the United States in 2003, West Nile virus in the United States in 1999,
and yellow fever in Cote d’Ivoire and Togo in 2008.38
Study of the United States’ response to plagues and infectious diseases show they
have not always been high on the government’s national security and foreign policy
agenda.39 The end of the twentieth century was a period of optimism and complacency, as
infectious diseases were thought to be successfully eradicated due to vaccinations,
antibiotics, antiviral drugs, and great advances in medical science.40 For example, the
World Health Organization officially certified in 1980 that small pox was eradicated from
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WHO News: Avian Influenza Virus Reappears in Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/bulletin/2003/Vol81-No3/bulletin_2003_81
(3) _232.pdf, last accessed January 21, 2011. Also see Laurie Garrett, “The Next
Pandemic?” Foreign Affairs 84, 4 (2005): 3–23.
37
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the world.41 In 1967, the United States Surgeon General, William H. Steward, proclaimed
that “the war against infectious diseases had been won.” 42 Laurie Garrett and several
other researchers, however, pointed out that the belief that infectious diseases had been
eradicated rested on two false assumptions.43 One was that microbes could not evolve
into new drug-resistant strains or develop new hosts, and the other was that infectious
diseases could be contained at state borders.44 What followed was exactly what some
public health specialists, like Richard Krause, had feared. 45 Not only was microbial
evolution taking place, thereby necessitating the need for new drugs and vaccines to
control the infectious diseases, but increased global interconnectedness through
transportation, trade, and tourism enabled infectious diseases to be spread over great
distances.46 More and more people crossing national borders everyday and unprecedented
levels of air travel made it very difficult to geographically isolate and contain diseases in
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their countries of origins. 47 Screening at airports was a fruitless exercise, as the
incubation period of many infectious diseases is more than 2 weeks and thus an infected
person might not display any symptoms of the diseases. The result was a resurgence of
highly lethal infectious diseases that had developed high resistance to antimicrobials and
insecticides.48 The emergence of Ebola in 1989 in Virginia in the United States therefore
evoked great concern among public health specialists. Until 1989, Ebola had been found
only in jungles of Africa. The New York Times ran the following editorial portraying the
virus as a big threat to the United States:
For much of this century the United States has served as "the world's
policeman" in armed crises. Now, with the Cold War over, it may be time
to put on the hat of "world's doctor," alone or in concert with others. As
the danger of nuclear war recedes, we may have less to fear from rogue
nations than from rogue viruses.49
Further, prominent publications such as “The Coming Plague,” by Laurie Garrett, led to
great awareness by politicians and the general public of the potential dangers incurred by
new and emerging diseases. The rapid spread of HIV/AIDS coupled with co-infection
with tuberculosis, the emergence of SARS, and the threat of an influenza pandemic in the
future have forced foreign policy makers to deal with health issues and engage in
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“microbialpolitik” (i.e., political strategies amongst states as they deal with pathogenic
microbes).50
Slowly, a coalition of domestic actors that included political leaders, human rights
activists, security agencies, public health experts, and think tanks began expressing
serious concern about economic and security implications of emerging and reemerging
diseases. These groups were also responding to the changing international environment
and interacting with transnational forces and international organizations in an effort to
capture public attention on issues closely related to infectious diseases.51 Strategic actors
had realized that they needed to frame issues in ways that would engage the American
public and persuade policy makers to support their arguments. The next chapter presents
the evolution of this debate in the context of three infectious diseases.
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II. FRAMES IN THE INFECTIOUS DISEASE DEBATE
This chapter traces the historical development of the prominence of the issue of
infectious diseases and the key stages of policy development relevant to infectious
diseases. The development of governmental policies and international laws and
regulations concerning infectious diseases has not been a simple, straightforward,
uncomplicated process. It has involved the collaborative action, and competition of
multiple agencies and institutions as well as among policy makers, and scientists.1
`These organizations have defined the issue of infectious diseases in persuasive
ways by emphasizing and focusing on different dimensions such as security, economic,
human rights, and biomedical. The objectives of the different actors were similar: They
aimed to create awareness of infectious diseases, mobilize public opinion and
government resources to support funding for prevention and treatment of these diseases.
Different actors, however, framed the issues in different ways to highlight different
aspects and dimensions of the diseases. For example, public health professionals and
researchers devoted themselves to studying the causes, transmission patterns,
epidemiology, and treatment of these infectious diseases, whereas the United States
government and international organizations increasingly began to focus on the security,
human rights, and economic implications of the diseases. In general, therefore, the three
infectious diseases on which the dissertation focuses (HIV/AIDS, Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and the avian flu) have been commonly framed as

Matthew C. Nisbet and Bruce V. Lewenstein, “Biotechnology and the American Media:
The Policy Process and the Elite Press, 1970–1980,” Science Communication 23, 4
(2002): 359–91.
1

17

biomedical, security, economic, and human rights concerns. These diseases have been the
subject of much biomedical research, because of their contagiousness and lethality.
While scholars and policy makers have increasingly drawn linkages between
infectious diseases and economic, security and human rights concerns, the biomedical
frame has been dominant and constant. The continued evolution of many infectious
diseases that can spread easily all around the globe has intensified advanced research on
microbial

genomes,

epidemiology,

transmission,

microbial

pathogens,

human

susceptibility to disease, and research on development of vaccines, medical supplies, and
diagnostics.2 All of this has had implications for the diversion of resources to medical
infrastructure, and also for the increased importance of medical professionals and experts
in the formulation of economic and security policies.3 Needless to say, a great deal of the
public discussion of these diseases naturally revolves around their epidemiology and
other biological aspects. This emphasis is relatively invariant. The emphasis placed on
other frames, however, varies over time. This chapter presents an historical overview of
that variation. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the security, economic, and
human rights frames.

Anthony S. Fauci, “Infectious Diseases: Considerations for the 21st Century,” Clinical
Infectious Diseases, 32(2001): 675-81.
2

Stefen Elbe, “Pandemics on the Radar Screen: Health Security, Infectious Disease and
the Medicalisation of Insecurity,” Political Studies 59, 4 (2011): 848-66.
3

18

2.1. HIV/AIDS as a Security Threat

Human Immune deficiency Virus (HIV) damages a person’s body by destroying
specific blood cells (CD4+ T cells) that are crucial to helping the body fight diseases.4
This causes a life-threatening condition called Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS). Since the 1980s, HIV/AIDS has become a worldwide epidemic and one of the
most studied diseases in history. Research continues on many biomedical aspects of the
disease as well as its origins.5
Since the beginning of the 1990s, scholars of international relations, foreign
policy, and security have framed HIV/AIDS as a threat to human security, state security,
and even international security because it threatened individuals and had the potential to
destabilize states in the post-Cold War era.6 Scholars of security issues and international
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Basic Information about HIV/AIDS is available online from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention: Department of Health and Human Services at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/basic/index.htm, last accessed February 2, 2010.
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western rain forests in Africa and that it crossed over into the human population as early
as the 1940s. It moved slowly from West Central Africa’s isolated land to its current
status as a global pandemic.
6

Some important works by academics include: Andrew T. Price Smith, “Ghosts of
Kigali: Infectious Diseases and Global Stability at the End of the Century,” International
Journal 54, 3 (1999): 426-42; Andrew T. Price Smith, The Health of Nations: Infectious
Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and
Development (Cambridge: MIT press, 2002), 117–41; Chris Bayer, “Accelerating and
Disseminating across Asia,” The Washington Quarterly Winter (2001): 211–25; Susan
Peterson, “Epidemic Disease and National Security,” Security Studies 12, 2 (2002/3): 43–
81; Jack Chow, “Health and International Security,” The Washington Quarterly (1996):
62–77; P. W. Singer, “AIDS and International Security,” Survival 44, 1 (2002): 145–58;
Stephen Elbe, “Changing Landscape of War in Africa,” International Security 27 (2002):
167–71; Stephen Elbe, “AIDS, Security, Biopolitics,” International Relations 19, 4
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relations who framed HIV/AIDS as threats to individual, state, and international security
did so as circumstances changed in the post-Cold War (i.e., domestic and non-military
threats had increased as external military threats had decreased in importance). This new
way of framing HIV/AIDS triggered a debate in the field of security studies, as some
scholars disagreed with widening the concept of security to include issues such as the
environment and infectious diseases.7
Scholars who argued that infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS were a human
security threat viewed HIV as a threat to the lives of individuals, their quality of living,
and their capacity to participate in economic activities.8 The term “human security” was
first used officially in the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations

(2000): 403–19; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Contagious Fears: Infectious Disease and National
Security,” Harvard International Review 23, 2 (2001): 82; David P. Fidler, “The Return
of Microbial Politick,” Foreign Policy (2001): 1–53; Stephen Morrison, “The African
Pandemic Hits Washington,” The Washington Quarterly 24, 1 (2001): 197–209; Dennis
Pirages, “MicroSecurity: Disease Organisms and Human well Being,” Washington
Quarterly 18, 5 (1995): 9–14; Dennis Pirages, “Ecological Theory and International
Relations,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5, 1 (1997): 53–64; Dennis Altman,
“Understanding HIV/AIDS as a Global Security Issue,” in Health Impacts of
Globalization: Towards Global Governance, ed. K. Lee et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2003), 33–46; Gwyn Prins, “AIDS and Global Security,” International Affairs 80, 5
(2004): 931–52; Robert. L. Ostergard, Jr., “Politics in the Hot Zone: AIDS and National
Security in Africa,” Third World Quarterly 23, 2 (2002): 333–50; David L. Heymann,
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Journal of Human Development 4, 2 (2003): 191–204; Lincoln Chen and Vasant
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(2003): 181–90.
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20

Development Program (UNDP).9 The concept of human security challenged the statecentric notion of security and made a case for individuals as objects of security and
members of a transcendent human community with common global concerns.10
Political scientists who have drawn links between infectious diseases and threats
to national and international security include Andrew Price Smith, Susan Peterson,
Robert Ostergard, Gwyn Prins, Stephen Elbe, Dennis Altman, Peter Singer, Peter Chalk,
and David Fidler. These scholars have analyzed infectious diseases (mainly HIV/AIDS)
as threats to a state’s capacity to govern in many distinct ways. They have been mainly
concerned about the high rate of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa. High rates of
infection in armies, state peacekeeping forces, and civilian personnel threatened domestic
stability of these states and undermined both defense and civilian worker productivity, as
it reduced life expectancy and killed skilled personnel in their most productive years.11
High rates of infection affected the public health infrastructure of fragile economies and
9

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Available online at
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most proponents of human security defined human security as any threat to individuals,
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led to increased health care costs, medical expenses, and funeral costs for individuals and
to reduced foreign investment and increased debt in affected countries such as Somalia,
Botswana, Nigeria, Lesotho, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and many other countries in subSaharan Africa. All of these factors posed serious risk to these states.12 As many states
failed, the international security of states became threatened. Scholars of security studies
feared it could lead to coups, ethnic struggles, struggles over resources, and increased
flows of refugees into other countries. Another factor of concern in many African
countries was that death of both parents left AIDS orphans or new “pools of combatants”
that were easily susceptible to crime and violent activities.13 In many countries of the
African subcontinent, AIDS was used as a weapon of war, with the disease being
deliberately transferred during rape.14 These scholars did not, however, see the spread of
HIV/AIDS in Africa as a direct security threat to the United States.
Conceptualization of HIV/AIDS as a threat to the United States came from
governmental agencies in the United States that were studying the implications of the
spread of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa on the national security of the United States.
Policy makers began to recognize the nexus between HIV/AIDS and national security in
the United States. As Tim Werth put it:
HIV/AIDS has potentially devastating impacts on whole sectors of
societies. In the most vulnerable nations, these trends could have
devastating consequences for sustainable development and contribute to
12

Radhika Sarin, “A New Security threat: HIV/AIDS in the Military,” World Watch 16,
2 (2003): 17–22.
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conflict and instability. We must understand the pandemic for its ability
to affect the social, economic, and political fabric of many nations and
thus, its implications for U.S. foreign policy, American leadership, and
global cooperation.15
For most policy makers, linking disease with security has been a “means of highlighting a
particular problem, capturing scarce resources, and stepping up national, international
and transnational response.”16 For example, Peter Pilot, executive director of the Joint
United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), explained public health advocates’
tendency to invoke security this way:
Whether we conceptualize AIDS as a health issue only or as a
development and human security issue is not just an academic exercise. It
decides how we respond to the epidemic, how much is allocated to
combating it, and what sectors of government are involved in this
response.17
In the early 1990s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) commissioned a study
that projected 45 million deaths due to HIV/AIDS by 2000. 18 Many reports were
published after the 1990 CIA memorandum that recognized the potential implications of
15

Tim Werth, foreword to Global HIV/AIDS: A Strategy for U.S. Leadership: A
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http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/aids/docs/statedept.pdf, last accessed February
2, 2009.
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the global spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases on the security of the United
States. Such reports included those by the Institute of Medicine, the World Bank, the
Center for Strategic and Security Studies, the National Science and Technology Council,
the Committee on Engineering, Science, and Technology, and the Global Emerging
Infectious Surveillance and Response System, which was set up by the Ministry of
Defense.19
In 2000, the National Intelligence Estimate on “The Global Infectious Disease
Threat and its Implications for the United States” was published.20 It was the first time
that a security agency (the National Intelligence Council (NIC)) had intervened in a
health question. The report was viewed by the United States government as an important
action on the part of the intelligence community, as it considered for the first time the
national security dimensions of a non-traditional threat. It reviewed the most lethal
diseases globally and by region, developed alternative scenarios about their future course,
examined national and international capabilities to deal with them, and assessed their
global social, economic, political, and security impacts. It then scrutinized the threat of

19

Joshua Lederberg, Robert E. Shope, and Stanley L., Jr. Oaks, eds., Emerging
Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the United States (Washington D.C.: Institute
of Medicine/National Academy Press, 1992), 220–94. See also Report of the U.S.
National Science and Technology Council Committee on International Science,
Engineering and Technology Working Group on Emerging and Reemerging Infectious
Diseases–A Global Threat (Washington D.C.: National Science and Technology Council,
1995).
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National Intelligence Council, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its
Implications for the United States (Washington, D.C.: NIE-99-17D, 2000). Available
online at
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/infectiousdisease/infectiousdiseases.pdf,
last accessed January 21, 2011.
24

infectious diseases from international sources to the United States. According to the
report, new and emerging infectious diseases would pose a rising global threat and
complicate United States and global security over the next 20 years, endanger United
States citizens at home and abroad, threaten United States armed forces deployed
overseas, and exacerbate social and political instability in key countries and regions in
which the United States had significant interests. The report also warned that restrictive
immigration controls and disputes over intellectual property rights for drugs could lead to
friction between the United States and its key trading partners. In 2002, another report by
the NIC projected that the alarming spread of HIV in countries of strategic interest to the
United States (i.e., Russia, India, and China) could have economic, social, political, and
military implications for the United States.21 In addition to the security agencies, several
think tanks and research organizations published reports focusing on the increased threat
from biological weapons and infectious diseases.22
HIV/AIDS also received the attention of the UN Security Council. In his speech
to the Security Council in 2000, then vice president Al Gore called for a “more expansive
21
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definition of security” that includes emerging and reemerging infectious diseases such as
AIDS.23 The UN Security Council met on January 2000 to discuss the impact of AIDS on
peace and security in Africa. On July 17, 2000 the UN Security Council passed resolution
1308 regarding “the potentially damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of
international peacekeeping personnel, including support personnel.”24 By its resolution
26-S/2 (annex), the General Assembly, at its twenty-sixth special session held in New
York from 25 to 27 June, 2001, adopted a resolution declaring HIV/AIDS to be an issue
that “constitutes a global emergency and one of the most formidable challenges to human
life and dignity, as well as to the effective enjoyment of human rights.”25
Concern about economic and security implications of emerging and reemerging
diseases was only one aspect of the increasing threat presented by microbes. Concern
about the threat of bioterrorism also was increasing. During the Cold War, the control of
biological weapons was strictly an arms control issue. In the 1990s, perturbed about the
magnitude of the former Soviet Union’s biological weapons program and concerns about
a similar capacity in Iraq raised more general security concerns about biological
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warfare.26 In 1975, despite the commencement of the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons,
there were no mechanisms for verifying the Convention’s prohibition on the production,
development, and stockpiling of biological weapons.27 In response to negotiations for an
additional protocol, the United States Congress passed the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Act of 1991, which had provisions for economic sanctions and economic
controls to curb the spread of biological weapons.28 There was no domestic law, however,
to control the spread of biological toxins by domestic groups within the state. The
Biological Weapons Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act followed in 1989 and 1996,

26

Robert P. Kadlec, Allan P. Zelicoff, and Ann M. Vrtis, “Biological Weapons Control:
Prospects and Implications for the Future,” Journal of the American Medical Association
278, 5 (1997): 351–56.
27

Until recently, United States policy focused almost entirely on preventing the
acquisition and use of biological weapons by other nations. To this objective, the United
States government focused on three major strategies. First, the United States entered into
a series of treaties and other international agreements designed to achieve biological
disarmament and to stop the proliferation of biological arms to countries that did not yet
have them. Second, the United States imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on
governments that continued their efforts to develop a biological arsenal. Third, the United
States designed an elaborate system of export controls to prevent the transfer to other
countries of United States goods and technologies that could be used in the development
of biological weapons. These strategies originated when the United States, with seventy
other nations, entered into the Biological Weapons Convention of 1992. Also see David
P. Fidler, “Bioterrorism, Public Health and International Law,” Chicago Journal of
International Law 3, 1 (2002): 7–26.
28

James R. Ferguson, “Biological Weapons and U.S. Law,” Journal of the American
Medical Association 278, 5 (1997): 357–59.

27

respectively.29 Revisions were also made to the Biological Weapons Act to include action
against any domestic group who “threatens” or “attempts” to use biological weapons.30
The terrorist acts of Aum Shinrikyo in Japan in the mid-1990s raised awareness of
the threat posed by biological weapons. In this case a non-state actor had committed a
major act of violence by releasing a chemical agent (Sarin) in Tokyo subway. Unlike the
threats of biological and chemical weapons from states such as the former Soviet Union
and Iraq, this event raised the possibility of threats from non-state actors and terrorists
and their use of chemicals and biological agents as weapons of mass destruction. 31
Biological agents and weapons could now be used not just as an arsenal of war but also to
spread terror.32 The anthrax attacks that occurred in 2001 in the United States further
demonstrated the potential for bioterrorism to inflict damage in a country.33 All previous
attempts by the United States to control the spread of biological and chemical weapons
concentrated on preventing acquisition of biological and chemical weapons by states. The
29
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public health and safety. It remained for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
to translate this broad statutory command into specific rules and regulations.
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anthrax attacks delineated the importance of more caution on the part of domestic law
enforcement agencies. It was agreed that that the first line of defense would be a
strengthened public health system. 34 This required strengthening laboratory capacities,
expanding the number of trained medical practitioners and epidemiologists, and
improving planning and coordination among law enforcement, the public, and medical
professionals. 35 Control of bioterrorism thus became a part of the national security,
homeland security, and foreign policy of the United States.
The National Security Strategy of the United States, announced in September
2002, and the National Strategy for Homeland Security released in July 2002 emphasized
the importance of strengthening the public health system against any future biological or
chemical attacks. 36 The United States Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002
acknowledged the universal nature of the infectious disease threat and admitted that
“domestic surveillance and monitoring, while absolutely essential, are not sufficient to
combat bioterrorism or ensure adequate domestic preparedness.”
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administration launched the National Biosurveillance Initiative in 2004 and the National
Biosurveillance Integration System in 2005 to strengthen the United States’ capacities for
surveillance and early warning of bioterrorist attacks and detection of outbreaks of
infectious diseases. 38 Three other programs that were created to this end were the
BioShield, BioSense, and BioWatch programs. 39 These programs established that
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surveillance and intervention were the two mainstays of the United States government’s
strategy to protect its country and people from the threat of bioterrorism and naturally
occurring infectious diseases that have the potential to threaten or disrupt the social,
economic, and political fabric of societies. David Fidler aptly named this strategy
“BioSecurity.”40

2.2. HIV/AIDS and the Economic Frame

As HIV/AIDS spread to countries around the world, policy makers and
international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN
realized its devastating economic implications. They focused on the economic factors that
contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS, the economic devastation caused by HIV/AIDS
in sub-Saharan Africa and in many other parts of the world, and the economic burden on
national governments that treatment and management of the disease entails. Framing of
HIV/AIDS as an economic issue helped highlight the need for more resources to fight the
disease. As James Wolfensohn said in his address to the UN General Assembly Special
Session regarding HIV/AIDS in 2001:
HIV/AIDS is no longer just a health problem, but a global development
problem, threatening to reverse many of the gains made over the last half
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century. Every war needs a war chest, but that provided by the
international community is woefully empty.41
Factors such as poverty, illiteracy, and migration, lack of preventive programs, an unsafe
blood supply, prostitution of women in poor countries, and the high cost of treatment
drugs were recognized as contributing to the spread of AIDS in poor countries of the
world.42 The economic devastation caused by HIV/AIDS has been well documented in
many studies over the past 20 years.43
The WHO established the Global Program on AIDS in 1986 and UNAIDS was
formed in 1996: These were the first multilateral responses to the epidemic. Together
with other organizations, UNAIDS developed strategies to finance and provide
technology to programs aimed at prevention and treatment of AIDS. 44 Several other
initiatives, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and the
United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, as well as philanthropic
foundations, especially the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, are important actors
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devoting resources to dealing with the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The United States was
gravely concerned with the economic consequences of the growing problem of
HIV/AIDS at home and in other parts of the world, and this was influential in the
conceptualization of HIV/AIDS as a security threat by the United States government.
One of the earliest reports that emphasized economic implications of spread of
HIV/AIDS to United States was a publication in 1997 by the Institute of Medicine titled,
America’s Vital Interest in Global Health.45 Both the Clinton and Bush administration
recognized the growing costs of HIV/AIDS to United States government and in countries
outside.46 The Bush administration launched United States President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and assistance to countries in Caribbean and Africa
acknowledging that HIV/AIDS was an economic threat. 47 Much of the aid through
PEPFAR was dispersed as bilateral aid efforts and this was seen as an exercise in power
by many critics, as they argued for extending aid through multilateral institutions.48
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2.3. HIV/AIDS and Human Rights

International organizations and human rights activists groups have been
particularly energetic in framing HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue in order to draw the
attention of the world community to the plight of people infected with HIV/AIDS. The
major human right concerns affecting those with HIV/AIDS are discrimination and lack
of universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care, and support.
The linkage between health and human rights is old. A huge step towards
incorporating human rights into international law was taken when the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was signed by 48 UN member states in 1948.49 Article 25
is of special importance to health care professionals. It states, in part:
Everyone has the right to standard of living adequate for the health and
well being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, and housing
and medical care and necessary social services.50
The United Nations adopted the Universal Declarations of Human Rights as a statement
of aspirations. The legal obligations of governments were to derive from formal treaties
that member states would eventually sign and incorporate into domestic law. 51 The
49
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nations. Of special importance is General comment No.14 (ICESCR): The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health, which stated that “health is a fundamental human
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two subsequent treaties (the International
Covenant on Civil and Political rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights) form a global human rights framework for action and have a
special relevance for global health.
The human rights concern in the early stage of the campaign for rights of people
living with HIV/AIDS in the 1980s in the United States was linked to the rights of
homosexuals, including protection of the civil and political rights of gays and lesbians
and the fight against stigma and public discrimination in the work place. This campaign
took place mainly in the developed world. Several human rights activists raised the issues
of discrimination, imprisonment, segregation, and isolation of homosexuals, prisoners,
migrants, sex workers, women, and children infected with AIDS. 52 HIV can be
transmitted when specific body fluids of an infected person come into direct contact with
mucous membranes, damaged tissue, or the blood stream (through the exchange of
needles, tattooing, and blood transfusion).53 Because of its association with behavior that
may be considered socially unacceptable, HIV/AIDS is a stigmatized disease that results
in discrimination against the HIV-positive population.
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In 1987, the WHO’s first global response to AIDS called for compassion and
respect for the rights for people living with HIV/AIDS. It placed responsibility on the
governments to protect the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS.54 The WHO’s framing
of AIDS in terms of human rights allowed HIV/AIDS policies to become anchored in
international law, thereby helping to make governments and intergovernmental
organizations publicly accountable for their actions in the context of HIV/AIDS.55
To further assist governments, international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and civil society groups in creating a positive, rights-based approach to
tackling AIDS, the UN Center for Human Rights and the WHO laid out guidelines on
HIV/AIDS and human rights beginning in 1989 and further revised them in 1996 and
2002.56 The Commission on Human Rights has asked states to take all necessary steps to
ensure the respect, protection, and fulfillment of HIV-related human rights as contained
in the guidelines and has urged states to ensure that their laws, policies, and practices
comply with the guidelines.
Slowly, human rights concerns became linked to the issue of free and nondiscriminatory access to medicines and treatment. These concerns have intensified
because of deep poverty and widening inequalities within and across countries. The UN
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Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS made a key Declaration of Commitment on
HIV/AIDS in 2001 that contains an entire section devoted to human rights.57 The World
Summit Outcome in June 2005 and the UNAIDS High-level Meeting on AIDS in 2006
and in June 2011 further resolved to provide universal access to antiretroviral drugs to
treat HIV and to intensify efforts to eliminate AIDS.
As national governments and intergovernmental organizations grapple with these
issues, a new set of transnational actors have begun to play an important role in solving
these global health problems.58 They extend widely from more formal organizations (e.g.,
multinational organizations and international non-governmental or civic society
organizations) to loosely formed networks.59 They try to influence national governments
and international organizations such as the UN.
Transnational actors in the field of global health have been particularly effective
in mobilizing resources and the attention of policy makers by framing issues of access
57
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and treatment as human rights issues. In the early stages of their campaign, human rights
activists protested against practices such as compulsory testing and quarantine advocated
by public health officials in the developed world.60 Unlike victims of other infectious
diseases, AIDS patients were considered by some to have brought this disease upon
themselves by engaging in sexual behavior that was socially unacceptable and/or by
injecting illegal drugs. Human rights activists protested the resulting lack of political will
and the apathy of government officials towards the disease, and they pressed officials to
incorporate rights for HIV patients into their domestic legislation.61 Beginning in 1987,
human rights advocates such as Jonathan Mann framed this fight for civil, political, and
social rights as a human rights issue for people living with HIV. He and his group, the
Global AIDS Policy Coalition, focused on the marginalization, stigmatization, and
discrimination that people with HIV/AIDS, mainly homosexuals, were subject to in
relation to housing, access to education, health care, international travel, and access to
treatment.62 Mann and his group further framed the denial of these rights to HIV patients
as an impediment to the realization of HIV prevention strategies. 63 Thus, the human
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rights activists drew a strong linkage between the protection of human health against
infectious diseases and the promotion of human rights.
As years passed, however, many AIDS activists alleged that addressing issues of
stigma and discrimination was not enough.64 The changing demographics and geographic
pattern of AIDS, both within the United States and around the world, has redefined the
nature of the rights demanded by human rights activists for HIV patients. As HIV spread
in many poor and developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, it became
evident that it was not just the risky behavior of individuals that was causing AIDS. In
fact, the most defenseless sections of society—poor women without access to education,
employment, health care, and the legal system—were the ones more likely to be infected
by AIDS.65 As one of the foremost AIDS activists, Paul Farmer, wrote, “regardless of the
message of public health slogans that AIDS is for everyone–some are at higher risk for
HIV infection.”66 Even in the United States, the demographic profile of people infected
with AIDS was changing: It was no longer affecting mainly white homosexual males but
also prisoners, injection drug users, African American and Latino women, people living
in inner cities, and poorer neighborhoods in America.67
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The advent of more effective antiviral medication accentuated those inequalities
further, particularly in poorer nations of the world, which were hit hard by the
epidemic.68 As HIV/AIDS spread to some of the poorest countries in the world, issues of
treatment and access to medicines arose. Effective treatment of HIV/AIDS required
development of new drugs and vaccines as well as widespread access to them. However,
there was a conflict between these two objectives. 69 The development of new drugs
required enormous investment of both time and money into research by pharmaceutical
companies, and the products were hence patented by the companies to recover their high
development costs. These drugs were often unaffordable in poor countries, and this issue
brought health advocacy groups and many non-state actors campaigning for universal
access to treatment and drugs into direct conflict with the pharmaceutical industry.
Transnational groups have taken up the issue of providing access to antiretroviral
(ARV) therapy drugs for the poor at affordable prices.70 These groups include doctors,
scientists, public health experts, and professional lawyers who provide the much-needed
technical expertise in intellectual property related issues. They contribute to the ongoing
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debate and also present their views at various AIDS conferences around the world. Many
AIDS activists, “ including Jonathan Mann (WHO), Peter Pilot (UNAIDS), Jeffery
Sachs, Paul Farmer (physician and founder of Partners in Health), Tony Barnett, Laurie
Garrett (Newsday), Barton Gellman (The Washington Post), Bono (Debt, AIDS, Trade,
Africa), Alan Berkman (New York physician and social activist), Jamie Love (The
Consumer Project on Technology), and John James (AIDS Treatment News),” expressed
the view that ARV treatment should be extended globally, and they helped create a
network of individuals committed to the cause.71
They also linked up with many advocacy networks.72 Advocacy networks have
played a very important role in the global campaign for treatment access by framing
rights to treatment as an ethical, moral, and human rights issue and by linking up with
international organizations and other actors in states or civil society to provide important
solutions to policy issues.73 Until 1996, the movement for greater access to medication
was confined to Western countries. When the triple drug combination ARV therapy was
introduced in 1996, it was reserved mainly for AIDS patients in developed countries.
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Thereafter, many organizations in the United States, such as Health Gap, the Clinton
Foundation, and Health Action International, reached out to organizations in other
countries to fight for ARV medication for people in poor countries.74
Closely connected to this debate was the issue of evolving global intellectual
property rights for pharmaceuticals. 75 According to the Trade Related Intellectual
Property Rights regime (TRIPS), member countries of World Trade Organization (WTO)
were to provide patent protection to countries (including the pharmaceutical sector) for
20 years.76 The advocacy networks fought a long struggle against these provisions in an
effort to promote drug access, which resulted in some concessions at the Fourth
Ministerial Conference of the WTO at Doha in 2001. The Doha Declaration held that
“the TRIPS agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to
protect public health.” 77 This was a major victory, as it later led to the advocacy of
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“universal access to ARV treatment” at a UN General Assembly Special Session in
2006.78

2.4. SARS as a Security Threat

From its appearance in November 2002 to July 3, 2003, when the WHO officially
declared it as contained, SARS took the world by surprise as it spread rapidly to many
countries of the world. The SARS experience illustrated that lack of surveillance facilities
and adequate response capability in a single country could threaten global public health
security.79 The WHO declared SARS to be “the first severe infectious disease to emerge
in the twenty-first century, that poses a serious threat to global health security,” in so far
it “threatened the livelihood of populations, the functioning of health systems, and the
stability and growth of economies.”80
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The WHO henceforth played an important role in controlling the spread of the
disease by issuing unprecedented travel advisories to specific regions most impacted by
SARS, by gathering a team of scientists, epidemiologists, and public health experts to
immediately act on this emergency situation, and by working in close collaboration with
health agencies in countries affected by SARS.81 Framing SARS as a threat to global
security also brought attention to the limitations that the WHO faces when trying to
control the global spread of disease. Although the need for provisions to better deal with
the spread of infectious diseases across borders already was being felt throughout the
1990s, the arrival of SARS accelerated the process.82 The only set of international rules
binding WHO members in terms of infectious diseases was the International Health
Regulations (IHR), and they were applicable to only three communicable diseases:
cholera, plague, and yellow fever.83 Member states were under no obligation to report the
emergence of new infectious diseases such as SARS and HIV/AIDS to the WHO, nor
could the WHO or the UN intervene in these countries to prevent the movement of
people or goods and avoid cross-border transmission. In 1990, the WHO initiated the
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process of revising these regulations to be able to deal effectively with new emerging
infectious diseases. In 2000, the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
(GOARN) was set up as a technical collaboration of existing institutions and networks
that pool human and technical resources for the rapid identification, confirmation, and
response to outbreaks of international importance.84
Although GOARN played an important role in keeping the international
community informed of disease outbreaks, the fact that it was up to countries to
voluntarily disclose the outbreak of diseases other than the three IHR diseases limited its
functioning. In 2004, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change was
instituted, and it listed infectious diseases as one of the threats facing countries
worldwide. 85 The IHR was revised in 2005 to include threats from chemical and
biological disasters. It also allowed the WHO to obtain information from non-state actors
in countries where infections were occurring so that it could ensure security against the
international spread of disease.86
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2.5. SARS and the Economic Frame

Sever Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was contained within a few months,
but it had significant economic consequences. The costs to the affected countries
included expenditures for medical treatment as well as income lost as a result of sickness
or morbidity.87 The economic consequences were enormous for SARS due to extensive
trade and financial linkages in a globalized world. 88 Tourism, retail trade, the airline
industry, and small businesses closed as precautionary measures, and confidence in
investment, delivery, and export declined in SARS affected countries.89 Foreign direct
investment in China suffered greatly. 90 The Canadian economy suffered due to travel
advisories issued by the WHO alerting the rest of the world and Canadian authorities
about the spread of SARS in Toronto and neighboring areas.91 The WHO estimated the
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cost of SARS to the Asian region at US$ 30 billion, whereas the Asian Development
Bank’s estimate was twice that amount. 92 Many industries in the United States with
business processing units and manufacturing plants in Asia suffered huge losses.93 The
media reported instances of people shunning Chinese and Asian restaurants in the United
States. 94 The economic impact on all countries due to SARS brought multinational
organizations, business interests, and leaders of countries together to invest in global
surveillance and improve the public health infrastructure of all countries of the world.

2.6. SARS and Human Rights

Although SARS was contained within 2 months, many human rights issues were
raised by governments, international organizations, and activists groups. The most
important issue within individual countries and in their international relations was the
balancing of civil and political rights of individuals with the public health of people and
communities. Public health experts and international organizations argued that based on
the experience of HIV/AIDS, anthrax attacks, and SARS and in light of concerns about
the possibility of an avian influenza outbreak in Asia, new international laws were needed
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to regulate the international spread of infectious diseases. The inapplicability of the
existing IHR to deal with new emerging diseases and concerns about biological and
chemical attacks made it necessary for international laws on infectious diseases to be
revised. New rules were needed for international surveillance and global health
security.95
The need to effectively balance public health with civil and political rights of
individuals was given a prominent place in the revised health governance regime (i.e., the
revised IHR).96 The new revised IHR stated:
that all state parties notify the WHO of all activities within their borders
that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern,
must be mindful of human rights, including civil and political rights when
implementing any public health measure that may restrict people's
freedom of movement and security of person.97
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The new IHR also announced that “the implementation of these regulations shall
be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of
persons.” 98 Any public health measure that restricts individual mobility should be
declared in the face of specific public health risks (Articles 23.2, 31.1, 31.2, and 43.1)
and must be applied in a transparent and non-discriminatory way (Article 42).99
Another issue that SARS raised was that of the obligation of nation states to
international health and international security.100 This included the reporting of infectious
diseases within their countries by state governments to the WHO. It was China’s refusal
to share details about the presence of SARS as early as 2002 in Guangdong Province that
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was believed to be responsible for the spread of the disease.101 The IHR provisions had
not been revised by then, and China was not under any obligation to report any infectious
diseases other than cholera, plague, and yellow fever to the WHO.102
During the SARS outbreak, public health measures employed to control its spread
encountered opposition from some civil and political rights groups. The most important
debate centered on the use of isolation and quarantine by governments to control the
spread of the disease. No vaccine against SARS was available and little was known about
the incubation period of the virus or how it was spread. It was known, however, that
SARS was virulent and contagious, and medical experts believed that the most effective
way to limit transmission was to isolate those who had been infected and to quarantine
those who had been exposed. This approach brought into attention the legal status of
quarantine decisions and the different kinds of human rights that could be violated by
quarantine policies.103 Containment measures in Canada, Asia, and to a lesser degree the
United States provoked a long debate on the ethics, legality, and civil and political rights
threatened by these measures.104 In the United States, in response to the SARS outbreak
and based on the recommendation of the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
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President Bush added SARS to the list of reportable diseases on April 4, 2003. Executive
Order 13295 effectively revised the existing list of quarantinable communicable diseases
by adding SARS to cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow
fever, and viral hemorrhagic fevers.105 This order granted legal authority to the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to “isolate, quarantine, or place the person
under surveillance and … order disinfection” based on a reasonable belief that a person
arriving in the United States or traveling in interstate commerce is infected or may have
been exposed to SARS.106 This triggered a debate involving legal experts and activist
organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union. 107 Rights to freedom of
association with family or children and to work and earn an income were all at risk,108
and this could, moreover, lead to mental anguish and stigma.109 Another concern raised
by the prospect of quarantine was that it could be discriminatory, particularly against
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racial minorities, migrant workers, and the poor.110 Activist groups feared that vulnerable
groups were more likely to be quarantined and denied access to medication and
information as a precautionary measure against SARS.111 Additional rights issues were
related to compensation for people who were quarantined.112 In fact, a major hurdle to
convincing people to assenting to quarantine was loss of income during quarantine and
loss of employment after quarantine because of absence or stigma associated with the
disease. 113 Many human rights activists called for adequate laws to compensate the
people concerned, arguing that “quarantines are measures designed to benefit a
community as a whole while imposing costs on particular individuals.”114
People infected with SARS and their relatives faced ostracization and, as a result,
they often delayed seeking care and reporting their illness.115 In the United States, Asian
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American communities were often shunned.116 This was of concern to the public health
officials who recognized it as a major obstacle in controlling transmission of the disease.
The public health officers emphasized the importance of addressing this issue by
preventing fear, stigmatization, and discrimination of certain sections of society through
community outreach programs.117
Another human rights issue that was highlighted by the SARS outbreak was that
of freedom of the press and media coverage of infectious disease. 118 Many scientists
believed that the spread of SARS could have been contained had China reported it to the
rest of the world instead of censoring its press about the outbreak of the disease in
November 2002. Only much later, due to scrutiny by the international press, was China
forced to admit to having cases of SARS within its territory. In its April 2003 issue, the
Economist noted: “When news of the catastrophe broke, it was because scientists in free,
neighboring countries had detected what the Communist authorities knew about, but had
tried to conceal.”119

116

Laura Eichelberger, “SARS and New York’s Chinatown: The Politics of Risk and
Blame during an Epidemic of Fear,” Social Science and Medicine 65, 6 (2007): 1284–95.

117

Bobbie Person, Francisco Sy, Kelly Holton, Barbara Govert, and Arthur Liang,
NCID/SARS Emergency Outreach Team, “Fear and Stigma: The Epidemic within the
SARS Outbreak,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 10, 2 (2004): 358–63. Available online
at www.cdc.gov/eid, last accessed August 3, 2011.
118

Ronald Keith and Zhiqiu Lin, “SARS in Chinese Politics and Law,” China
Information 21, 3 (2007): 403–24.
119

“The SARS Virus: Could it become China’s Chernobyl?” The Economist, April 24,
2003.

53

2.7. Avian Flu as a Security Threat

In 2005, when avian flu was infecting poultry at an alarming rate around the
globe, public health experts and scientists wrote extensively about how it could become a
threat to international and national security.120 The biggest concern was that a human
influenza pandemic could occur. The few human cases reported had been the result of
close contact with infected poultry, and scientists feared that genetic changes would
allow the avian influenza A virus (H5N1) to achieve the potential for efficient and
sustained transmission among humans. A human influenza pandemic could cause illness,
death, and other economic and social costs throughout the world. 121 Scientists and
epidemiologists who gathered at the American Association of the Advancement of
Science meeting in February 2005 emphasized that the potential for the virus to mutate
into a form allowing human-to-human transmittal was high, and a global influenza
pandemic could occur if a new subtype of the H5N1 influenza A virus were introduced
into the human population.122 Policy makers responded to this threat immediately and
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very effectively. President Bush unveiled the pandemic influenza plan to the National
Institutes of Health.123 The four basic strategies of the plan were to: strengthen domestic
surveillance, stockpile antiviral drugs, speed up the development of vaccine technologies,
and develop an emergency pandemic plan in conjunction with public health officials in
all 50 states and local communities. Emergency plans across the nation were also needed
as the nation prepared for other dangers, such as a terrorist attack using chemical or
biological weapons.124 The National Security Strategy of 2006 also outlined threats from
avian flu. It stated:
Globalization has exposed us to new challenges and changed the way old
challenges touch our interests and values, while also greatly enhancing our
capacity to respond. Examples include: public health challenges like
pandemics (HIV/AIDS, avian influenza) that recognize no borders. The
risks to social order are so great that traditional public health approaches
may be inadequate, necessitating new strategies and responses.125
The threat of a worldwide pandemic also became a foreign policy concern for the United
States government.
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2.8. Avian Flu and the Economic Frame

The economic impact of the spread of avian flu was felt mainly by the world’s
multibillion-dollar poultry industry. International organizations such as the UN Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Bank have released country and sector
reports on the losses of poultry trade, travel, and tourism.126 A report in 2007 estimated
that around US $1.02 billion was disbursed and another US $1.68 billion had been
committed, as of June 2007, to preparedness efforts.127 These reports also estimated the
long-term investment costs of containing the spread of bird flu. News reports also
emphasized the actual costs incurred particularly by Asian economies that had been most
affected by the spread of avian flu. These losses were based on estimates of direct
morbidity due to HPAI caused by H5N1 virus, governmental expenditure to control the
spread of avian flu(i.e., measures such as surveillance, vaccination of poultry, and hiring
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workers for culling and clean up), and on reactions of markets, trade, and associated
industries.128

2.9. Avian Flu and Human Rights

The spread of avian flu raised several human rights issues, including quarantine
and isolation, compensation for farmers whose birds were culled in the public interest,
and equitable distribution of vaccines. Because no human-to-human transmission of this
disease has been established, there has not been any need to isolate and quarantine
individual human beings. This has not, however, prevented the emergence of a debate
both in the United States and in the world community.
President Bush’s National Strategy of Pandemic Influenza, which was unveiled in
November 2005, discussed quarantine and isolation as tools to contain the spread of the
human influenza virus in case the United States was threatened by a pandemic.129 This
provoked a debate among human rights activists and legal experts on the likely adverse
impact these measures would have on the rights of individuals. The activists also argued
for legislation on compensation for lost income or jobs by quarantined individuals.130
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They argued that job security and income replacement laws would not only assure
individuals of their rights but also encourage public cooperation and compliance with
quarantine measures. This issue was also discussed by the world community. The revised
IHR (2005) had provisions that would govern intervention strategies such as quarantine,
isolation, border controls, and social distancing within countries if the world were faced
with mutations in H5N1 that could allow human-to-human transmission of avian flu.131
The spread of bird flu has also raised two important human rights issues. First, it
has raised issues of compensation for governmental destruction of private property, as the
destruction of private property (e.g., infected poultry) is performed in the public interest.
Compensation in this case has been defined as “indemnification of private actors for
losses incurred as a result of public action undertaken to promote the public good, such as
in the case of payments to farmers for culled birds.”132 Currently, the most effective way
to contain avian flu is by culling poultry belonging to farmers in regions that are infected.
Not paying adequate compensation not only infringes on the rights of farmers but also
becomes a disincentive for farmers to notify authorities of disease outbreaks. 133 This
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issue has been raised by intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, the
FAO, and the International Food Policy Research Institute, which have laid out
guidelines on best practices for payment of compensation as part of Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza eradication strategies.134 The second human rights issue that has come
up with regard to the spread of bird flu is the equitable distribution of vaccines. In 2006,
the Indonesian government refused to share virus samples with the WHO’s Global
Influenza Surveillance Network unless developing countries, such as themselves, were
assured of adequate vaccine supplies.135 This decision was supported by several other
states in Southeast Asia and caused global concern, as public health officials and
scientific researchers required viral samples to conduct surveillance on changes in
pathogen strains and accordingly develop vaccines to effectively address the threat of
influenza.136 Indonesia’s decision was seen by many developed countries as a threat to
the WHO’s vision of global public health security and the provisions of the revised IHR
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(2005).137 The provisions of the revised IHR required WHO member states to submit to
the WHO “public health information about events that may constitute a public health
emergency of international concern.”138 On May 23, 2007, the World Health Assembly
adopted a resolution on sharing influenza viruses and promoting access to vaccines in
connection with pandemic influenza preparedness.139 The episode involving Indonesia,
however, highlighted the inconsistencies between the developed countries’ proclamation
of global health security as an ideal and the developing countries’ need for access to
medications, vaccines, and treatment.140

2.10. Conclusion

The above review indicates that many governmental and non-governmental
agencies are involved in the campaign against the spread of infectious diseases. The
security frame used by the national and international agencies stressed the dire
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consequences that would follow if action against diseases were not taken. Activists who
framed infectious diseases as an ethical/human rights issue tried to evoke compassion
towards the victims of disease, whose rights to health and good living were being denied.
Some of these activists have been critical of “securitizing” infectious diseases, as it gives
more power to the military and intelligence community at the expense of civil society.
Human rights activists also fear that representing HIV/AIDS or other infectious diseases
as a security threat diminishes the work of many activist organizations that are trying to
normalize social apprehensions about people living with these diseases (mainly
HIV/AIDS). 141 The economic frame, which identifies the alarming economic and
financial losses that epidemics could incur, is promoted by individuals, multinationals,
business interests, travel and tourism industries, and state governments that have a vested
interest in the smooth running of the economy.
While infectious diseases were framed as economic risks, infringement of human
rights, and security threats, the biomedical frame continued to persist as a backdrop
against which these other frames emerged. The importance of medical technologies, in
prevention, detection, and treatment of infectious diseases was widely emphasized by
government officials and in the mainstream media.
The mass media is the primary arena in which these issues come to the attention
of the public, interest groups, and policy makers. Given the influence of the media and
the effect its coverage has on public opinion, the nature of media coverage and its impact
on public opinion has become an important subject of study. There has been considerable
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research on the role of the media- how it portrays or frames issues, and how audiences
understand the issues framed in alternate ways by the media. The concept of framing has
become particularly important in media research. The next chapter turns to the study of
framing in more detail.
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Framing may be broadly defined as any attempt to influence public opinion
through formulation of messages that offer different perspectives on some event. This
chapter will examine some of the important debates about the impact of issue framing
and the effectiveness of certain frames over others in influencing public opinion. The
chapter will also outline the research design for the dissertation.

3.1. Framing and Framing Effects

The concept of “framing” and “framing effects” has been studied widely in the
social sciences.1 Studies of agenda setting and framing as developed in research on social
movements, communication, and foreign policy all suggest that public opinion may be
shaped by the way in which an issue is framed. Framing refers to, “efforts by leaders and
other actors to insert into the policy debate organizing themes that will affect how the
public and other actors, such as the media, will perceive an issue.”2 Framing effects occur
when the media’s decision to highlight or emphasize only certain aspects of an issue
causes individuals to base their views and opinions on these salient aspects.3

1

For a review, see Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury, “Framing, Agenda
Setting and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models,” Journal of
Communication 57, 1(2007): 9–20; Bertram Scheufele, “Framing-effects Approach: A
Theoretical and Methodological Critique,” Communications 29 (2004): 401–28.
2

Alex Mintz and Steven B. Redd, “Framing Effects in International Relations,” Synthese
135, 2 (2003): 193–213.
3

William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “The Changing Culture of Affirmative
Action,” Research in Political Sociology 3 (1987): 143.
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Communication scholars categorize framing effects as either “equivalency”
framing effects or “emphasis” framing effects.4 An equivalency framing effect is one that
involves the use of different but analytically equivalent words or phrases (e.g., 5% fat or
95% fat free) to cause individuals to change their preferences.5 Generally, equivalency
framing effects occur when frames that cast “the same critical information in either a
positive or negative light” cause individuals to alter their preferences.6 Framing effects
may challenge even the most basic axioms of the rational actor model of decision
making.7 They suggest that a person’s preference and choice may change depending on
the way in which a choice is presented, even if none of the objective features of the
choice change. The term “framing effect” thus refers to changes in decision outcomes
resulting from these alterations in the presentation of choices.8 Tversky and Kahneman
showed, for example, that people’s choices could be reversed simply by presenting the
outcome of decisions as either a gain or a loss.9 Most studies on framing and framing

4

James N. Druckman, “The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence,”
Political Behavior, 23, 3 (2001): 225–48.
5

Ibid., 228.
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Eldar Shafir and Robyn A. LeBoeuf, “Rationality,” Annual Review of Psychology 53
(2002): 491–517.
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Political Behavior 23, 3 (2001): 225–48.
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Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice,” Science, 211, 4481 (1981): 453–58.
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effects in the field of foreign policy and international relations are studies of equivalency
framing effects. For example, scholars analyzing foreign policy decision making have
dealt with the outcomes associated with alternative courses of action, as gains or losses
relative to a reference point. 10 Others have evaluated public support for humanitarian
intervention in terms of gains and losses: Support increases when the public perceives
minimization of losses to be the objective and it declines when the public assesses the
goal to be seeking of gains.11 In contrast, some scholars have found more support for
humanitarian intervention when intervention is framed as creating gains.12 In the field of
health care and disease detection, most studies also have focused on framing of health
messages as a gain(lives saved) or loss(lives lost), and the effectiveness of framing
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Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict,”
International Political Science Review 17, 2 (1996): 179–95; Jack S. Levy, “Prospect
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behavioral changes or in motivating testing for diseases for which early detection could
enhance treatment.13
The emphasis framing effect occurs “when, in the course of describing an issue or
event, a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes
individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions.”14 Like
equivalency framing effects, emphasis framing effects work by causing individuals to
focus on certain aspects of an issue or problem instead of others. For example, if an
organization argues for funding more research on vaccines to prevent infectious diseases
because these diseases cause economic losses to the state and to individuals, it may cause
people to evaluate their policies based on the economic implications of the disease.
Unlike equivalency framing effects, the frames focus on different conceptualizations of
the same issue rather than on mere changes in wording. Emphasis framing thus adds
information, often suggesting underlying causes or remedies.15 Hence, these frames are
also referred to as issue- or content-related frames. 16 The individuals subject to these
13

Alexander Rothman, Amy E. Latimer, and Peter Salovey, “The Effectiveness of Gain
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frames evaluate the strength of alternative policy conceptualizations. For example,
foreign engagements have been framed as humanitarian interventions, as promoting
American values, or sometimes as wasteful expenditures.17 On the domestic front, several
issues also have been debated in this way. For example, Ku Klux Klan rallies are framed
as “exercises of free speech” or “threats to public safety,” and welfare programs were
framed as “giving away tax payers’ dollars to lazy people” or “helping children who are
innocent victims.”18
In this dissertation I analyze different conceptualization of infectious diseases as
security, economic, biomedical, and human rights concerns. The focus, therefore, is on
emphasis framing and its impact on changes in public opinion. The goal is to identify
which kinds of frames have the greatest influence on public opinion about infectious
diseases. Other questions addressed in this dissertation include: What kinds of frames can
persuade the public to change behavior and support funding and other policies regarding
infectious diseases? Do different frames have varying impacts? If they do, which issue
frame is the most compelling or persuasive in influencing public opinion to support
governmental policies on infectious diseases and why? The next section presents some
prominent and important debates about what kinds of frames influence public opinion
and how framing effects take place. Several studies have focused on framing of infectious
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diseases and understanding public attitudes towards infectious diseases.19 Most of these
studies are descriptive in that they examine variations in media coverage of infectious
diseases. These studies do not explore the impact of the frames on public opinion. None
of the existing studies evaluated the impact of infectious disease framing on public
opinion.
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Communication, 15, 3 (2005): 289–301; Tsung-Jen Shih, Rosalyna Wijaya, and
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3.2. Studies on Emphasis Framing

A number of studies have examined the impact that emphasis frames have on
people. Some of the early work on emphasis or issue framing was conducted in the 1980s
and early 1990s in the fields of sociology and communication. Communication scholars
posited that mere media attention to a particular issue (agenda setting) could influence
public opinion.20 For example, Iyengar argued that increased news coverage of the 1990–
91 Persian Gulf crisis was associated with an increase in the proportion of survey
respondents who considered it to be the most important issue facing the nation and who
also gave foreign policy performance greater weight when evaluating the President.21
Allen et al. (1994) argued that the media’s pro-war footage of Operation Desert Storm
and lack of coverage of any dissenting voices (i.e., those pointing out economic costs or

20
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loss of lives) resulted in overwhelming support by the Americans for the war.22 Soroka’s
more recent work also established a strong connection between the importance of foreign
affairs in the media and the prominence of foreign affairs in the minds of the public.23
Challenging the findings of these studies, some scholars have contended more
recently that public opinion was influenced more by alternate representations of issues
and the different ways those issues were framed than by mere increased coverage of an
issue. Many studies evaluated important domestic and foreign policy issues. 24 In an
experimental study, Paul Brewer found that participants who read news articles framing
other countries as competitors with the United States held less favorable opinions about
those countries. When they read news articles that depicted other countries as sharing a
common interest with the United States, however, they viewed those countries
positively.25 The focus of these studies was mainly to determine whether framing effects
22
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Behavior 19, 3 (1997): 221–46; James N. Druckman, “Evaluating Framing Effects,”
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had a substantial effect on individuals’ opinions when the individuals were exposed to
only one type of frame. Most of these studies were conducted as controlled laboratory
experiments. All subjects were assumed to be roughly equal at the beginning of the
experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned rival frames (for example, either the
positive or negative frame) but were not exposed to both frames and changes in responses
(relative to their original views on the subject) were then assessed. The rival frames were
supposed to push public opinion in opposing directions, and the framing effects were
expected to be contrasts. The two different groups were expected to respond differently
from each other. For example, in a study on land development dispute, the issue was
framed as either an economic development issue or an issue of environmental concern.
Individuals exposed to the developmental frame were significantly more likely to view
developmental concerns as important and consequently allow the project to continue
(compared to individuals who received the environmental frame). 26 Presumably, the
subjects' overall opinions about the project were based on the increased importance they
attached to economic development as a result of the frame.27
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In these studies, subjects were exposed to single frames. Thus, the experimenters
were not able to determine what kinds of reactions would be evoked if subjects were
exposed to dual or multiple frames at the same time, as usually happens in the real world.
These studies, therefore, were unable to establish which kinds of frames were more
powerful or influential in determining public preference for one frame over the other.28 In
response to this concern, scholars such as Paul Sniderman and Sean Theriault studied
framing in competitive environments in which individuals were exposed to dual frames in
equal quantities in controlled laboratory experiments. These scholars set out to prove that
exposure to more than one frame would neutralize or cancel the effect of the other
frame.29 Norris, Aldrich, and Griffin extended this idea of competitive framing to the
study of foreign policy. Aldrich and Griffin focused on different frames used by George
Bush and John Kerry regarding the Iraq war.30 While George Bush framed the Iraq war as
a war on terrorism, John Kerry framed it as a distraction from fighting terrorism. Aldrich
and Griffin found an even balance of public opinion. This occurred because the presence
of competing frames mitigated the impact of the opposing frame. These studies, however,
28
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failed to explain why in some cases one frame could be more influential than another.
The studies also were conducted as laboratory experiments and thus were subject to the
same criticisms of external validity. They failed to capture the effects of the manifold,
more complex and variegated framing environments that citizens face in the real world.31
In more recent studies, subjects were exposed to multiple frames in varying
quantities at the same time.32 These studies were conducted either in an experimental
setting or in a non-experimental setting like focus groups or by combining content
analysis of news reports with survey research in order to understand the effects of
framing on public attitudes.33 In one such study, Wise and Brewer found that competitive
framing of an issue such as a ban on trans fat mitigated framing effects of any single
frame.34 Other studies showed that in such a competitive environment, some frames were
more persuasive than others and not all frames were successful in changing public
opinion.35 These findings, however, indicated that in a very competitive environment,
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framing results were not as powerful as they were when subjects were exposed to single
frames in laboratory settings.
There is no consensus among scholars about which frames will appeal most to the
public and why some frames are more successful in persuading audiences when presented
as part of multiple frames.36 James Druckman recently pointed out that “work on how
competition influences information processing and preference formation continues to be
in its infancy” and “understanding what strengthens a frame is perhaps the most pressing
question in framing research.” 37 Scholars also have shown that frames may not
necessarily be oppositional in nature and that audiences may adopt only a portion of
frames.38 In other words, they might embrace mixed frames.
Some scholars, including Shanto Iyenger, emphasize that the loudest or most
prominent frames are most effective.39 Iyengar defined prominent or the loudest frames
as those frames that received the most coverage. Thus, they are more accessible and
therefore more effective in influencing public opinion. Other researchers concluded that
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framing effects depended on the strength of the frames rather than on their frequency.
These scholars argued that some frames were stronger and more persuasive and thus had
more impact than weak frames.40 However, the definition of a strong frame varies.
Iyengar made another important contribution to the study of framing effects by
distinguishing between “episodic” and “thematic” media frames. He found the former
(which focused on individual cases rather than on broader social, economic, or political
forces) to be more powerful in influencing public opinion.41 Many scholars have used this
typology to understand framing effects. 42 For example, a recent study of HIV/AIDS
concluded that episodic framing of HIV/AIDS stimulates a positive response from
African American men towards policies designed to fight AIDS.43
Still others concluded that the frame from the most credible source had the most
impact on public opinion.44 Most of these authors suggest that messages from sources
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perceived as trustworthy, knowledgeable, and having a good political reputation were
viewed more favorably by the audience. In their influential work, Lupia and McCubbins
lay out the conditions under which uninformed subjects will be able to rely on cues from
better informed speakers so as to express “informed” views. 45 In the field of foreign
policy and international relations, many studies have concluded that on foreign policy
issues of war and intervention, the President and his staff are perceived to be the most
credible source. There is, however, a problem with this literature. Sometimes the views of
the ruling elite are dismissed and less known organizations can frame issues and make
them look more purposive.
While the President and his advisers often have an initial edge in controlling
frames of foreign policy, they may lose it as the public becomes aware of realities of
issues such as war.46 Scholars of communication studies have also assessed the impact of
on public opinion, of news channels, that are perceived to be more trustworthy, compared
with less trustworthy news channels. In his study of public opinion on the war with Iraq,
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Baum concluded that the audience was more likely to believe in the same news from
Cable News Network than from Fox News Channel, as the latter was supposed to be
biased towards the Republican view point and thereby was seen as less credible.47 Some
studies on framing effects have concluded that people agree more with messages coming
from the political parties (perceived as credible sources) with which they identify.48 Even
here, however, the authors conclude that people support the party frame only if it is
consistent with their own beliefs.
Most scholars of framing studies believe that frames with moral valence, such as
equality, compassion, and humanitarianism, or values in democratic societies, such as
freedom, individualism, and capitalism, are most accepted by the audience.49 Framing of
issues such as gay rights, welfare reform, stem cell research, and foreign aid as value
frames have been studied by scholars such as David Domke, Dhavan Shah, Thomas
47
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Nelson, and Donald Kinder. A value frame was defined by Paul Brewer as a type of
frame that draws an association between a value and an issue that carries an evaluative
implication: It presents one position on an issue as being right (and others as wrong) by
linking that position to a specific core value.50
Most of these studies were conducted as laboratory experiments, although some
involved focus groups.51 These studies again had several flaws. First, when conducted as
laboratory experiments, they lacked external validity. Most of these experiments were
performed in single sessions, making it impossible to assess changes over a long period
of time; however, the temporal component is important, as the same messages may not
hold as much sway as they did when they were first exposed to frames. 52 Second,
respondents often use their own moral values rather than taking their cue from frames.
Findings from a recent study about public support for the war in Afghanistan contradict
the previously understood relationship between frames and the moral valence ascribed to
public issues. The study sought to understand audience support for the war in
Afghanistan, when exposed to multidimensional war/crime frames, in the aftermath of
50
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the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The study revealed that “respondents may use their
own moral compasses to evaluate and combine frame elements instead of deriving moral
valences from the frames.”53
Some scholars believe that frames consistent with people’s existing beliefs and
predispositions are more likely to find favor with the audience.54 Many people reject a
frame that contradicts their existing predispositions, be it on gay rights or race issues.55
The problem with this observation lies in the difficulty of measuring existing beliefs and
the values, especially when the dependent variable is public opinion measured in public
opinion surveys. Other studies on persuasiveness of frames claim that frames have more
impact if they highlight specific emotions.56 Framing scholars like Dennis Chong and
James Druckman argue that even in competitive environments certain messages are able
to influence opinion in the desired direction. Along similar lines, a recent work on frame
strength argues that a political argument is more persuasive “if it frames a problem and
its proposed solution in a way that resonates with people’s cognitive biases-loss aversion
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and in group bias.”57 Still other scholars have concluded that news frames are persuasive
if they are “culturally congruent,” which means they use “words and images highly
salient in the culture, which is to say noticeable, understandable and emotionally
charged.” 58 Associated to this is Edy’s conclusion that frames are very powerful in
influencing public opinion if they have been used in the past or are part of a “collective
memory.”59
Another group of scholars concluded that those frames that resonated with
people’s personal experiences were more influential in influencing their attitudes. Graber
concluded that the media impact depended on the importance of issues to the individual.60
Gamson studied issues such as nuclear power, the Arab–Israeli conflict, affirmative
action, and troubles in industry. He concluded that while media frames do play an
important role, people “evaluate news in light of past learning and determine how well it
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squares with the reality that they have experienced directly or vicariously.” 61 Iyengar
reached similar conclusions in his research on television news and agenda setting.
According to his study, “personal experience and media agendas may interactively shape
citizens’ personal concerns.”62 Studies on emphasis framing in the field of foreign studies
have consistently shown that the American public responds positively to frames that
show “national interest” or promote “victory frames.”63 Bliech, who studied support for
United States spending on HIV/AIDS, reached similar conclusions: Americans did not
support spending on HIV/AIDS related projects (to prevent, treat and tackle the disease)
for developing countries when the funding was framed as “foreign aid.”64 She concluded
that the United States does not see other countries’ problems as their own. Overall,
support for funding for programs to tackle HIV/AIDS in developing countries was likely
to improve only if more Americans were personally affected by the disease.
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3.3. Research Design

The above review indicates there is no consensus among scholars if any particular
frame is effective in all situations, and some feel that only an “operational approach of
asking people directly to evaluate the relative strength of various frames” will allow
assessment of frame strength.65 Previous research on framing effects when participants
are exposed to multiple frames points to two things: unequal effect of frames and that
while framing has a substantial impact in influencing public opinion, it cannot be used as
a tool to change public opinion in the desired direction in all situations.
I pose the following research questions. Does it matter if the framing of infectious
diseases stresses medical dangers, economic costs, human rights infringement, or
strategic threats? If it does, which issue frame is the most compelling or persuasive in
influencing public perception of threat and concern over the disease? Previous research
indicates that two factors may greatly enhance the impact of a frame. First, repeated
exposure to a frame may enhance its accessibility and make it more persuasive. Second,
perceived relevance of an issue frame may also increase its influence. Frames that are
more directly related to the United States, for example, may have the effect of increasing
public anxiety. Consistent with this, and building on previous research the following
hypotheses were tested:
Hypothesis 1. Frames represented prominently in the media will tend to mobilize
public support for policies associated with those frames. Increased repetition of the frame
65
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will enhance its effect. Frequent exposure to the frame will increase the accessibility and
thereby the relevance of the issue and people will pay more attention to considerations
underlying the issue. This claim relies on the accessibility and memory-based model of
public opinion formation.
Hypothesis 2. When the medical and economic frames dominate media coverage,
which is the most common scenario, people will be worried about the disease. They will
be likely to support potentially inconvenient policies intended to address the dangers of
the disease. On the other hand, when security and human rights frames dominate, which
should be less often, people will be less worried and concerned about the spread of
disease. In this case, people would be less likely to support inconvenient public policies
because they will view these frames as less personally relevant.
To test these hypotheses, a content analysis of newspaper reports about infectious
diseases was used to determine which frame was more prevalent at different times.
Qualitative content analysis of health frames and a brief historical discussion of the
resulting public opinion supplement this analysis. Public opinion poll data are used to
present a measure of the public reaction to these frames.
Using Lexis-Nexis, I collected newspaper reports about three infectious diseases
(HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian flu) from The New York Times and The Washington Post.
These newspapers were chosen as sources for three major reasons. First, newspapers are
still a major source of information for millions of people in the United States.66 Second,
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these newspapers devote substantial resources to coverage of national and international
affairs and have a large reporting staff with expertise in science, technology, and medical
issues. 67 Third, some national news sources like The New York Times and The
Washington Post are considered the “gatekeeper” or “elite” sources of news, in that they
influence news coverage made in other national and regional newspapers.68 Analysis of
these two newspapers gives an indication of reporting trends likely to be followed in
other news reports.
The most prominent frames identified in the articles were the biomedical,
economic, security, and human rights frames. In fact, the choice of these four frames
emerges, in part, from pre-test content analysis showing that they are the most prominent
infectious disease frames. Other frames, such as entertainment, political, and
humanitarian, were not as common in the news stories. A fellow student was given ten
percent of the stories (randomly selected) to code, and she recorded the data on a separate
coding sheet. This test of inter-coder reliability showed an overall level of 86%
agreement between me and the other student. Such reliability figures are considered to be
acceptable by most communications scholars.69
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The following themes were considered when coding for the biomedical frame:
transmission and epidemiology of the disease; the possibility of it taking the form of an
epidemic or pandemic; focus on different strains of viruses that caused these infectious
diseases; diagnosis and symptoms of disease; cure, rehabilitation, and biophysical issues
surrounding the disease; treatment/medication related to the disease; and employment of
quarantine and isolation as intervention strategies to contain the disease. With regards to
HIV/AIDS, debates about prevention and treatment (i.e., needle exchange, use of
condoms, abstinence only, and blood transfusion) were considered. The role of the World
Health Organization, Centers for disease Control and Prevention, National Institutes of
Health, doctors, health care professionals, virologists, and scientists in relation to the
disease was also indicators of the biomedical frame.
To measure the security frame, news reports were coded for mention of threat to
the state’s capacity (i.e., its military and peacekeeping forces, threat to state borders, and
state institutions) due to the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, SARS, or avian flu. Mention of
deliberate use of microbes to inflict bioterrorism was also included in the security frame.
The following themes defined the economic frame: indications that the spread of
disease caused financial losses, decline in investments, investments, decline of gross
domestic product, loss of exports, losses to manufacturing units, loss of trade and
commerce, and decline in tourism; references to absenteeism at work, loss of skilled
workers, and health insurance payments as a result of the disease; and mention of costs
and expenses to the federal and state governments or global funds to fight the disease and
financial costs of vaccine research and production incurred by pharmaceutical industries.
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Economic factors leading to the spread of disease were also coded, including: smuggling
of uninspected meat/chicken to avoid custom duties; prostitution or forced sex on
women; poverty causing people to sell blood infected with HIV in poor countries where
blood often is not screened for infection; slums, squalor, urbanization, and nutritional
deficiencies leading to the spread of infectious diseases; and changes in land use or
economic development associated with disease transmission. Finally, stories about
economic activities such as human encroachment on forests, which can bring humans
into closer contact with insects and animals carrying disease, and stories that mentioned a
mention of lack of infrastructure (e.g., roads) and higher tariffs (if they are a hurdle in the
shipment and transfer of medicine to poorer countries), were also coded for the economic
frame.
The key words in the human rights frame for HIV/AIDS were stigmatization and
discrimination against people infected with the disease. Also coded were stories about
protests by the homosexual population of the United States against mandatory screening
of blood when donating blood; protests against the “partner notification program” in the
case of HIV/AIDS, as it was seen as a violation of a person’s right to privacy and
confidentiality; and protests by patients and their families about being denied
access/privileges to public amenities, education opportunities, housing, and employment.
The human rights issues debated in the media regarding SARS and avian flu
differed somewhat from those surrounding HIV/AIDS. Demands for freedom of the press
and against censorship by countries (like China) that censored news about the outbreak of
disease in their country were voiced. As immigrants and travelers were screened at
airports, many of them protested that their privacy was being violated. Human rights
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groups protested mandatory quarantine and isolation in some countries as infringement of
peoples’ civil and political rights. In the case of avian flu, the issue of compensation to
farmers whose poultry was culled was raised by many private and international
organizations. Coverage of issues such as these was also coded for the human rights
frame.

3.4. Conclusion

This study seeks to enhance our understanding of public attitudes and public
opinion towards infectious diseases and the policies that people are likely to support. By
relying on content analysis and public opinion data, it also addresses some of the
limitations of past laboratory studies.70 Beyond the well known external validity problem,
laboratory experiments used in the study of framing effects also tend to rely on a single
exposure to a single frame, whereas people are exposed to multiple frames over an
extended period of time, from various sources, in real world settings.
This study will shed light on how public opinion is activated by different frames.
It contributes to the growing literature on understanding the strength of frames in
competitive settings. This study also seeks to improve our understanding of the
relationship between public opinion and domestic and foreign policy. It addresses the
extent to which the public is capable of making informed choices when presented with
information on issues that are of concern to both domestic and foreign policy makers.
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The next three chapters focus on three infectious diseases (HIV/AID, SARS, and avian
flu) as test cases to study the impact of media frames on public opinion.
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IV. CASE STUDY: SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME
On March 15, 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a global alert
and emergency guidelines for airlines and travelers about a new atypical pneumonia of
unknown etiology affecting people in China, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. 1 It was
considered a deadly respiratory disease with the potential of developing rapidly into a
global pandemic. By March 24, 2003, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) confirmed that Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was caused by a new
strain of virus (the corona virus) most frequently associated with upper respiratory
infections.2 Both the local and international media reported extensively on the disease.
According to the WHO, 8,098 people worldwide became sick with SARS during the
2003 outbreak, and 774 of those affected died. In the United States, only 8 people had
laboratory evidence of SARS-corona virus infection. All of these people had traveled to
other parts of the world where SARS was present.3 By the end of June 2003, no new
cases were reported, and the WHO declared the global outbreak to be over. “With the last
known chain of transmission interrupted in Taiwan, the whole world can breathe an
initial sigh of relief,” said Dr David Heymann, the WHO executive director for the
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Communicable Diseases Cluster. 4 The number of newspaper stories about SARS
decreased when the WHO withdrew its travel alerts towards the end of June.
Throughout the outbreak, the media reported on the biomedical aspects, economic
consequences, security concerns, and human rights issues related to the disease. SARS
was recognized by the WHO as the first severe infectious disease to emerge in the
twenty-first century. 5 In an age of travel and increased global trade, it spread at an
alarming rate from Asia to other parts of the world.6 It was seen as a mysterious disease
that spread very efficiently from person to person, and there was no known vaccine or
cure for the disease. As leading laboratories and public health practitioners devoted
themselves to understanding the cause of SARS and to studying the genetic sequence of
the corona virus that was thought to cause it, newspapers reported overwhelmingly on the
biomedical aspects of the disease and the prospects for a cure. Medical news was notably
dominant throughout the outbreak. Certain events, such as the WHO’s global health alert
4
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and advisories against traveling to many countries, led to increased news reporting. The
following news story, which appeared on April 7, 2003 in The New York Times,
discusses the medical aspects of the disease:
Public anxiety about SARS appears to be increasing, with a hotline at the
federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta receiving
more than 1,000 calls a day late last week. People of all ages have caught
SARS. The illness typically starts like any other acute respiratory
infection: with a fever, chills, headache, malaise and dry cough. Chest Xrays tend to show what doctors call "atypical pneumonia" in a lower lobe
of a lung. In the following days, a victim may develop difficulty breathing
as the pneumonia spreads to another lobe.
About five to seven days after onset, the symptoms improve in about 80 to
90 percent of patients and worsen in the remainder. Many of the sickest
patients require intensive care, even to the point of being connected to a
respirator. Why some people improve and others die is not known. So far,
it appears that people most susceptible to severe symptoms are 40 or older
and those who have had a chronic disease in the past. Aside from regular
nursing care and help in breathing, there is no effective treatment, and
recovery seems to depend on a patient's own immune system. No one is
certain what causes SARS, but a microbe known as a corona virus is the
chief suspect, most likely a new strain that originated in Guangdong
province.7
At that time, there was no vaccine or treatment for SARS, and the disease was
extremely contagious. There were reports in the newspapers of people stigmatizing and
discriminating against people infected by SARS. Such stories were reported mainly from
countries such as Hong Kong, China, and Canada, where SARS was more widespread.8
In the United States, debates about the linkage between human rights and SARS centered
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on the issue of isolation and quarantine.9 In the absence of a vaccine and a definite cure
for SARS, the media in the United States widely endorsed the views of the CDC and the
WHO that the best way to stop the spread of this contagious disease was to practice
isolation and quarantine.10 On April 4, 2003, United States President George W. Bush
issued an executive order that added SARS to the CDC’s list of quarantinable diseases.
This order gave the CDC the authority to isolate persons who might have been exposed to
the disease.11 This drew protest from civil rights activists, who argued that such laws
might curtail peoples’ civil liberties. The following news story that appeared in The New
York Times is illustrative of the debate that ensued:
A lesson of the SARS outbreak is that we in the United States need to
compromise on civil liberties to confront health risks more effectively.
After 9/11, the Bush administration wisely pushed a Model Emergency
Health Powers Act as a template for legislation by the states. Such
legislation would permit governors to respond to health crises with a state
of emergency in which they could impose quarantines, order vaccinations
and the destruction of dangerous property, limit people's movements and
ration medicine, and seize anything from dead bodies to private hospitals.
The steps are tough and sobering, but would apply only in desperate
circumstances and within safeguards. So far only 22 states have passed
this kind of law, and California, New York and Texas have all spurned it.
One main obstacle has been shrieks of protest by civil libertarians, whom
I'm usually sympathetic to — but not this time. Aside from terrorism, 30
new diseases have popped up in the last quarter-century, from avian flu to
AIDS. This is an age of global disease, when viruses flit across continents.
9
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If you disagree, how about if I visit your neighborhood the next time I'm
back from an Ebola outbreak in Congo and feeling feverish?12
According to the CDC website, because there was limited transmission of the SARS
virus, neither individual- nor population-based quarantine was recommended. Therefore,
the issue of SARS as a threat to human rights was not as prominent as the biomedical and
economic news about SARS.
As SARS hit Asia and Canada in June 2003, there was tremendous economic
fallout, as these countries had extensive commercial links with the rest of the world. The
spread of SARS disrupted retail, manufacturing, trade, tourism, and travel.13 The media
reported extensively on the economic consequences of the disease both during the
outbreak and in the period following the outbreak:
SARS is not just a health problem. As fear and shutdowns curtail travel, it
is devastating the Asian economy. It may seem heartless to look at a
terrifying disease, for which there is neither a vaccine nor a cure, through
the lens of cash. But as widespread suffering has failed to persuade leaders
in both poor and rich countries to finance public health, perhaps an
economic argument will carry more weight.14
In fact, in the two months after the SARS outbreak, the economic frame became
the dominant frame. Newspapers reported extensively on losses suffered by airlines and
the retail and manufacturing sectors. In October, there was a renewed interest in SARS in
the media because it was anticipated that SARS might reemerge during the influenza
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season. News stories that gave information on preparedness efforts of the CDC, the
WHO, virologists, and laboratories around the world were published in newspapers. At
this point in time, there was a renewed emphasis on the discussion on SARS with a focus
on scientific and medical issues.
SARS emerged in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2011, the anthrax
scare, and growing concern among policy makers in the United States about the
malevolent use of microbes by rogue states and terrorist groups. The security frame,
however, was not one of the dominant frames during or after the SARS outbreak.
Newspapers published a few news stories that called SARS a threat to regional and
national security in Asia, and in the United States some public health officials and
scientists raised fears about bioterrorism. 15 Some news reports called for greater
surveillance “to protect against the growing danger of potentially devastating pandemics,
either occurring naturally or because of bioterrorism.”16 According to the Washingtonbased Jamestown Foundation, at least one Russian scientist has suggested a link between
SARS and bio-war, but the mainstream media did not pick up this story.17 In other words,
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the mainstream media in the United States did not link SARS with bioterrorism. In fact,
there were only a few stories that framed SARS as a security threat. For example:
SARS, a respiratory infection with an overall death rate of 11
percent and one 50 percent or higher among people 60 and older, is
of paramount concern. The longstanding threat of bioterrorism
turned real with the deliberate release of anthrax spores in 2001.
When SARS suddenly appeared, there was speculation that it was
bioterrorism. Experts dismissed that. No one was "smart enough to
invent a SARS from scratch," said Dr. Joshua Lederberg, a Nobel
Prize-winning microbiologist. Now, he said, "SARS may end up
being a biological weapon. No one knows when or where the next
plague may be from a newly discovered infectious agent or a
natural mutation that produces a new version of an old microbe. It
may even escape from a laboratory."18
The examples from news reports cited above show that the media not only
extensively covered the SARS outbreak but it also framed SARS in different ways. The
volume and nature of media messages therefore needs to be examined to understand its
impact on public perception and awareness of SARS. The remainder of this chapter is
divided into four parts: The first part presents the results of the content analysis of
newspaper reports on SARS. The second presents an analysis of public opinion data
collected by the Harvard School of Public Health (project on the Public and Biological
Security) and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. These data were retrieved from the
Kaiser Family Foundation’s Health Poll Search database. Additional data were collected
from surveys conducted by the Pew Research Foundation. The third section reports
correlation analysis of media coverage about SARS with survey data. Finally, the fourth
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section discusses the effects of agenda setting and framing on the public’s evaluation of
different frames relevant to SARS.

4.1. Content Analysis of Newspaper Reports

To investigate in detail the prominence and content of news coverage of SARS, I
conducted a content analysis of news stories about SARS published in The New York
Times and The Washington Post. Using the Lexis-Nexis academic database, I collected
news articles between March 1, 2003 and December 30, 2004. The search stipulated that
the term “SARS” must be present in the “headline or lead paragraph” with “at least three
occurrences” in the article to ensure that SARS was the focus of the article. Obituaries
were excluded from the search process. The New York Times returned 550 stories in the
time period March 16, 2003 and June 26, 2004, and The Washington Post returned 370
stories between March 20, 2003 and May 5, 2004. Because the stories returned by LexisNexis were not ordered in any way other than by date, every fourth story was included in
the pool. A total of 224 news stories were coded. The stories were identified, sampled,
and coded for different frames (biomedical, economic, human rights, and security)
included in the stories. Table 4.1 shows the total number of articles (coded) for each
newspaper and for the two newspapers combined. In further analysis, news data from
both newspapers were combined.
Each news articles was coded at the sentence level. Each frame was considered to
be a variable and was assigned a numerical value based on the number of times the frame
was mentioned in a given news article. For example, if the biomedical frame was
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mentioned twice, it was given a score of 2. This numerical score was then converted into
a weighted measure for each frame, which is defined as the ratio of the number of times a
given frame is mentioned in the news article and the total number of sentences in the
news article. The weighted measure was used primarily for two reasons: 1) to normalize
the measure so that it is comparable across news articles of varying lengths, and 2) to
allow comparison of the relative scores across frames in a given news article.

Table 4.1: Data Sources and Overall Coverage
Newspaper

Number of Articles

Start date

End date

The New York Times

136

3/16/03

6/26/04

The Washington Post

88

3/20/03

5/1/04

Overall

224

3/16/03

6/26/04

The stories also were coded as follows for the region or country that was the focus
of the story: USA, countries other than USA, global impact, or geographic region not
mentioned. As SARS spread to different geographic regions of the world, local and
international media covered the epidemic. Table 4.2 shows the frequency of the analyzed
articles that were related to each geographic location. Both newspapers published more
stories about the impact of SARS on Asia and countries other than the United States to
which SARS had spread than about its impact on the United States. This fact is important
in understanding the public reaction to SARS in the United States. More than half the
stories in both the newspapers discussed the impact of the spread of SARS in Asia and
Canada. Only 26% of the total coverage discussed the impact of SARS on the United
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States. Seventeen percent of the total news coverage, however, discussed the global
impact of SARS in an increasingly interconnected world.

Table 4.2: Frequency of News Content by Geographic Location

Newspaper
The New York
Times
The Washington
Post
Overall

United
States
36
(25.2%)
24
(28.9%)
60
(26.5%)

Geographic Location
Other
Global
Not
countries impact
mentioned
83
22
2 (1.4%)
(58.0%)
(15.4%)
41
18
0 (0.0%)
(49.4%)
(21.7%)
124
40
2 (0.9%)
(54.9%)
(17.7%)

Start
date

End
date

3/16/03

6/26/04

3/20/03

5/1/04

3/16/03

6/26/04

4.2. Data Analysis: The Mean Ratios of Four Coverage Types/Newspapers

The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics as well as comparative
statistics such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). All analyses were conducted using
Excel and SPSS. The data were analyzed in great detail to evaluate the pattern of
coverage and to understand changes in media coverage over time. News data overall (The
New York Times + The Washington Post) were analyzed for type of coverage (Table
4.3), mean ratios of coverage type for regions coded (Table 4.4), and comparison of
coverage during and after the outbreak (Table 4.5). To investigate the monthly and
weekly trends in newspaper coverage of SARS, the data were further analyzed using
monthly (Appendix Table A4.1; Figure 4.1) and weekly intervals (Appendix Table A4.2;
Figure 4.2; Table 4.6).
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Because the news articles were coded for content or type of coverage and
weighted for length, the news data were further analyzed with a focus on different types
of coverage. Table 4.3 displays the mean ratios for all four types of coverage. The
biomedical and economic frames were the most prominent in news reports about SARS.

Table 4.3: Mean Ratios for Each Coverage Type in both Newspapers Combined
Frame

Number of
Articles

Biomedical

Economic

Security

Human
Rights

224

0.366

0.154

0.040

0.026

Start date

End date

3/16/03

6/26/04

Mean ratios of the four coverage types also were computed for each region for the
overall sampled period (Table 4.4). The biomedical frame was the dominant frame in
news reports that discussed the impact of SARS on the United States and on other
countries. The economic frame was the second most prominent frame. The security and
human rights frames were less important.

Table 4.4: Mean Ratios for Coverage Type by Region
Region

Biomedical Economic Security

Human
Rights

USA

0.27

0.17

0.05

0.06

0.36

0.19

0.04

0.02

0.46

0.09

0.04

0.00

0.67

0.00

0.00

0.00

Other
countries
Global
impact
Not
mentioned
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Time Interval
3/16/03–
6/26/04
3/20/03–
5/1/04
3/16/03–
6/26/04
3/16/03–
6/26/04

Further analysis of the media data on SARS included comparing the four frames
over the entire time period to determine whether the media coverage focused primarily on
one of the four frames or on a few or all of the four frames and determining if there was a
difference in the relative weight of these four frames during the SARS outbreak and after
it was over. The analysis was performed by breaking the total sampling period into two
phases: the period of outbreak (March 16–June 30, 2003) and the period after the
outbreak (July 1, 2003–June 26, 2004).
A one-way ANOVA was used to test for differences in the ratios among the four
frames over the entire sampling period, during the outbreak, and after the outbreak (Table
4.5). During the entire sampling period, the least squares mean values were 0.37, 0.15,
0.04, and 0.03 for the biomedical, economic, security, and human rights ratios,
respectively. The least squares mean is the best linear-unbiased estimate of the
subpopulation means (i.e., the means for each frame). It thus represents the relative
weight of each frame in media coverage. Comparison among the least square means
values of the four frames revealed that the biomedical ratio was the most prominent
frame (p < 0.0001). The economic ratio was the second highest, and it was significantly
higher than the security and human rights ratios (p < 0.0001). Thus, all pairwise
comparisons are significant at the p<0001 level except for the comparison of the amount
of human rights and security coverage (which did not differ significantly) and the
medical and economic coverage (which differed with a significance level of p<.002).
The human rights ratio and security ratios did not significantly differ, and both were
minimal compared to the economic and biomedical ratios.
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Table 4.5: Comparison of the Four Frames over the Entire Sampling Period
Least Square Mean of the Four Frames
Human
Sampled Period
Economic
Right
Entire Sampled Period 3/16/03-6/26/04
0.15
0.03
During Outbreak (3/16/03-6/30/03)
0.15
0.03
Post Outbreak (7/1/03-6/26/04)
0.18
0.00

Medical Security
0.37
0.38
0.32

0.04
0.05
0.02

To determine whether the relative weight of these four frames in media coverage
showed similar patterns during the SARS outbreak and after it, the analysis was
performed separately for these two periods. During the SARS outbreak (March 16, 2003–
June 6, 2003) the least squares mean values of the biomedical, economic, security, and
human rights ratios were 0.38, 0.15, 0.05, and 0.03, respectively. The biomedical frame
again was the dominant frame, and its ratio was significantly higher than those of the
other three frames (p < 0.0001). The economic ratio was the second highest, and it was
significantly higher than the security and human rights ratios. The security and human
rights ratios were both minimal and did not differ significantly. During the post-outbreak
period (July 1, 2003–June 24, 2004), the same relative ranks were maintained. The only
difference in the post-outbreak period was that the least squares mean value for the
biomedical frame decreased slightly (from 0.38 to 0.32) and the value for the economic
ratio increased slightly (from 0.15 to 0.18). These changes in value occurred because
media coverage shifted from the biomedical issues to the economic fallout of the disease
as estimates of losses were made after the outbreak.
Overall, for both phases the biomedical frame was the predominant frame,
followed by the economic frame. Both security and human rights frames were less
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significant in the news coverage of SARS, with the human rights ratio being the smallest
among the four frames.

4.3. Changes in Media Coverage over Time

The changes in media coverage in terms of the number of articles published
(including ratios of the four frames) were summarized using monthly and weekly
intervals over the course of the outbreak period to examine the trends at a much more
detailed level. During the entire sampling period, there were on average five articles
about SARS per week. The period from April 13 to May 24, 2003 was one of “saturation
coverage.”19 During this period, the level of coverage jumped to four times the average
level, with each newspaper publishing as many as 25 articles about the spread of SARS.
Figure 4.1 show the monthly trend of changes in frames. The SARS timeline of
key events is also plotted in the graph to show the key events that triggered a change in
the nature of media coverage. The figure illustrates that the biomedical and economic
frames were the two dominant frames in media coverage. In contrast, the security and
human rights frames were much less prominent in the media coverage. On March 12,
2003, the WHO issued its first global alert about SARS. At the same time, the biomedical
frame dominated about half of the media coverage (ratio = 0.48) over the entire month.

19

Daniel Drache and Seth Feldman, “Media Coverage of the 2003 Toronto SARS
Outbreak: A Report on the Role of Press in a Public Crisis,” in Robarts Centre Research
Papers (Toronto: York University Press, 2003), 1–18. Available online at
http://www.yorku.ca/robarts/projects/global/papers/gcf_mediacoverageSARSto.pdf, last
accessed October 10, 2010.

102

When news about the biomedical aspects of the disease declined, the economic impact
and the losses incurred by countries due to SARS began to be widely reported. By the
beginning of June, the economic frame exceeded the biomedical frame and became the
prominent frame for about 2 months. After the beginning of August 2003, the biomedical
frame again exceeded the economic frame and remained the dominant frame throughout
the remainder of the study period. The monthly average of the biomedical, economic,
security, and human rights ratios were 0.11–0.52, 0.00–0.43, 0.00–0.08, and 0.00–0.04,
respectively. Notably, the biomedical ratio was at its lowest levels when the economic
ratio climbed to its highest levels during one month beginning on July 16, 2003. The
decline in SARS-related biomedical news could have been triggered by the WHO’s
announcement in July that SARS had officially been contained worldwide and that no
new cases were being reported. As SARS was no longer a health emergency, the media
coverage shifted its focus from biomedical coverage to the economic impact of the
disease.
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Figure 4.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time at Monthly Intervals

The same analysis was conducted at weekly intervals, and the change over time
plot (Figure 4.2) clearly shows three sub-periods (Appendix Table A4.2). The first phase
encompassed the period of intense outbreak and rapid spread of the disease from Asia to
other parts of the world. The biomedical frame was the dominant frame during this entire
period. The second phase took place from the second week of June to the end of August.
During this time period, both the CDC and the WHO began to lift their travel advisories
against countries in Asia, as no new SARS cases were reported. Despite the lack of new
cases, the media continued to actively report on SARS, particularly the economic and
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political impact of the disease. During this phase, there was a shift in media framing and
the economic frame became the dominant one. In this phase, the mean ratio for the
economic frame was the highest, and it exceeded the biomedical frame. In both the first
and second phases, few stories reinforced the human rights and disease linkage or framed
SARS as a security issue. The third phase in this analysis began around the end of August
2003 and ended in June 2004. During this period, biomedical issues once again
dominated the media stories about SARS. This is because most media stories discussed
the efforts of the WHO, the CDC, and scientific committees around the world to be
prepared in case SARS returned in the winter to coincide with influenza.20

20

Karen S. Monaghan, SARS: Down but Still a Threat, National Intelligence Council.
August 2003.Available online at, http://www.odci.gov/nic, last accessed July 12, 2009;
WHO Scientific Research Advisory Committee on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS); Report of the First Meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, 20-21, October, 2003.
Available online at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/SRACCDSCSRGAR2004_16.pdf, last Accessed August 10, 2010; Stacey Knobler, Adel A. F.
Mahmoud, Alison Mack, Laura Sivitz, and Kelly Oberholtzer, eds, Learning from
SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak, Workshop Summary, Board on Global
Health, Institute of Medicine (Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2004).
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Figure 4.2: Changes in Media Coverage over Time at Weekly Intervals

The media coverage over time (weekly trend) was further analyzed using ANOVA
followed by Tukey’s test. The test indicated that the biomedical frame was the dominant
frame during the first phase (Table 4.6). The economic and biomedical frames were
equally prominent during the second sub-period, as no significant differences were found
between them (p = 0.7194); the least squares mean value for the economic frame,
however, was higher than that for the biomedical frame (0.32 vs. 0.25). Significant
differences existed between each pairwise comparison, except for security versus human
rights.

106

Table 4.6: Comparison of Four Frames during the Three Phases (Weekly Trend)
Least Square Mean of the Four Frames
Sampled Period
Sub-Period 1 (3/16–6/7/03)
Sub-Period 2 (6/8/03–
8/30/03)
Sub-Period 3 (8/30/03–
6/26/04)

Economic Human Right Biomedical
0.13
0.04
0.38

Security
0.05

0.32

0.00

0.25

0.01

0.13

0.00

0.36

0.02

4.4. Public Opinion Analysis

The public opinion surveys were drawn from a secondary database corresponding
to the time period in which these news stories were published. Public opinion data were
collected mainly from the I Poll data bank, Polling the Nation, and the Health Poll Search
of the Kaiser Family Foundation. All three are databases contain polling data on healthrelated issues from major polling organizations such as Gallup, The Pew Research
Center, and the Harvard School of Public Health. All survey results are based on
representative national samples of adults aged 18 or older. With very few exceptions, the
sample sizes of these surveys were at least 1,000 respondents. Shifts in public opinion
towards infectious diseases were assessed by considering exact and similarly worded
questions about issues related to SARS. 21 Specifically, these questions measured the
21

Shirley Ho, Dominique Brossard, and Dietram A. Scheufele, “The Polls—Trends
Public Reactions to Global Health Threats and Infectious Diseases,” Public Opinion
Quarterly 71, 4 (2007): 671-92.
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following: a) willingness to support harsh public health measures such as quarantine to
curb the spread of disease; b) precautionary steps taken and behavioral changes made in
personal lives due to fear of the disease; and c) concerns about the spread and likelihood
of contracting the disease. Positive responses to these questions would indicate a higher
level of awareness and concern about the disease in response to media coverage of
SARS.
The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics. A z-test was used to compare
the proportion of subjects who responded positively or negatively in each survey. Survey
responses were grouped together to form positive or negative responses. For example,
survey responses such as “very worried” and “somewhat worried” or “extremely likely”
and “very likely” were grouped together. All analyses were carried out using Excel and
SPSS. Z-test scores > the absolute value of 1.96 at the 95% confidence interval were
considered to be statistically significant.
Four sets of questions (see Appendix Table A4.3) were examined in the category
of willingness to change behavior and support quarantine. All four surveys were
conducted in April 2003 and repeated in May 2003. Three sets of questions were about
the public’s willingness to support quarantine. More than 90% of the surveyed population
supported quarantine and over 80% of the sampled population did not see it as a threat to
their personal rights. Moreover, the percentage of responses (positive or negative) did not
vary much when the surveys were repeated in May (± 2%). In the fourth survey,
respondents were asked specifically if they were more likely to seek medical help if they
or their families experienced flu-like symptoms. Sixty-nine percent of the surveyed
population gave a positive response. According to z-test results, a significant number of
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people supported quarantine. This likely is related to the increased news coverage
presenting SARS as a highly infectious disease both prior to and at the time the surveys
were conducted.
Nine survey questions (see Appendix Table A4.4) related to actual behavioral
changes made also were examined. The respondents were surveyed between April 11 and
13, 2003. The same sets of questions were repeated in another survey conducted between
May 2 and 6, 2003. The average percentage of positive responses dropped from 12% to
8%, and the average percentage of negative responses increased from 87% to 91%
between surveys in April and May. A significantly higher percentage of people did not
change their behavior. Thus, news of the spread of SARS did not bring about changes in
the daily behavior of people. This may be partly attributed to the fact that news of the
SARS outbreak was reported mainly in China, Southeast Asia, and Canada. In the United
States, only eight people were confirmed to have SARS based on laboratory tests, and no
one died from it. Thus, very few people in the United States contracted SARS. This was
in sharp contrast to the large number of reported cases in other countries.
Three sets of questions (see Appendix Table A4.5) were examined to evaluate the
concern among Americans about the spread of SARS. The first set of questions asked
respondents if they were worried that they or someone in their family would be exposed
to SARS. The first survey was conducted between April 5 and 6, 2003, and it was
repeated every subsequent week in the months of April and May. The surveys conducted
in April and May showed that on average 32% of the population was worried about being
exposed to SARS. This indicates a reasonably high level of concern. Another survey with
very similar wording was repeated in November 2003, and it indicated that 40% of
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people were worried. By this time media reporting about SARS had dropped
considerably. However, this survey coincided with the influenza season and people were
concerned about the return of SARS or a related illness.
The second set of survey responses analyzed came from surveys conducted in
December 2003 and repeated in November 2004. The surveys asked people if they were
concerned that they or members of their family would be exposed to SARS. 28% of
respondents feared SARS in December 2003. However, the numbers declined to 14% in
the December 2004 survey. Both of these surveys were conducted when the coverage of
SARS had declined considerably.
A third set of questions was studied to assess changes in perception about the
threat posed by the new disease from Asia. Respondents were questioned about the
likelihood that they or their families might actually be exposed to SARS. The first set of
surveys was conducted between April 11 and 15, 2003. In this survey, 25% of the people
felt that SARS was likely to spread. The percentage of positive responses declined
steadily to 14% (April 25–30, 2003), 16% (May 2–3, 2003), 8% (June 18– to July2,
2003), 8% (January 7–11, 2004), and 7% (August 25–29, 2004). The high level of initial
concern can be attributed to the media reports of people dying from SARS in Asia and
that there was no cure or vaccine to protect people from SARS. The numbers would have
been significantly higher had the disease spread to the United States and infected a large
number of people.
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4.5. Relationship between Media Coverage and Public Opinion

To understand the relationship between changes in media coverage of SARS and
changes in public opinion, further correlation analyses were conducted. The three public
opinion measures studied were willingness to support harsh public health measures,
actual behavioral changes made, and recognition of SARS as a threat.
Public opinion polls that asked people whether or not they were willing to support
harsh public health measures such as quarantine were first conducted in April 2003 and
repeated in May 2003. To examine the correlation between media frames and public
opinion, news coverage data from the corresponding time period (March 16, 2003 to June
5, 2003) were included in the analysis. A 5-day interval was chosen to examine the
changes over time in the two sets of data. The percentage of positive responses within the
four frames of media coverage is shown in Figure 4.3(also see Appendix A4.6). There
was no change in public opinion when the survey was repeated in May. As far as the
media coverage is concerned, the biomedical ratio decreased from 0.53 to 0.37. The
economic ratio showed a modest increase between April and May but then dropped to its
original level of 0.11. The human rights and security ratios were very small and changed
very little. These results show that changes in frames did not correlate with changes in
public opinion. The overall support, however, for harsh measures such as quarantine and
isolation was very high and stable at 95% during the sampled period. Thus, the total ratio
of coverage with a focus on biomedical aspects and economic implications of the disease
seems to have influenced public opinion.
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Note: Q1. Suppose you were exposed to someone who had SARS but you didn't know if
you had the disease. Would you be willing to be quarantined in your home for 10 days in
order to prevent spreading the disease? Q2. Suppose you were exposed to someone who
had SARS but you didn't know if you had the disease. Would you be willing to be
quarantined for 2 or 3 weeks in a health care facility to prevent spreading the disease?
Q3. Recently, President George W. Bush signed an executive order adding SARS to the
list of diseases for which people can be quarantined. Do you think this order threatens
your personal rights and freedoms? Q4. Having heard about SARS, would you say you
are much more likely to seek medical help, a little more likely to seek help, or it has not
affected whether you would seek help if you or a family member got flu-like symptoms?
Figure 4.3: Changes in Media Coverage and Willingness to Change Behavior
To examine the relationship between media coverage and public opinion data
about actual behavioral changes made in response to SARS, a total of nine survey
questions were analyzed. A table was constructed displaying mean ratios from media
coverage and mean percentage of positive/negative responses in 5-day intervals
(Appendix Table A4.7 and Figure 4.4). The questions asked respondents if they had taken
any precautionary measures or made changes in their behavior to prevent SARS. For
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seven out of nine questions, the mean percentage of “yes” answers dropped from 12% to
8% between April and May when the surveys were administered. During the same time
period, the biomedical ratio decreased from 0.53 to 0.37. The economic ratio first
increased and then dropped to the original level of 0.11. The human rights and security
ratios were very small and showed very little change. Changes in public opinion seemed
to correspond to a decrease in biomedical news, as it was the dominant frame when the
first round of survey questions was administered. Moreover, all nine questions were
largely related to health and biomedical issues. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore,
that the public response to these questions reflected the change in the biomedical ratio.
To examine the relationship between media coverage and public perception of
SARS as a threat, a table of mean ratios from media coverage and mean percentage of
positive responses in the threat category at weekly intervals was constructed (Appendix
Table A4.8). The Pearson correlation coefficient was computed for the first question in
the “threat” category for the period between March 30 and May 24, 2003 because many
surveys were administered during this period. None of the correlations was significant.
The percentage of positive responses regarding worry over being exposed to SARS,
however, had the highest correlation with the economic ratio. The level of worry showed
a very small negative correlation with the biomedical frame (Table 4.7 and Figure 4.5).
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Note: Q1. Have you avoided international air travel? Q2. Have you avoided people you
think may have recently visited Asia? Q3. Have you avoided Asian restaurants or stores?
Q4. Have you used a disinfectant at home or at work to protect against SARS? Q5. Have
you talked with your doctor about health issues related to SARS? Q6. Have you avoided
public events? Q7. Have you consulted a website for information about how to protect
yourself against SARS? Q8. Have you or someone in the family purchased a face mask?
Q9. Have you carried something to clean any object you think might have come in
contact with someone who has SARS?
Figure 4.4: Changes in Media Coverage and Behavioral Changes Made

Table 4.7: Correlation between Worry about Exposure to SARS and Media Coverage
Frame
value)

Pearson correlation coefficients (p–0.2087
(p = 0.6534)
0.6542
(p = 0.1109)
0.40198
(p = 0.3714)
–0.21427
(p = 0.6445)

Biomedical
Economic
Security
Human Rights
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Note: Q1. How worried are you that you or someone in your family will be exposed to
SARS? Q2. How worried are you that you or someone in your family will be exposed to
SARS? Q3. Do you think that SARS is very likely to affect you or someone in your
immediate family in the next 12 months?
Figure 4.5: Changes in Media Coverage and Perception of SARS as a Threat

4.6. Relationship between Media Coverage and Public Opinion (Coverage on United
States)
The above analysis did not reveal any significant correlation between changes in
media coverage and public response to SARS. To determine if news coverage about
SARS that focused on its impact on the United States had a higher correlation with the
survey question assessing perception of the threat from SARS, Pearson correlation
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coefficients were computed ( see Appendix Table A4.9). None of the correlations were
significant. The percentage of positive responses indicating the level of worry about
being exposed to SARS, however, showed a small positive correlation with the
biomedical frame (r = 0.2456) and the economic frame (r = 0.2267) and a small negative
correlation with the human rights frame (Table 4.8 ).

Table 4.8: Correlation between Worry about Exposure to SARS and Media Reports of the
Impact of SARS on the United States
Frame

Pearson correlation coefficients (p-value)

Biomedical

0.2456
(p = 0.5956)
0.2267
(p = 0.6250)
0.0793
(p = 0.8658)
–0.2317
(p = 0.6172)

Economic
Security
Human Rights

4.7. Discussion and Conclusion

In this study, I assessed whether news coverage during and after the outbreak of
SARS increased the anxiety of Americans about the disease and led to support for
measures such as quarantine.22 In March and the beginning of April in 2003, the story

22

Robert J. Blendon and John M. Benson, “The Public’s Response to SARS in Toronto
and United States,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 38 (2004): 925–31; Robert J. Blendon,
C.M. DesRoches, John M. Benson, M.J. Herrmann, E. Mackie, and K.J. Weldon,
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was developing and being brought to the attention of the public. Extensive reporting
about how SARS had affected various parts of the world evoked public concern about the
disease, and this concern was evident in many surveys administered in April 2003. Onethird of the respondents were gravely concerned about the disease. The responses
(willingness to support quarantine and perception of threat) did not change much between
when the surveys were first administered in April 2003 and when they were repeated in
May 2003. 23 While high percentages of people were worried in May, the number of
positive responses did not increase in May. The time period from April to May was one
of “saturation coverage.” There was a steady decline both in news coverage and in public
perception of threat of the disease after that time.
In this study I also sought to understand if certain ways of representing or framing
the disease evoked greater concern among the public, which in turn would lead them to
make behavioral changes in their personal lives and support harsher public health
measures such as quarantine. The results of the analysis substantiate the hypothesis that
frames represented predominantly in the media will influence public opinion. The
correlation analysis revealed a correlation between the economic frame and the
percentage of positive responses expressing worry about being exposed to SARS. SARS
caused significant economic losses in Asia and in countries linked commercially to Asia
and Canada. The economic frame was the second most prevalent frame throughout the
Working Papers Project on the Public and Biological Security Harvard School of Public
Health: Americans’ response to SARS (I), April 29, 2003. Available online at
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/research/horp/files/WP9SARSUS1.pdf, last accessed
October 11, 2010.
23

Ibid.
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sampled period (Tables 4.5 and 4.6). A very small negative correlation was found
between the biomedical frame (predominant frame) and overall worry about the disease.
This can be attributed to the fact that the actual number of people infected with SARS
was very low in the United States. According to the CDC website, from November 2002
through July 2003 a total of 8,098 people worldwide became sick with SARS that was
accompanied by either pneumonia or respiratory distress syndrome (probable cases).24
Through July 2003, 192 cases had been reported in the United States, including 159
suspected and 33 probable cases.25 Of the 33 probable cases, only 8 were confirmed in
the laboratory as SARS infections. There were no reported cases of SARS-related deaths
in the United States. Another explanation for why the biomedical frame did not increase
worry about the disease could be that while the media reported a lot on the biomedical
aspects of the disease, it also described how the United States public health system was
equipped and well prepared to control the disease following the distribution of anthraxtainted mail in 2001.26 Table 4.2 clearly shows that close to 50% of total stories focused
on the impact of SARS on countries outside the United States; only 26% of the total
coverage discussed the possible and actual impact on the United States.

24

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Fact Sheet: Basic information about
SARS. May 3, 2005. Available online at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/factsheet.htm,
last accessed August 10, 2009.

25

Ibid.
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World Health Organization. SARS: Status of the Outbreak and Lessons for Immediate
Future, Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response. Geneva, Switzerland. May
20, 2003. Available online at http://www.who.int/csr/media/sars_wha.pdf, last accessed
September 27, 2009.
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A separate correlation analysis was conducted for stories that discussed the
impact of SARS in the United States and levels of worry about the disease (Table 4.8). In
this analysis both the biomedical and economic frames showed a small positive
correlation with people’s worry that they or their families might be exposed to SARS.
This finding further confirms the second hypothesis that biomedical and economic frames,
when predominant, will influence people to support inconvenient measures such as
quarantine and isolation. This is because these issues are of personal relevance to them.
Peoples’ worry about being exposed to the disease will make them support quarantine.
Public opinion polls indicated strong public support for the use of quarantine when
required. The overall support for harsh biomedical intervention strategies such as
quarantine and isolation was very high and stable at 95% during the sampling period
(Appendix Table A4.3). The news media emphasized the severity of the highly infectious
disease and its consequences to human health. When respondents were asked if they had
made changes in their behavior or taken precautionary steps to prevent SARS, the
responses were mixed. Few Americans purchased face masks or consulted a doctor.
However, many consulted a website, used disinfectant at home, and avoided international
travel and contact with people who they thought had traveled to Asia. These responses
appeared to follow changes in the biomedical frame (Appendix Table A4.4). Although
SARS did not become a public health crisis in the United States, the country experienced
an economic impact of the outbreak. Not only were the direct costs of quarantine, and
screening at airports significant, but many airlines, tour operators, and companies that
had offshore offices and manufacturing units in Asia suffered considerable economic
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losses.27 The economic coverage became more prominent as these losses mounted, and in
turn a corresponding worry and increased concern over the disease occurred. The security
and human rights frames were not prominent and people did not see them as relevant.
Thus, I conclude that framing and agenda setting are important in bringing the
public’s attention to issues and in creating an initial awareness of the issue. However, it
seems likely that the public's response is mediated by perceptions of relevance. In this
case, successful efforts to limit the spread of SARS in the United States may have
reduced Americans' perceptions that the biomedical frame was relevant, compared with
the economic frame.

27

Karen S. Monaghan, Intelligence Community Assessment: SARS Down but Still a
Threat. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. August 23, 2003. Available online
at http://ww.dni.gov/nic/special_sarsthreat.html, last accessed August 10, 2010.
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V. CASE STUDY: AVIAN FLU
While Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) received immense media
coverage because it was new and had tremendous potential for human-to-human
transmission, another more lethal virus, avian influenza A (also called H5N1), and its
potential to cause a human influenza pandemic garnered considerable media attention
between 2004 and 2007. H5N1 is particularly contagious among birds and therefore is
also known as bird flu. H5N1 was first identified in poultry in Guangdong Province,
China in 1996 and in humans in Hong Kong in 1997.1 It was only at the end of 2003 and
in early 2004 that the virus was reported in poultry, wild birds, cats, and some other
mammals in other countries.2 In several countries in Southeast Asia and China, cases of
human infections were also reported.3 Most infections in humans, however, resulted from
direct contact with infected poultry, and no human-to-human transmission of the virus
occurred.4 By the summer of 2005, H5N1 began spreading beyond Asia.5 Although the

1

WHO, Global Alert and Response (GAR): H5N1 Avian Influenza: Timeline of Major
Events. Available online at
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/2010_10_20_h5n1_avian_influenza_tim
eline_updates.pdf, last accessed November 11, 2010.
2

Ibid.

3

Ibid.

4

CDC: Key Facts about Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) and Avian Influenza A (H5N1)
Virus. Available online at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/facts.htm, last accessed
August 9, 2011.
5

WHO Global Alert and Response (GAR): H5N1 avian Influenza: Timeline of Major
events. Available online at
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/2010_10_20_h5n1_avian_influenza_tim
eline_updates.pdf, last accessed November 8, 2010.
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United States experienced only few incidents, scientists and public health officials in the
United States feared that if the virus mutated to allow for transmission among humans, it
could have devastating results.6 The big worry was that H5N1 might have the capacity to
undergo antigenic shift, which refers to the swapping of genetic material with human
influenza viruses to produce a highly pathogenic microbe transmissible from person to
person. 7 The potential for antigenic shift was real, because influenza viruses mutate
rapidly and can acquire genes from viruses that infect other animal species.8 Laboratory
analysis of the H5N1 virus samples from 2004 from Vietnam showed that they were
different from virus samples from 1997 and 2003 from Hong Kong, which indicates that
the virus had mutated. 9 The experience with SARS had shown the public that in an
increasingly interconnected world, the next infectious disease could travel fast from one
country to another. Both the print and visual media covered stories about avian flu and
shaped public perception about it.
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Content analysis of media reports has shown that news about avian flu was
framed in several ways, including biomedical aspects, economic consequences, security
concerns, and human rights issues. In the initial phase of the outbreak, the biomedical
frame was dominant in the news media. In the year 2004, bird flu was found in many
countries in Asia. As it continued its geographic expansion, it was also “undergoing
genetic diversity expansion.” 10 The public health agencies in the United States began
monitoring it very closely, and the media in the United States began extensive reporting
on the subject. The media reports sought to understand the general biomedical aspects of
the disease and urged the development of flu vaccines and preparedness against the
disease:
Health authorities in Vietnam are investigating 30 suspected cases
of bird flu in people. Fourteen have died, most of them children
under age 1. In six cases, laboratory testing identified a strain of
avian influenza designated H5N1. The H and N denote two
proteins, hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, that sit on the outer
shell of the virus. Together, they provide a virus's chemical
appearance to the immune system. The particular combination of H
and N is the key to a strain's identity and the first hint of whether it
might be a danger to people. There are 15 forms of hemagglutinin
and nine of neuraminidase in the most populous class of flu viruses
— influenza A. The less common and less dangerous influenza B
has only one type of H and N. When a virus with a new H-N
combination appears, immunity built up to older ones is no help.
What follows can be a worldwide epidemic — assuming the virus
also grows well in people and is spread easily in coughs and
sneezes. Virologists once believed these "reassortments" occurred
only in pigs, because that species is capable of being infected by
both human and avian flu. With the 1997 Hong Kong cases,
10

Mark Henderson, “Bird Flu Mutation Adds to Threat of Human Pandemic',” The
Sunday Times, March 21, 2006.
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however, it was clear reassortments might also occur in a person
simultaneously infected by both. The chance of that occurring
depends on how much avian flu is around. What scares scientists
this winter is that it is all over the place —- in flocks in Japan,
Vietnam, and South Korea and now in Thailand. "It is an
unprecedented situation with H5N1 virus in so many countries
around Asia," Webster said. "The extent of the spread of this virus
has not been seen before.11
As avian flu spread throughout Asia in late 2003 and in 2004, economic losses to
the poultry industry became apparent, and the implications of the spread of avian flu to
the poultry industry began to get some media coverage. During the weeks of February
11–17, 2004, March 10–16, 2004, and April 7–13, 2004 (Table 5.8, Figure 5.3), the
economic issues were dominant in the media. This was the time when small outbreaks of
low pathogenicity avian influenza were reported in flocks of chickens in Texas,
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Maryland and in live markets in New Jersey in the United
States. 12 This had a big impact on the poultry trade in the United States, as many
countries announced bans on imports from the United States. 13 The government and
poultry industry officials decided to invest in expanding testing for bird flu to cover most
of the poultry raised in the United States.14 Similar bans were applied by other countries

11

David Brown, “A Horror Script for Health Officials; Bird Flu Poses Global Epidemic
Threat,” The Washington Post, January 24, 2004.
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on poultry imports from Asian countries that experienced outbreaks of avian flu. The
following news story that appeared in The New York Times in April 2005 dealt with the
economic fallout of the disease:
What is striking in the last two months, though, is the prominence with
which avian flu, often called bird flu, is being mentioned as a risk as well.
CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, the Asian investment banking arm of Cr?t
Agricore of France, estimated in a report on Monday that the disease had
already cost Asian nations $8 billion to $12 billion, mostly from the deaths
or destruction of 140 million chickens and other poultry. But the cost
would be greater if the disease gained the ability to spread easily from
person to person, a possibility that is not factored into current stock and
other asset prices, said Christopher Wood, CLSA's chief equity strategist.
It would be a regional panic and potentially a global panic,'' he said,
adding, ''There's no way markets can discount this.15
Fears about the spread of bird flu increased in 2005, as avian flu spread from Asia
to the bird populations in Europe and the Middle East. At the same time, new scientific
research also increased concerns about the capacity of H5N1 to set off an influenza
pandemic. Researchers found that the influenza virus that caused the 1918–1919
pandemic appeared to have been an avian-like virus that adapted to humans.16 A study
published in January 2005 indicated that the case of a girl passing on the virus to her
mother may be the first published account of human-to-human transmission.17 Scientists
and public health officials had been stating for years that prevention of the spread of
avian influenza was paramount to protecting both public and human health. As the virus
15
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spread at an unprecedented rate to many countries outside Asia in the middle of 2005, the
United States Congress, the President, and public health specialists became actively
engaged in the fight against bird flu.18
In the first week of June 2005, the security frame gained prominence as some
public health specialists lobbied for a Manhattan Project for the 21st century: to defend
against destruction caused by infectious disease and biological weapons. 19 During the
weeks of October 19–25, 2005 and November 2–15, 2005 (Table 5.10), both the security
and economic frames were more prominent in the media than the biomedical frame.
President Bush announced the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic
Influenza (IPAPI) at the United Nations General Assembly on September 14, 2005. This
partnership sought to bring together countries that shared a set of core principles to
generate and coordinate political momentum for addressing avian and pandemic
influenza.20 In a speech given to the National Institutes of Health in November 2005,
President Bush issued the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and unveiled a $7.1
billion flu-fighting plan.21 The National Security Strategy (2006) of the United States also
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outlined threats from avian flu.22 In December 2006, Congress passed and the President
signed “The Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act,” which called for the
establishment of the National Health Security Strategy. This was a period of intense
reporting on the avian flu. Thus, although biomedical issues remained dominant in 2005
and 2006, economic and security concerns about the bird flu were also voiced in the
media.
Similar trends were seen in 2006. During the weeks of January 18–26, 2006,
February 15–21, 2006, March 1–14, 2006, March 22–28, 2006, and April 12–18, 2006 (
see Appendix Table A5.5), the economic and biomedical frames dominated the media
reporting. As bird flu spread to different countries, poultry trade all over the world was
greatly affected.23 The media reported about how economic investment was needed to
step up public health preparedness, disease surveillance, and research in the development
and production of vaccines and antiviral drugs. International organizations emphasized
the need for investment to contain bird flu in poorer farms and backyard kitchens in
Southeast Asian countries. All of this required international cooperation among countries
and international agencies. International organizations such as the United Nations Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the
World Organization for Human Health (OIE) called for more international pledges and
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mobilization of resources to help contain the disease.24 The avian flu was framed as a
threat to national and international security to raise the salience of the issue and to
mobilize more resources in the fight against avian flu. The news story below is an
illustration of the security frame:
When we think of the major threats to our national security, the first to
come to mind are nuclear proliferation, rogue states and global terrorism.
But another kind of threat lurks beyond our shores, one from nature, not
humans — an avian flu pandemic. An outbreak could cause millions of
deaths, destabilize Southeast Asia (its likely place of origin), and threaten
the security of governments around the world. So far, H5N1 has not been
found in the United States. But in an age when you can board planes in
Bangkok or Hong Kong and arrive in Chicago, Indianapolis or New York
in hours, we must face the reality that these exotic killer diseases are not
isolated health problems half a world away, but direct and immediate
threats to security and prosperity here at home.25
Because the virus did not establish human-to-human transmission and no isolation
or quarantine was actually enforced, concerns about civil and political rights were not a
big topic in news reports. Human rights concerns over compensation to farmers for
destruction of their poultry, however, were raised.26 International organizations such as
the FAO, the WHO, and the OIE issued a joint statement asking the international
community to support poor farmers in small countries affected by avian flu. 27 The
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farmers who had to kill their infected and exposed birds and poultry needed to be
compensated for loss of their property:
Bird flu has not yet turned into a pandemic, but it is already killing the
meager hopes of some of the world's poorest people for a marginally
better life. When poultry become infected with the deadly strain of avian
influenza (H5N1), it is essential that all birds nearby be culled to prevent
further spread.
The Indonesian government pledged to pay about $1.50 for each bird
infected with the H5N1 virus, a sum that may approximate the bird's fair
market value. But most birds that have been killed under this policy are
healthy, so their owners, most reports suggest, will receive nothing.
Families whose birds are found to be infected with the virus may suffer
even more. People in Cambodia, China and India whose poultry have been
blamed for avian influenza outbreaks have often been subject to extreme
stigma and isolation, and there have even been reports of suicides by
desperate farmers.
Indonesia's avian influenza budget for the coming year is reported to be
less than $50 million. Clearly, without donor assistance, the government
cannot afford to compensate families and farmers fairly. Developing a
program to compensate poor families in countries with limited resources is
an enormous challenge.28
Another rights issue raised by many developing countries was that of equitable
access to vaccines. The time period from May 2006 to December 2007 was one of
increased research on vaccines, antiviral drugs, and public health preparedness by
governments all over the world, particularly in the United States. The media, therefore,
reported mainly on biomedical issues such as transmissibility, lethality, virology, public
Available online at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2004/pr7/en/, last
accessed November 11, 2011.
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health infrastructure, and epidemiology. Continuing with its efforts to address the threat
of avian flu, on April 17, 2007, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
announced its approval of the first vaccine to prevent human infection with one strain of
the avian influenza H5N1 virus. 29 This was the time when the media reported on
Indonesia’s decision to withhold sharing of virus samples from the WHO, alleging that
Indonesia was not assured of access to vaccines and antiviral drugs if a human pandemic
of influenza occurred.30 Thailand had raised similar issues in January 2007, and the WHO
reacted to it with a joint statement between Indonesia and WHO member states, and
agreed to work
to assess and develop potential mechanisms, including Material Transfer
Agreements, that could promote equitable distribution and availability of
pandemic influenza vaccines developed and produced from these
viruses.31
In May 2007, the World Health Assembly adopted a resolution about sharing
influenza viruses and promoting access to vaccines in relation to the avian flu.32 This
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issue was further addressed on June 15, 2007, when revised International Health
Regulations, substantially updated since 1969, took effect. They aimed to help protect the
world from a host of emerging diseases and health threats, such as pandemic influenza
and bioterrorism.33
The excerpts from news reports cited above show that the media not only covered
the avian flu outbreak extensively but also framed avian flu in different ways. The
volume and nature of media messages, therefore, can be evaluated to identify the media’s
impact on public perception and awareness of avian flu. The stories were identified,
sampled, and coded for four different frames presented in the stories (i.e., biomedical,
economic, human rights, and security). The prominence of each frame was identified
over time, and the stories were coded for the region of the world that was the focus of the
news article. This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part presents the results of
the content analysis of newspaper reports about avian flu, and the second part describes
public opinion data collected by the Harvard School of Public Health (Project on the
Public and Biological Security) and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. These data
were retrieved from the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Poll Search data base.
Additional data were taken from surveys conducted by the Pew Research Foundation and
polls conducted by the Associated Press and CNN. Public opinion polls also were
analyzed to determine if shifts in media frames in stories about avian flu influenced
Available online at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/, last accessed March 25,
2011; David P. Fidler and Lawrence O’ Gostin, “The WHO Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework,” JAMA 306, 2 (2011): 200-1.
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changes in public behavior and attitudes towards the disease. The third section, presents a
correlation analysis of media coverage of avian flu with survey data about avian flu
during the corresponding time period. The final section discusses the evidence supporting
the premise that agenda setting and framing affected the public’s evaluation of different
news frames on avian flu.

5.1. Content Analysis of Newspaper Reports

To investigate in detail the prominence and content of news coverage of avian flu,
I conducted a content analysis of stories about avian flu published in The New York
Times and The Washington Post. Using the Lexis-Nexis academic database I collected
news articles between January 1, 2004 and December 12, 2007. The search stipulated that
the term “bird flu” or “avian flu” be present in the "headline or lead paragraph" with at
"least three occurrences in the article" to ensure that avian flu was the focus of the article.
Obituaries were excluded from the search process. The New York Times returned a total
of 388 articles and The Washington Post returned 263 articles. Because the stories
returned by Lexis-Nexis were not ordered in any way other than by date, every fourth
story was included in the pool. Table 5.1 shows the total number of articles for each
newspaper and for the two newspapers combined. The data from both newspapers were
combined for further analysis.
Each news story was coded at the sentence level. Each frame was considered to
be a variable and was assigned a numerical value based on the number of times the frame
was mentioned in a given news article. For example, if the biomedical frame was
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mentioned twice, it was given a score of 2. This numerical score was then converted into
a weighted measure for each frame, which is defined as the ratio of the number of times a
given frame is mentioned and the total number of sentences in the news article. The
weighted measure was used to normalize the measure so that it would be comparable
across news articles of varying lengths and so that I could compare the relative scores
across frames in a given news article.

Table 5.1: Data Sources and Overall Coverage
Newspaper
The New York Times
The Washington Post
Overall

Number of
Time Interval
Articles
99
1/18/04–11/22/07
62
1/14/04–12/11/07
161
1/14/04–12/11/07

The stories also were coded as follows for the region or country that was the focus
of the story: United States, countries other than the United States, global impact, or
geographic region not mentioned. Table 5.2 shows the frequency of articles that were
analyzed that were related to each geographic location. About half of the articles in each
newspaper focused on regions other than the United States. There were, however, a
number of stories that discussed the global impact of avian flu in an increasingly
interconnected world.
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Table 5.2: Frequency of News Content by Geographic Location
Newspaper
USA
The New York Times
The Washington Post
Overall

23
(21.7%)
26
(41.9%)
49
(29.2%)

Geographic Location
Other
Global
Not
countries
impact
mentioned
62
17
4
(58.5%)
(16.0%) (3.8%)
29
7
0
(46.8%)
(11.3%) (0.0%)
91
24
4
(54.2%)
(14.3%) (2.4%)

Time
Interval
1/18/04 –
11/22/07
1/14/04 –
12/11/07
1/14/04 –
12/11/07

5.2. Data Analysis: The Mean Ratios of the Four Coverage Types/Newspapers.

The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics as well as comparative
statistics such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). All analyses were conducted using
Excel and SPSS. The data were analyzed to evaluate the pattern of coverage and to
understand changes in media coverage over time. News data overall (The New York
Times + The Washington Post) were also analyzed for type of coverage (Table 5.1).
Because the news articles were coded for content or type of coverage and
weighted for length, the news data were further analyzed with a focus on different types
of coverage. Mean ratios of the four coverage types were computed for each region for
the overall sampling period (Table 5.3). The biomedical ratio was the highest in all news
stories in all geographic areas: the United States (0.33), countries other than the United
States (0.44), and stories that discussed the global impact of the avian flu (0.49). The
economic ratios were the next most important, followed by the security and human rights
ratios.
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Table 5.3: Mean Ratios for Coverage Type by Region

Region
United States
Other
countries
Global
impact
Not
mentioned

Biomedical
Ratio

Economic
Ratio

Security
Ratio

Time Interval
Human
Rights Ratio

0.33

0.25

0.09

0.01

2/5/04–7/11/07

0.44

0.15

0.03

0.01

1/14/04–11/22/07

0.49

0.26

0.02

0.01

1/25/04–12/11/07

0.37

0.25

0.03

0.00

10/28/05–8/1/06

Table 5.4 summarizes the mean ratios of the four coverage types. The coverage
patterns for the two newspapers were similar. Overall, the biomedical ratio was higher
(0.410) than the economic ratio (0.189), and the security and human rights ratios were
less than 0.05 during the sampling period. As with SARS, the biomedical frame was
dominant.

Table 5.4: Mean Ratios for Coverage Type in The New York Times and The Washington
Post (combined)
Frame
Newspaper

No. of
Articles

Overall

161

Biomedical
0.410

Economic

Security

0.189

0.046

Human
Rights
0.011

Time
Interval
1/14/0412/11/07

A one-way ANOVA followed by Tukey’s post hoc test was used to test for
differences in ratios among the four frames over the entire sampling period (Table 5.5).
The least squares mean values were 0.41, 0.19, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, for the
biomedical, economic, security, and human rights ratios. The least squares mean value is

135

the best linear-unbiased estimate of the subpopulation means (i.e., the means for each
frame). It represents the relative weight of each frame in the media coverage. Comparison
among the least squares mean values of the four frames shows that the biomedical ratio
was the most prominent, as its value was significantly higher than those of the other three
frames (p < 0.0001). The economic ratio was the next highest, and it was significantly
higher than the security and human rights ratios (p < 0.0001). The human rights and
security ratios did not differ significantly, and they were both minimal (p < 0.05)
compared to the economic and biomedical ratios.

Table 5.5: Comparison of Four Frames over Entire Sampling Period (1/14/04–12/11/07)
Frame
Economic
Human
Rights
Biomedical
Security

Least Squares
Mean
0.19

Economic
-----------

Human
Rights
<.0001

Biomedical
<.0001

Security
<.0001

0.01
0.41

<.0001
<.0001

----------<.0001

<.0001
-----------

0.05

<.0001

0.3403

<.0001

0.3403
<.0001
----------

5.3. Changes in Media Coverage of Avian Flu over Time

The changes in media coverage in terms of the number of articles published and
the ratios of the four frames were analyzed at quarterly, monthly, and weekly intervals.
Appendix Table A5.1 and Figure 5.1 show the quarterly averages of the four frames.
Figure 5.1 also compares the geographic focus of the stories over time. The pie charts
show changes in the relative proportion of articles focusing on the three different regions
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over time. In 2004, more than half of the articles focused on countries other than the
United States. All articles in the second quarter focused entirely on the impact of avian
flu on countries other than the United States. In 2005 the percentage of articles discussing
the impact of on avian flu on the United States and the globe increased. The majority of
the articles, however, focused on the impact of avian flu on other countries. This was true
because countries in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East were most affected by avian flu.
The same trend continued in the first three quarters of 2006. In the last quarter of 2006,
75% of the articles concerned the impact of the disease on the United States. In the
second quarter of 2007 100% of the articles did focus on United States

Figure 5.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time at Quarterly Intervals
In the first quarter of 2004, 63% of the articles focused on other countries, in the
second quarter 100% of the articles dealt with the impact of avian flu on the United
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States, and in the third quarter 67% of news coverage was about other countries. In the
last quarter of 2007, half of the articles discussed the global impact of avian flu and how
the Asian economies were affected by the spread of this disease.
To examine changes over time in a more detailed manner, media coverage data
were analyzed on monthly and weekly intervals. Figures 5.2–5.5 show weekly changes in
the four frames over a period of 4 years (see also Tables A5.2, for monthly changes, and
Tables 5.3-5.6, for weekly changes, in the Appendix).

Figure 5.2: Media Coverage Changes over Time: Weekly Averages of the Four Media
Frames in 2004
In 2004, the biomedical frame dominated the media reporting, except from
January 28 to February 17 (see weeks 3–5 in Appendix Table 5.3, and Figure 5.2) and
March 10–16 and April 7–13 (weeks 9 and 13 in Appendix Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2).
Between January 28 and February 3, the economic ratio exceeded the biomedical ratio. In
week 5, both the economic and security ratios exceeded the biomedical ratio, and the
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economic frame was clearly dominant this week (0.55). Between March 10 and March
16, the economic ratio was about five times the biomedical ratio, and during the week of
April 7 to April 13 (0.09 vs. 0.46), the biomedical and economic ratios were both
prominent (0.20 and 0.24, respectively). Overall, 28 articles related to avian flu were
published in the two newspapers in 2004, with fewer than three articles published each
week during this year. A one-way ANOVA followed by Tukey’s post hoc test was used
to test for differences in ratios among the four frames in 2004 (Table 5.6). Overall, the
two newspapers devoted on average 31% of the coverage of avian flu to the biomedical
frame and 24% to the economic frame. There was no significant difference between the
biomedical and economic ratios and between the security and human rights ratios. The
biomedical and economic ratios, however, were both significantly higher than the
security and human rights ratios. This indicates that the economic and biomedical frames
were the dominant frames in 2004. The news coverage was also focused mainly on
countries outside the United States.

Table 5.6: Comparisons of the Four Frames in 2004
Least Squares Mean Values of the Four Frames
Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security
0.24
0
0.31
0.04
p-values for Mean Ratio Pair Wise Comparisons among the Four Frames
Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security
Economic Ratio
<.0001
0.4736
0.0003
Human Rights Ratio
<.0001
<.0001
0.8896
Biomedical Ratio
0.4736
<.0001
<.0001
Security Ratio
0.0003
0.8896
<.0001
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Figure 5.3: Media Coverage Changes over Time: Weekly Averages of the Four Media
Frames in 2005

In 2005 (Appendix Table A5.4 and Figure 5.3), the biomedical frame dominated
media reporting, except in June 1–7, October 19–25, November 2–11, and November 23–
29. In the first week of June, the security frame was dominant. For October 19–25,
November 2–11, and November 23–29, the economic ratio exceeded the biomedical
ratio. For November 9–15, the economic ratio was about 18 times the biomedical ratio,
and was the dominant frame in the media reporting during this time period. Overall,
however, the biomedical frame dominated the media coverage in 2005. ANOVA
followed by Tukey’s test (Table 5.7) showed that the biomedical ratio was significantly
higher than those of the other three frames, and the economic ratio was significantly
higher than the security and human rights ratios. There was no significant difference
between the human rights and security ratios. Overall, there were 25 articles about avian
flu published in 2005.
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Table 5.7: Comparisons of the Four Frames in 2005
Least Squares Mean Values of the Four Frames
Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security
0.2
0.02
0.39
0.08
p-values for Mean Ratio Pair Wise Comparisons among the Four Frames
Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security
Economic Ratio
<.0001
<.0001
0.0044
Human Rights Ratio
<.0001
<.0001
0.373
Biomedical Ratio
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
Security Ratio
0.0044
0.373
<.0001

Figure 5.4: Media Coverage Changes over Time: Weekly Averages of the Four Media
Frames in 2006
In 2006 (Appendix Table A5.5 and Figure 5.4), the biomedical frame dominated
the media reporting, except for the periods of January 18–24, February 15–21, March 1–
14, March 22–28, April 12–18, and December 13–19. For January 18–24, February 15–
21, March 1–14, March 22–28, and April 12–18, the economic and biomedical frames
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were both prominent in the media. Between December 13 and 19, the economic and
security frames dominated the media reporting. Thus, biomedical and public health issues
were both prominent in media, except for brief periods between December 13 and 19,
2006 and between July 11 and 17, 2007. In December 2006, the National Security
Strategy discussed the threat from avian flu. This provoked some discussions about
health and security in the media. In July 2007, the state of Virginia banned all live poultry
sales and shows for the rest of the month after suspected avian flu antibodies were
discovered in a flock of 54,000 turkeys on a Shenandoah County farm, and this
dominated the news stories on avian flu at this time.34 Overall, the biomedical frame
dominated the media coverage in 2006. ANOVA followed by Tukey’s test (Table 5.8)
revealed that the biomedical ratio was significantly higher than those of the other three
frames; the economic ratio was significantly higher than the security and human rights
ratios. There was no significant difference between the human rights and security ratios.
Overall, 50 articles were published about avian flu in 2006, which was twice the number
in 2005.
Table 5.8: Comparisons of the Four Frames in 2006
Least Squares Mean Values of the Four Frames
Economic
Human Rights Biomedical
Security
0.15
0.01
0.42
0.03
p-values for Mean Ratio Pair Wise Comparisons among the Four Frames
Economic
Human Rights Biomedical
Security
Economic Ratio
<.0001
<.0001
0.0003
Human Rights Ratio
<.0001
<.0001
0.8264
Biomedical Ratio
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
Security Ratio
0.0003
0.8264
<.0001
34

Staff Reporter, “Possible Bird Flu Leads to Live Poultry Sales Ban,” The Washington
Post, July 7, 2007.
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Figure 5.5: Media Coverage Changes over Time: Weekly Averages of the Four Media
Frames in 2007

In 2007 (Appendix Table A5.6 and Figure 5.5), the weekly average for the
security ratio was zero. It was, therefore, excluded from Figure 5.5. Between July 11 and
17,the economic ratio was about three times the biomedical ratio, and between December
12 and 18, the economic ratio equaled the biomedical ratio. Other than these two weeks,
the biomedical ratio was dominant throughout the year. There were only 14 articles about
avian flu published in 2007, indicating a considerable decline in coverage. ANOVA
followed by Tukey’s test (Table 5.9) showed that the biomedical ratio was significantly
higher (<.0001) than other three frames. Moreover, there was no significant difference
among the economic, human rights, and security ratios.
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Table 5.9: Comparisons of the Four Frames in 2007
Least Squares Mean Values of the Four Frames
Economic
Human Rights Biomedical Security
0.19
0.02
0.63
0.00
p-values for Mean Ratio Pairwise Comparisons among the Four Frames
Economic
Human Right
Medical
Security
Economic Ratio
0.2071
<.0001
0.1495
Human Rights Ratio
0.2071
<.0001
0.9982
Biomedical Ratio
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
Security Ratio
0.1495
0.9982
<.0001
ANOVA followed by Tukey’s test with year as a fixed effect was used to
determine whether coverage for each frame changed significantly over the years 2004–
2007. Table 5.10 gives the least squares mean values for each frame by year and the pvalue for the significance test. No significant difference among years was detected for the
economic, security, and human rights ratios. The biomedical ratio, however, had
significantly higher values in 2007 compared to 2004, 2005, and 2006.
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Table 5.10: Comparisons of Each Frame (2004–2007)
Least Squares Mean by Year
Biomedical
Economic
Year
Ratio
Ratio
Security Ratio
2004
0.31
0.24
0.04
2005
0.39
0.20
0.08
2006
0.42
0.15
0.03
2007
0.63
0.19
0.00
p-value for effect year (each frame tested individually)
Biomedical Ratio
2004
2005
2006
2004
0.5949
0.2922
2005
0.5949
0.9322
2006
0.2922
0.9322
2007
0.0024
0.0185
0.0461
Economic Ratio
2004
2005
2006
2004
0.8535
0.3336
2005
0.8535
0.7098
2006
0.3336
0.7098
2007
0.8985
0.9990
0.9532
Security Ratio
2004
2005
2006
2004
1
2
3
2005
0.3624
0.9969
2006
0.3624
0.0985
2007
0.9969
0.0985
Human Rights
Ratio
0.6287
0.0524
0.6456
2004
0.3174
0.9156
2005
0.3174
0.5202
2006

0.9156

0.5202

2007

0.7262

0.9973

Human
Rights Ratio
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.02
2007
0.0024
0.0185
0.0461
2007
0.8985
0.9990
0.9532
2007
4
0.6287
0.0524
0.6456
0.7262
0.9973
0.9136

0.9136

5.4. Public Opinion Analysis

The public opinion surveys were drawn from a secondary database corresponding
to the time period during which these news stories were published. Public opinion data
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were collected mainly from the I Poll data bank, Polling the Nation, and the Health Poll
Search of the Kaiser Family Foundation. These three databases provide access to more
than a million surveys on various topics conducted in the United States by different
survey organizations. The Kaiser Family Foundation is the leading organization for
health policy analysis, and it routinely conducts surveys on health-related topics. All
survey results are based on representative national samples of adults aged 18 or older.
With very few exceptions, the sample sizes of these surveys were at least 1,000
respondents. Shifts in public opinion towards infectious diseases were reviewed by
analyzing exact and similarly worded questions about issues related to avian flu.
Specifically, these questions assessed the following: a) willingness to support harsh
public health measures such as quarantine and to make changes in daily behavior to curb
the spread of disease; b) precautionary steps taken and behavioral changes made in
personal lives due to fear of the disease; c) concerns about the spread of the disease and
the likelihood of contracting the disease; and d) support for federal funding to improve
the country's ability to respond to new infectious diseases.
The data were analyzed using descriptive statistical methods. The z-test was used
to compare the proportion of subjects who responded positively or negatively in each
survey. Survey responses were grouped together to form positive or negative responses.
For example, survey responses such as “very worried” and “somewhat worried” or
“extremely likely” and “very likely” were grouped together. All analyses were conducted
using Excel and SPSS/PASW. Z-test scores greater than or equal to the absolute value of
1.96 at the 95% confidence interval were considered to be statistically significant.
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Eighteen questions were analyzed in the category of willingness to support harsh
public health measures, which examined support for quarantine and protective behavior
(Appendix Table A5.7). The surveys were conducted between August 2005 and April
2006. The responses were combined to compute the percentage of positive opinion. The
first set of questions were similarly worded and asked the sampled respondents their
opinion about quarantine. On average, 82.6% of the public expressed support for
quarantine (a statistically significant value). The next series of survey questions assessed
public opinion about willingness to take protective steps (e.g., washing hands more
frequently, avoiding travel, and wearing masks) if a human case of the avian or bird flu
was reported in their state. On average, 79.1% of the public expressed their willingness to
take various protective steps to prevent avian flu. A higher percentage of subjects
expressed willingness to take protective measures, except for wearing a mask. Only 52%
of subjects were willing to wear masks, which was not statistically significant.
Four sets of survey questions on actual behavioral changes made were examined
in the second category of questions (Appendix Table A5.8). The respondents were
surveyed from January to April 2006. A higher percentage of people did not change their
behavior compared to those who did. News of the spread of avian flu did not bring about
changes in the daily behavior of people. On average, 80.6% of the sampled population
denied implementing precautionary behavior.
Six sets of questions were examined to understand Americans’ concern about the
spread of the disease (Appendix Table A5.9). The first set of questions asked Americans
if they were worried that they or someone in their family would be victims of bird flu.
The first survey was conducted between October 21 and 23, 2005, and it was repeated on
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December 9–11, 2005, January 12–25, 2006, and March 10–12, 2006. A significantly
higher percentage of subjects were not worried about actually contracting avian flu. On
average, only 23.5% of subjects expressed that they were worried they would be victims
of bird flu. It is likely that the ability of the United States public health system to
effectively deal with SARS made people confident or “desensitized.”35 The second set of
questions asked Americans how worried or concerned they were that they or someone in
their family would be exposed to bird flu. Eight surveys were included in this set. The
surveys were administered between November 3–6, 2005 and January 18–22, 2007. In
the first survey, 38% of the respondents were concerned about bird flu. For the first seven
surveys, on average 34.1% of subjects were worried, whereas in the last survey (January
18–22, 2007), 60% of subjects were worried A third set of questions assessed the
perceived likelihood of bird flu striking the United States. Four surveys were included in
this set. Surveys administered on October 21–23, 2005, March 2–5, 2006, and April 25–
27, 2006 showed that a significantly higher percentage of subjects thought that the bird
flu virus was likely to strike the United States. An average of 67.7% of subjects chose
“very likely” or “somewhat likely” when asked about the likelihood of bird flu striking
the United States. The last survey, which was administered on December 31, 2006,
showed that 50% of respondents thought bird flu would strike the United States in 2007.
This illustrates a decrease in concern (from 64% to 50%) from the last survey conducted
in April 2006. The fourth set of questions also assessed Americans’ concern about the
disease. These questions were worded differently and asked if Americans were concerned
35

Shirley S. Ho, Dominique Brossard, Dietram A. Scheufele., “The Polls—Trends Public
Reactions to Global Health Threats and Infectious Diseases,” Public Opinion Quarterly
71, 4 (2007): 678.
148

that the United States might be part of an avian flu pandemic in the near future. An
average of 64% of subjects showed concern, and a significantly higher percentage of
subjects expressed concern compared to expressing no concern at all. The fifth question
asked a similar question, but it was worded differently: It asked Americans how
concerned they were about a pandemic outbreak of avian or bird flu. The first survey was
administered between January 17 and 25, 2006, and it showed that 62% of subjects were
“very concerned” or “somewhat concerned.” In a survey conducted between June 7 and
21, 2006, 51% of subjects were “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned,” which was
not a significantly high value. The sixth set of questions asked how concerned Americans
were about the spread of bird flu in the United States. All five surveys in this set showed
that a significantly higher percentage of subjects expressed concern. The last set of
questions asked Americans if they thought there was more likelihood of cases of avian or
bird flu among wild birds, chickens, or other farm-raised poultry or among humans in the
United States during the next 12 months. On average, 58% of Americans thought it was
very likely or somewhat likely that more cases would occur among wild birds, 43%
thought it was very likely or somewhat likely that there would be more bird flu cases
among chickens, and only 34% believed it was very likely or somewhat likely that there
would be more bird flu cases among humans.
Four sets of questions were examined to understand Americans’ support for
funding to fight infectious diseases such as the avian flu (Appendix Table A5.10). The
first question asked respondents if they supported government investment in the
development and production of vaccines to prevent avian flu. The mean percentage
supporting the investment on vaccine research was 92.5% in the two surveys conducted
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in August 2005 and April 2006. The support for this issue was considerable and high.
The second set of questions asked Americans if they were worried that the government
was not doing enough to protect its citizens from infectious diseases. Nationally, 60% of
respondents felt that the government was not doing enough in January 2005. The
percentage of people worried about the issue increased to 63% when the poll was
repeated in January 2006. In both surveys, a significantly higher percentage of people
expressed that they were “worried” compared to “not worried.” The third set of questions
also explored public opinion about government spending on avian flu. The questions
specifically asked the public whether the United States spends too much, too little, or
about the right amount of money to protect citizens against bird flu. In January 2006,
only 36% of subjects thought that the United States was spending the right amount. In
January 2007, 32% felt the United States spent the right amount of money. When asked if
the United States was spending too much, in January 2006 only 6% agreed. The
percentage of people who felt the United States government was spending “too much”
increased to 20% in January 2007 and in the same survey, 24% felt that the government
was spending “somewhat more” than enough. Between January 2006 and January 2007,
the sense of urgency about the threat from avian flu seems to have declined. The fourth
question asked Americans if they thought it was important to improve the country’s
ability to respond to new infectious diseases such as SARS and the avian flu. The surveys
were conducted in May 2006 and April 2007. More than 80% of the respondents thought
this was an extremely or very important thing to do in both the surveys. This was a
statistically significant positive response.
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The time period between October 2005 and December 2006 was one of increased
media reporting on avian flu. The United States government and the media emphasized
not just the biomedical aspects but also the economic and security concerns that arose due
to the spread of avian flu. Increased media reporting probably led to the high level of
support for policies such as quarantine and funding for research on vaccines against avian
flu. This initial awareness did not, however, lead to increased worry or personal concern
about respondents and their families being victims of avian flu or being actually infected
or dying from the disease. As a result, the American public did not make too many
precautionary changes in their lives to protect themselves from bird flu.

5.5. Relationship between Media Coverage and Public Opinion

To understand the relationship between changes in media coverage of avian flu
and changes in public opinion, data were analyzed using descriptive statistical methods.
The correlation coefficient was computed and a test of significance was performed for the
correlation between media coverage and percentage of positive responses for the
following survey topics: worry about being the victim of the bird flu virus, worry about
being exposed to the bird flu, and likelihood of the bird flu virus striking the United
States. All analyses were performed using Excel and SPSS.
Public opinion polls that questioned whether people were willing to support
quarantine were conducted first on August 3–5 2005 and repeated on October 11–12,
2005, January 17–25, 2006, and April 25–27, 2006. Questions that examined people’s
willingness to make changes in daily behavior other than quarantine to curb the spread of
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disease also were included in the analysis. To assess whether changes in the media
coverage on avian flu had an impact on the percentage of people who were willing to
make changes in daily behavior, a plot showing news coverage data from the
corresponding time period (July 2005–April 2006) and percentage of respondents
supporting quarantine was constructed (Appendix Table A5.12). Questions about
willingness to avoid travel, wearing a mask, etc. (Q2–Q17, Appendix Table A5.7) were
not included in the analysis because these questions were not asked repeatedly over a
period of time. A monthly interval was chosen for the analysis in order to examine the
changes over time in the two sets of data. The percentage of positive responses was
plotted for the four frames in media coverage (Figure 5.6). In the survey, the same
question was repeated with different types of responses. For example, Q1a showed the
percentage of positive responses calculated as the percentage of “absolutely essential,”
“very important,” and “somewhat important” responses, and Q1b showed the percentage
of positive responses calculated as the percentage of “yes” or “favor” responses. There
was no change in the percentage of positive responses when the survey was repeated in
October 2005 and April 2006 with response options of “absolutely essential,” “very
important,” “somewhat important,” “not important,” and “not important at all.” The
percentage choosing “absolutely important” increased from 25% to 30% (Appendix
Table A5.7). The percentage increased considerably from 65% to 83% between October
2005 and January 2006 when the same question was asked with response options of “yes”
or “no.” As far as the media coverage was concerned, the biomedical ratio decreased
from 0.65 to 0.38 between August 2005 and April 2006. The economic ratio also
decreased from 0.42 to 0.16. The human rights and security ratios were very small and

152

changed little. From October 2005 to January 2006, all media coverage had decreased,
whereas public opinion about supporting quarantine increased from 65% to 83%. In this
case perhaps less coverage increased concern about the disease. Continuous reporting on
avian flu increased the publics’ attention and support for quarantine measures, and after
some time it stabilized. Eighty percent of the sampled population supported quarantine in
April 2006, which was a very slight decrease from January 2006. Overall support for
quarantine and isolation measures was high during the sampling period.

Note: Q1. Do you agree that quarantining is important to limit the spread of avian flu?
Figure 5.6: Changes in Media Coverage and Willingness to Change Behavior
Four sets of questions (Appendix Table A5.13) were examined to see if
Americans made any significant behavioral changes or took any precautionary measures
to protect themselves against avian flu. The first two sets of questions were asked only
once. Therefore, change over time could not be assessed. Only the third question was
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included in the analysis (Figure 5.7). This question asked whether the public had taken
any steps to prevent contracting the bird flu. The first survey was conducted between
February 28 and March 3, 2006, and it was repeated between April 18 and 20, 2006. The
percentage of “yes” responses to the question dropped from 15% to 9%. During the same
time period, there was not much change in any of the frames, but the number of articles
on bird flu decreased from 12 to 6. Perhaps the decrease in volume of reporting
influenced public opinion. From February to March, the economic ratio decreased from
0.25 to 0.15. Due to the limited number of surveys on this issue, however, it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to further evaluate how the media coverage shaped public
opinion on actual behavioral changes made.

Figure 5.7: Changes in Media Coverage and Behavioral Changes Made
Seven questions were used to evaluate the perceived likelihood of the spread of
avian flu among humans (Appendix Table A5.13 and Figure 5.8). The Pearson
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correlation coefficient was computed for the first three questions, as surveys were
continuously collected during this time period (Table 5.11). The percentage of people
worried about avian flu was significantly correlated (p = 0.0754) with the biomedical
ratio for Q2 (Appendix Table A5.9). The Pearson correlation coefficient (r = 0.70741)
was indicative of a positive correlation and shows that the higher the biomedical ratio, the
higher the level of people’s concern that they would be exposed to avian flu. Positive
responses about the perceived likelihood that the bird flu virus from other countries
would strike the United States were significantly correlated with the economic ratio (p =
0.0666). The Pearson correlation coefficient was –0.85225, which indicates that the
percentage of respondents who thought that bird flu would strike the United States was
negatively correlated with the economic ratio (i.e., the more media reported on economicrelated issues, the less likely the public thought it was that avian flu would strike the
United States). The Pearson correlation coefficient was 0.81839 for the correlation
between the percent of respondents worried about being a victim of the bird flu virus
(Q1) and the biomedical ratio. This indicates that the higher the biomedical ratio, the
higher the level of worry by the general public. Both Q1 and Q2 (Appendix Table A5.9)
had a positive correlation between the level of worry and the biomedical ratio, and the
correlation was significant for Q2.
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Note: Q1. Are you worried that you or someone in your family will be the victim of the
bird flu virus? Q2. How worried /concerned are you that you or someone in your family
will be exposed to the bird flu? Q3. How likely do you think it is that the bird flu virus
will strike the United States? Q4. How concerned are you that the United States will be
part of an avian flu pandemic? Q5. How concerned are you about a pandemic outbreak of
avian or bird flu in many countries at the same time? Q6. How concerned are you about
the spread of bird flu in the United States? Q7. How likely do you think it is that there
will be cases/more cases of avian or bird flu among in the United States during the next
12 months?
Figure 5.8: Changes in Media Coverage and Perception of Avian Flu as a Threat
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Table 5.11: Correlations between Levels of Worry about Being Exposed to Avian Flu and
Media Coverage: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (p-value)

Frame

Biomedical
Economic
Security
Human Rights

Q3 (bird flu
Q2
(worried
Q1(worried
about
virus
will
about
being
being a victim of the
likely strike
exposed to the
bird flu)
the
United
bird flu)
States)
0.81839
0.70741
0.33591
(p=0.1816)
(p=0.0754)
(p=0.5805)
0.36343
–0.51197
–0.85225
(p=0.6366)
(p=0.2401)
(p=0.0666)
–0.33907
–0.50173
–0.58353
(p=0.6609)
(p=0.2513)
(p=0.3017)
–0.21537
0.07355
0.12158
(p=0.7846)
(p=0.8755)
(p=0.8456)

Four questions were studied to understand public support for federal funding to
improve the country's ability to respond to new infectious diseases (Appendix Table
A5.14 and Figure 5.9). The first question asked the public how important it was to invest
government dollars in the development and production of avian flu vaccines. The
question was asked in August 2005 and again in April 2006. The percentage of subjects
responding in the affirmative increased from 61% to 65% over the 8 month. At the same
time, the biomedical ratio dropped from 0.65 to the lowest point in November (0.28), and
then it increased to 0.38 in April 2006. The economic ratio dropped and increased several
times, but overall it dropped from 0.42 to 0.16. The security and human right ratios were
small and did not change much. It is very difficult to determine how each frame
influenced public opinion because only two surveys were conducted over this 8 month.
The slight increase in the percentage of people supporting the production of vaccines may

157

have resulted from the cumulative effect of media reporting over this period of time
rather than having responded to any particular frame.
The next question asked whether the public was worried that the United States
may not be doing enough to prevent contagious diseases such as SARS, lethal flu, and
mad cow disease that originated in other countries. The question was first asked in June
2005, and 60% of respondents expressed worry. When the same question was repeated in
January 2006, the percentage of respondents who were worried had increased slightly to
63%. At the same time, both the biomedical and economic ratios had dropped and
increased multiple times. Given the fact that there were only two surveys conducted over
the 7 month period, it is very difficult to determine how each media frame shaped public
opinion. The slight increase in overall level of worry that occurred between June 2005
and January 2006 was similar to the trend seen in the responses to the previous question.
The third question asked if the United States was spending too much, too little, or
about the right amount of money to protect the country against avian flu. The percentage
of respondents supporting investment was 72% in January 2006. When the same question
was repeated in January 2007, 64% of respondents supported investment. Again, only
two surveys were conducted to address this issue, which makes it very difficult to
correlate this change with any media frame.
The fourth question asked people if they thought it was important to improve the
country's ability to respond to new infectious diseases such as SARS and avian flu. The
survey was conducted first in March 2006, and it was repeated in April 2007. The
responses were roughly the same and overall showed very high support. This result
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illustrates that most Americans supported the idea of improving the country’s ability to
respond to new infectious diseases.

Note: Q1. How important will it be to invest government dollars in the development and
production of avian flu vaccines? Q2. Are you worried that the United States may not be
doing enough to prevent contagious diseases such as SARS, lethal flu, and mad cow
disease that come from other countries? Q3.Do you think the United States is spending
too much, too little, or about the right amount of money to protect the country against the
avian or bird flu? Q4. Do you think it is important to improve the country's ability to
respond to new infectious diseases such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome)
and avian flu?
Figure 5.9: Changes in Media Coverage and Public Support for Funding
5.6. Discussion and Conclusion

In this study I assessed whether increased news coverage of avian flu increased
the worry of Americans about the disease. Public concern about the threat of an avian flu

159

pandemic did increase in the years 2005–2006. The percentage of people worried that
they or a family member might get sick from avian flu in the next 12 months increased
from 12% in 2003 to 21% in 2006. 36 This was perhaps in response to increased media
reporting on the possibility of a pandemic. This study has also shown that the volume of
news coverage about avian flu increased in 2005 and 2006 and that news stories focused
more on the impact of the disease on the United States (Figure 5.1). Until 2004, most
stories about avian flu discussed its impact on Asia. As in the case of SARS, the
geographical focus of the story evidently became important in determining people’s
concerns about the disease.
This study also sought to determine whether certain ways of framing the disease
evoked greater concern among people and led them to make behavioral changes in their
personal lives, support harsher public health measures such as quarantine, and support
government investment. A trend towards significant positive correlation (r = 0.70741, p =
0.0754) between an increased biomedical ratio and the level of worry about bird flu was
detected (Table 5.11). Although avian flu is primarily a disease of birds, scientists and
public health officials feared that it might mutate in a way that could allow human-tohuman transmission. In October 2005, two research studies warned that there were
similarities between the deadly Spanish flu virus of 1918 that killed nearly 50 million
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people and the H5N1 strain slowly spreading through Asia. 37 This, along with media
reports of the spread of bird flu to regions outside Asia and the knowledge that no
vaccine was available to protect against the flu, caused fear and concern among the
public. Although there were a few infections reported in poultry in February 2004 in the
United States, the situation did not become an epidemic, as had happened in Asia. Had
there been human cases of the flu in the United States or a major disruption of the
economy or the public health system, the numbers might have changed drastically. As a
reaction to the increased concern about avian flu, most people supported quarantine and
were willing to take protective measures and change their behavior.
The percentage of respondents who thought that bird flu would strike the United
States was negatively correlated with the economic ratio (r = –0.85225, p = 0.0666, Table
5.11). This can be attributed to the fact that it was mainly the Asian economies that
suffered losses from the spread of bird flu. The financial cost of culling chickens and
taking control of the situation was borne by Asian economies. Although the United States
poultry industry did suffer losses in early 2004, there was no major impact at the macro
level and the economic losses were very sector specific. In stories centered on the United
States, the focus was less on actual economic losses and more on preparedness efforts,
government expenditure, and the financial commitment of the government to address the
threat of bird flu. IPAPI was announced by President Bush at the United Nations General
Assembly on September 14, 2005 to improve international surveillance, transparency,
timeliness, and response capabilities and facilitate sharing of epidemiological information
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and samples critical for the response effort. The United States Congress also launched a
$3.8 billion preparedness effort. President Bush issued the National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza on November 1, 2005. The Strategy outlined the coordinated federal
government effort to prepare for pandemic influenza, and it unveiled a $7.1 billion flufighting plan. This likely instilled confidence in the public about the government’s
preparedness to fight the avian flu.
Two hypotheses were tested in this chapter. First, frames represented prominently
in the media will tend to mobilize public support for policies associated with those frames.
This study indicates that the biomedical frame was the predominant frame in media
reports in the sampled period 2004–2007 (Tables 5.4–5.9 and Figure 5.1-5.3). The study
also highlights a strong correlation between the biomedical frame and the American
public’s worry about the disease and their concern about the likelihood that the disease
would strike the United States. The surveys were conducted mainly between December
2005 and in 2006 and the beginning of 2007. Figure 5.1 clearly indicates that between
2005 and the second quarter of 2007, the volume of stories that discussed the impact of
avian flu on the United States and the globe as a whole increased. In the second quarter of
2007 all articles dealt with the impact of the disease on the United States. In February
2005, a news story reported that at the national meeting of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science, scientists stated that they believed it highly likely that a
virus that has swept through chickens and other poultry in Asia would genetically change
into a flu that can be transmitted among people. 38 At the same time, Cambodia and

38

AP, “CDC chief: Bird flu could become Epidemic,” USA Today February 22, 2005.

162

Indonesia reported their first human cases of avian flu, which turned out to be fatal.39 By
November 2005, the WHO's official count of human cases of H5N1 reached 122, with 62
deaths in Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia.40 This was followed by news
reports of the spread of avian flu to countries such as China, the Russian Federation,
Turkey, Italy, and many other countries around the globe. This was also a time when the
United States President and Congress launched several initiatives. The Pandemic and All
Hazards Preparedness Act was adopted by Congress in December 2006. With this law,
Congress mandated for the first time in United States history that the federal government
prepare a National Health Security Strategy to guide improvement of the country’s public
health emergency preparedness and response capabilities.
The second hypothesis tested was that when the biomedical and economic frames
dominate media coverage, which is the most common scenario, people will be more
worried about the disease. They will be likely to support potentially inconvenient policies
intended to address the dangers of the disease. The survey reports show high support for
vaccine production and research and willingness on the part of the American public to
undertake precautionary measures to deal with the disease. The public did not see the
human rights and security frames as relevant. The security frame was more prominent in
media stories about bird flu than it was for SARS. It did not, however, show any
significant correlation with worries about bird flu. The human rights frame was not very
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prominent in news stories about bird flu. Part of the reason for this is that the bird flu did
not infect humans in the United States, and there were no major issues arising over access
to antiviral drugs and vaccines or about quarantine and isolation.
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VI. HUMAN IMMUNE DEFICIENCY VIRUS AND ACQUIRED IMMUNE
DEFICIENCY SYNDROME
Unlike SARS and the avian flu, Human Immune Deficiency Virus/ Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) is an infectious disease that became a health
epidemic in the United States. The media in the United States has been reporting on
AIDS since it was first identified in 1981, although the nature of coverage has changed
over time. The media has been an active participant in the efforts of governments and the
United Nations (UN) to educate people about HIV/AIDS.1 The first known news report
on what was later known to be AIDS was published on June 5, 1981 in the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Morbidity Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR).2
The Los Angeles Times and the Associated Press covered it on the same day. The New
York Times published its first news report on AIDS on July 3, 1981.3
In the United States, media coverage of HIV/AIDS in the first 22 years since its
discovery was focused mainly on its impacts on the United States.4 In the late 1990s,
however, the media began presenting news about HIV/AIDS with a global perspective.
1

Matt James, Tina Hoff, Julia Davis and Robert Graham, “Leveraging the Power of the
Media to Combat HIV/AIDS,” Health Affairs 24, 3 (2005): 854-57.

2

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Pneumocystis Pneumonia — Los
Angeles,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 30, 21 (1981): 1-3. Available online at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/june_5.htm, last accessed July 12, 2011.
3
Kaiser Family Foundation, Global HIV/AIDS Time line. Available online at
http://www.kff.org/hivaids/timeline/hivtimeline.cfm, last accessed, December 11, 2010.
4

Mollyann Brodie, Elizabeth Hamel, Lee Ann Brady, Jennifer Kates, and Drew E.
Altman, “AIDS at 21: Media Coverage of the HIV Epidemic 1981-2002,” Columbia
Journalism Review Supplement, March/April (2004): 1-18. Available online at
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/AIDS-at-21-Media-Coverage-of-the-HIVEpidemic-1981-2002-Supplement-to-the-March-April-2004-issue-of-CJR.pdf, last
accessed September 21, 2011.
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Not only did the geographic focus of the news stories widen, but the topics of stories also
changed to reflect changes in policy debates, both on the domestic and international
fronts. Until about 1999, the media served to educate the public about HIV/AIDS.
Foremost were the stories on HIV prevention and testing. 5 Stories discussed the
epidemiology of the disease and the efforts that were needed to prevent transmission.
Next followed news reports about research on HIV drugs, protease inhibitors, treatment,
and vaccine research. A number of stories focused on the origin of AIDS.6 Stories about
these issues and the various health agencies involved in the research continuously
appeared in the media in the years that followed. Medical advances, debates about the
association between HIV and AIDS, and the scientific breakthrough involving
antiretroviral drugs were highlighted.7 Once antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) were available,
research on side effects of the drug and their administration was conducted. Because
these drugs were not a complete cure, research on vaccines was always emphasized. As
AIDS spread around the globe, with more and more infections being reported every year,
stories about prevention, transmission, and treatment remained dominant in the 1980s and
1990s period. The following news story is typical of media reports about HIV/AIDS:
As it invades the body, the virus that causes AIDS unleashes a domino
effect of destruction at the molecular level within immune system cells,
5

Ibid.

6

David Brown, “Chimps Tested in Quest for AIDS Virus Origin; Animals Sampled
Without Human Contact,” The Washington Post, January 18, 2002.
7

Karen E. Johnson, “AIDS as a National Security Threat; Media Effects and
Geographical Imagination,” Feminist Media Studies 2, 1 (2002): 81-96; Timothy E. Cook
and David C. Colby, “The Man Mediated Epidemic: The Politics of AIDS on National
Network News,” in AIDS: The Making of a Chronic Disease, eds. Elizabeth Fee and
Daniel M. Fox (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 84-122.
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ultimately leading to cellular suicide. Now researchers from the University
of California at San Diego have used sophisticated technology to track
with unprecedented precision the progression of cellular damage that
follows infection with H.I.V.
They revealed the sequence of events and the mechanisms employed by
the virus to kill the very cells charged with defending the body against
such invaders: immune cells called CD4 T-cells. ''They are like the
conductor of the immune response,'' said Dr. Jacques Corbeil, an assistant
professor of medicine at the university's School of Medicine and the lead
author of the study, which was reported last week in the journal Genome
Research.
H.I.V. invades and swiftly overpowers the immune cells' DNA, inserting
its own viral blueprints into the cellular machinery, poisoning genes and
altering the cellular energy source, the researchers reported. It then
suppresses the immune cells' DNA repair mechanisms and induces the cell
suicide process called apoptosis, they said.'' When we looked at the data,
we realized how much H.I.V. packs a punch,'' Dr. Corbeil said. The
destruction of the immune cells robs the body of its ability to defend itself,
eventually leading to the collapse of the immune system.8
Beginning in 2000, media attention shifted to the growing HIV crisis outside the
United States, especially in Africa. Several reports were published that stressed the idea
that new and emerging infectious diseases such as HIV posed a threat to citizens of the
United States at home and abroad, threatened the United States armed forces deployed
overseas, and accentuated social and political instability in key regions where the United
States had significant interests.9 At this time, the political community in the United States
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framed HIV/AIDS as a national security threat. It was reported as a security threat widely
in the media. The first such news article appeared in The Washington Post:
Convinced that the global spread of AIDS is reaching catastrophic
dimensions, the Clinton administration has formally designated the disease
for the first time as a threat to U.S. national security that could topple
foreign governments, touch off ethnic wars and undo decades of work in
building free-market democracies abroad.10
Conceptualization of HIV/AIDS as a threat to national and international security by
policy makers in Washington D.C. generated a debate both in academia and in policy
circles. There were some who disagreed:
That terming the disease a national security threat seems alarmist, even
selfish. The United States should be part of the global battle against AIDS,
even lead if necessary, but it should do so out of a sense of humanity, not
fear.11
Framing of HIV/AIDS as a security threat helped mobilize financial resources and
attract much needed attention from the international community to the catastrophic
impact of HIV and AIDS throughout the world. 12 Political leaders and international
organizations around the world began to recognize the frightening dimensions and
enormous costs of the global AIDS epidemic.13 Economic issues were discussed even
prior to the year 2000. Most stories, however, dealt with funding and financing the
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domestic battle against AIDS, costs of prescription drugs, and philanthropic fundraising
efforts.14 After 2000, the economic impact of AIDS began to be emphasized in news
stories. More funds were needed to combat the growing AIDS epidemic. The following
news story published in The Washington Post is illustrative of such sentiments:
Last year AIDS killed almost 3 million people around the world. More
than 5 million were newly infected with HIV in 2000, nearly 4 million of
them in Africa. In Eastern Europe and South and Southeast Asia, there is
evidence that the disease is taking deadly hold. Closer to home, AIDS has
become the major cause of death among men in the Caribbean under 45.
As world finance and development ministers gather in Washington this
weekend for key meetings with the World Bank, International Monetary
Fund and the Group of Seven, these facts should command their attention.
What they underscore is that HIV/AIDS is no longer just a health problem
but a global development problem, threatening to reverse many of the
development gains made over the past half-century. More than that, it is an
international security problem. As Kofi Annan and others have said, what
we need is a war chest and a war strategy.
Money alone will not solve the problem, but it is a vital part of the
solution. Total global support for HIV/AIDS in developing countries last
year was probably under $ 1 billion, less than a third of the estimated need
in Africa alone.
For this reason, the bank supports the calls for the establishment of a
global fund to address prevention, care and treatment of HIV/AIDS, TB,
malaria and other infectious diseases within the context of meeting a series
of key targets known as the international development goals. Rich
countries must set an example by putting up funds and offering help to
those who speak out. Let us join with the G-7 and the U.N. system to
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commit to a global fund. Let us make this a pivotal moment in the fight
against HIV/AIDS.15
Compared to the previous case studies of SARS and the avian flu, for which
human rights issue were not paramount, linkages between human rights and HIV/AIDS
have been the focus of media stories since the 1980s. From 1981 to 1999, the media
published stories about discrimination against homosexuals in job settings and housing in
the United States. Stories about various domestic organizations, such as the AIDS
Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), rallying for availability of treatment and reduced
prices for drugs for people living with AIDS within the United States also were
covered. 16 Since 1999, news stories began to cover debates over reduced prices for
prescription drugs and access to ARVs at the global level.17 Stories about the plight of
minorities, women, drug users, prostitutes, and AIDS orphans, who were stigmatized and
often had no access to treatment and education about prevention, also were published.18
For example:
Access for All, the theme of next month's International AIDS Conference
in Bangkok, sets an appropriately high standard for the world's response to
the pandemic. Unfortunately, all too many prevention and treatment
programs fail to address the needs of most of those living with the virus,
especially in Africa: women and girls. It's time to design programs
targeted to the risks that women and girls face in a world of AIDS.
15
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Most prevention messages, and certainly those favored by the Bush
administration, focus on the "ABC" approach to fighting HIV-AIDS:
abstinence, be faithful, and use condoms. While important messages, these
things are often not within women's power to control.
Sixty percent of those living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa are women
and girls. Girls between the ages of 15 and 19 are infected at rates as much
as five times higher than boys their age. This disproportionate impact is
linked to social and economic factors that severely undermine women's
control over their sexual lives. In a climate where sexual abuse and
exploitation of women and girls are widespread and usually goes
unreported, how can they practice abstinence? When married women,
many of whom were child brides, have been faithful to the
husbands
who are infecting them, how do messages about monogamy help them
protect themselves?19
The news stories mentioned above indicate that HIV/AIDS has been framed in
different ways and that many groups and institutions besides the community of scientists,
epidemiologists, and public health professionals have been able to push the global
scourge of HIV/AIDS onto the political and public agenda in the United States. Epistemic
communities and civil society organizations have taken up the issue of pharmaceuticals
and treatment access for all. The UN and the World Health Organization (WHO) have
also emphasized the economic, security, and human rights dimension of AIDS.
To help understand the changing nature of media coverage of AIDS, I conducted
content analysis of media reports (1999–2007); the results are presented in the first part
of this chapter. National surveys conducted by various organizations have shown that
news media is the major source of information about HIV/AIDS for the public.
According to national surveys conducted in the United States in 2003, 72% of Americans

19

Janet Fleischman, “Beyond 'ABC': Helping Women Fight AIDS,” The Washington
Post, June 29, 2004.

171

identified print and visual media as their primary source of information about
HIV/AIDS.20 In 2004, 71% of respondents got information about HIV/AIDS from the
media.21 In 2006, 61% of respondents identified the media as the major source of news
about HIV/AIDS.22 In a survey conducted in June 2011, media remained the top source
of information about HIV/AIDS across racial/ethnic and all age groups. The second part
of this chapter presents an analysis of public opinion polls to determine whether shifts in
media framing of HIV/AIDS led to changes in public behavior and attitudes towards the
disease. Public opinion data were collected by the Harvard School of Public Health
(Project on Public and Biological Security) and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
These data were retrieved from the Kaiser Family Foundation’s Health Poll Search
database. Additional data were collected from surveys conducted by the Pew Research
Foundation and polls conducted by the Associated Press and CNN. The third section of
the chapter describes a correlation analysis of media coverage of HIV/AIDS versus
survey data about HIV/AIDS during the corresponding time period. The fourth section
discusses the effects of agenda setting and framing on the public’s evaluation of different
frames relevant to HIV/AIDS.
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6.1. Content Analysis of Newspaper Reports

Using the Lexis-Nexis academic database, samples for this study were drawn
from two major national newspapers (The New York Times and The Washington Post)
between June 1, 1999 and June 30, 2007. The search process was different for this case
study than in the cases of SARS and avian flu. The process was refined to obtain the most
relevant results, as more than 3,000 stories were found during the original search. The
term HIV/AIDS was added to the controlled vocabulary search, in addition to the
requirement that it be present in the “headline or lead paragraph” and in at “least five
occurrences in the article.” Obituaries and letters to the editor were excluded from the
search. In the initial search of The New York Times returned 1,088 stories, and that of
The Washington Post returned 972 stories. Because the stories returned by Lexis-Nexis
were not ordered in any way other than the date, every fourth story was included in the
pool (Table 6.1). Four frames (biomedical, economic, human rights, and security) were
identified in the news stories. Coding criteria similar to those used for SARS and avian
flu were used for HIV/AIDS.

6.2. Data Analysis: The Mean Ratios of Four Coverage Types/Newspapers

The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics as well as comparative
statistics such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). All analyses were conducted using
Excel and SPSS. The overall level of coverage was first examined in terms of number of
articles. Table 6.1 shows the total number of articles for each newspaper and for the two
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newspapers combined during the sampling period of June 1, 1999 through June 30, 2007.
The two newspapers had similar numbers of articles published and similar average word
counts.
Table 6.1: Data Sources and Overall Coverage

Newspaper
The New York Times
The Washington Post
Overall

Number
of
Articles
243
296
539

Start date
6/22/1999
6/1/2009
6/1/2009

End date
6/30/2007
6/29/2007
6/30/2007

As HIV spread to different geographic regions, local and international media
covered these stories. Each of the news stories on HIV from The New York Times and
The Washington Post was coded as follows for the region or country that was the focus of
the story: USA, countries other than USA, global impact, or geographic region not
mentioned. Table 6.2 shows the frequency of articles relevant to each geographic
location.
Table 6.2: Frequency of News Content by Geographic Location.

Newspaper
New York
Times
The
Washington
Post
Overall

USA
101
(39.0%)

Other
countries
124
(47.9%)

Geographic Location
Global
Not
impact mentioned Start date
30
(11.6%) 3 (1.5%) 6/22/1999

106
(34.6%)
207
(36.6%)

140
(45.8%)
264
(46.7%)

46
(15.0%)
76
(13.5%)
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End date
6/30/2007

14 (4.6%)

6/1/2009

6/29/2007

18 (3.2%)

6/1/2009

6/30/2007

About half of the articles in each newspaper focused on regions other than the
United States. A higher percentage of stories focusing on the United States were
published in The New York Times than in The Washington Post. There were also a
number of stories that discussed the global impact of HIV in an increasingly
interconnected world.
Because the news articles were coded for content or type of coverage and
weighted for length, the news data were further analyzed with a focus on different types
of coverage. Mean ratios of the four coverage types were computed for each region and
are listed in the Table 6.3. The biomedical ratio was highest (0.30) in articles focused on
the impact of HIV/AIDS on the United States, whereas the biomedical ratio was lowest
(0.19) in articles focused on other countries. The mean biomedical ratio was 0.25 for the
global impact context. The mean economic ratio was lowest (0.13) in articles focused on
the United States, and the articles that focused on other countries and the overall global
impact had similar economic ratios (0.25–0.26). The mean human rights ratio was similar
for all three geographic categories (0.08–0.11), and the mean security ratio was very
small for all three categories (< 0.05).
Table 6.3: Mean Ratios for Coverage Type by Region

Region
USA
Other
countries
Global
impact
Not
mentioned

Biomedical
Ratio

Economic
Ratio

Security
Ratio

0.30

0.13

0.01

Human
Rights
Ratio
0.11

0.19

0.26

0.01

0.10

6/19/1999 6/18/2007

0.25

0.25

0.04

0.08

8/19/1999 6/29/2007

0.25

0.20

0.01

0.10

7/1/1999
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Start date

End date

6/1/1999

6/30/2007

6/30/2007

Table 6.4 summarizes the mean ratios for the four coverage types. The coverage
patterns for the two newspapers were similar. Overall, the biomedical ratio was highest
(0.26), the mean economic ratio was 0.20, the mean human rights ratio was 0.10, and the
security ratio was very small (0.01).
Table 6.4: Mean Ratios for Coverage Type in The New York Times and The
Washington Post

Newspaper
The New
York Times
The
Washington
Post
Overall

Frame

Time
Interval

Number
of
Articles

Biomedical
Ratio

Economic
Ratio

Security
Ratio

Human
Rights
Ratio

243

0.27

0.23

0.01

0.11

6/22/19996/30/2007

296

0.25

0.17

0.01

0.08

6/1/19996/29/2007

539

0.26

0.20

0.01

0.10

6/1/19996/30/2007

A one-way ANOVA followed by Tukey’s test was used to test for differences in
ratios among the four frames over the entire sampling period. Overall, the two newspaper
sampled devoted on average 26.0% (Table 6.5) of their coverage to the biomedical frame.
The biomedical frame remained a central focus throughout the entire sampling period,
and it had significantly higher coverage than the other three frames (p < 0.0001). The
economic frame had the second highest coverage (20.0%), and it was significantly higher
than those of the security and human rights frames (p < 0.0001). The human rights frame
had the next highest coverage (10.0%), and it was significantly higher than that of the
security frame (p < 0.0001).
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Table 6.5: Comparison of the Four Frames over the Entire Sampling Period
P-values for Mean Ratio Pairwise Comparisons Among the Four Frames (HIV)
Entire
Least
Human
Sampling
Frame
Square Economic
Biomedical Security
Rights
Period
Mean
Economic
0.20
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
Human
0.10
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
6/1/99–
Rights
6/30/07
Biomedical
0.26
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
Security
0.01
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

6.3. Changes in Media Coverage over Time

The changes in media coverage in terms of the number of articles published and
the ratios of the four frames were summarized over semiannual and quarterly intervals.
Appendix Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 show semiannual averages of the four frames, and
Appendix Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 show quarterly averages of the four frames.
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Figure 6.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time at Quarterly Intervals

Figure 6.2: Changes in Media Coverage over Time at Semiannual Intervals
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On a semiannual basis, the biomedical ratio gradually increased from the second
half of 1999 until the second half of 2001. It dropped slightly at the beginning of 2001
and then increased to the highest level at the beginning of 2002. It dipped again to the
lowest level during the second half of 2002. Over the time interval studied, the
biomedical ratio increased and decreased four times until the first half of 2007. Overall,
the highest level was 0.34 during the first few months of 2002 and the lowest level was
0.17 during the second half of 2002. The economic ratio was lowest (0.12) during the
first half of 1999, and then it increased during the second half of 1999 though the first
half of 2001. It reached its peak value (0.29) three times: at the beginning of 2001, during
the second half of 2002, and during the second half of 2003. The human rights ratio was
highest (0.16) during the second half of 1999, and then it went up and down multiple
times. The lowest level (0.04) was recorded during the second half of 2005. The security
ratio was always small. Its peak (0.07) occurred during the first half of 2001; otherwise it
was always less than 0.05.
The data analysis at quarterly intervals (Appendix Table A6.2 and Appendix
Figure 6.1) further revealed that the biomedical ratio was the highest among the frames
studied throughout the entire sampling period, with the exception of April–June and
October–December, 1999; April–June, 2001; October–December, 2002; October–
December, 2003; July–September, 2004; and April–September, 2005. During April–June,
1999, both the economic and human rights ratios were higher than the biomedical ratio.
In October–December, 1999, the human rights ratio was the highest, and in April–June,
2001, October–December, 2002, October–December, 2003, July–September, 2004, and
April–September, 2005, the economic ratio was highest among the frames studied.
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A closer look at these data tables illustrates that biomedical issues were always
dominant. The security frame also was prominent in 2001. It is important that the
economic frame was dominant in the second half of 1999 and in 2001, 2002, 2003, and
2005 because one of the arguments given for declaring HIV a security threat was that it
posed grave economic consequences. HIV was securitized in 2000–2001. This galvanized
the attention of policy makers in the United States and of international organizations,
which pledged huge amounts of money and also called for more economic funds to fight
the disease. This was also the time when several news stories focused on the economic
causes of the disease (e.g., why poor and uneducated women and men were infected by
the disease). This was also the time when biomedical issues were less prominent and
security and economic framings of the disease were dominant in media stories. The
human rights issue peaked at the time when ARVs went on the market and then remained
a constant issue in the human rights debate linked to HIV. Effective treatment against
these infectious diseases required development of new drugs and vaccines, and
widespread access of these drugs and medicines. However, there was a conflict between
these two objectives. 23 The development of new drugs required heavy investment in
research by pharmaceuticals. Often it took more than twelve years to pass through all the
stages of drug development and the only way for them to recover these high costs were to
patent these drugs and charge high prices for these drugs. These drugs were often
unaffordable by poor countries, and this issue brought health advocacy groups and many
23
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non state actors campaigning for universal access to treatment and drugs in direct
confrontation with the pharmaceutical industries.
To examine the media volume (number of articles published) and the relative
proportion of articles focusing on each geographic region, a bar chart was constructed at
semiannual intervals (Figure 6.3). On average, 34 articles were published in each half
year, out of which 13 articles focused on the United States, 17 articles focused on other
regions, and 5 articles focused on the global impact of the disease. Since 2000, the media
has covered the impact of HIV/AIDS on countries outside the United States. This does
not mean, however, that reports about HIV in the United States declined. HIV continued
to be an important health topic in news reports.

Figure 6.3: Number of Articles Focusing on the Impact of HIV/AIDS on different
Geographic Regions over Time at Semiannual Intervals.
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6.4. Public Opinion Analysis

The public opinion survey data were drawn from a secondary database
corresponding to the time period during which these news stories were published. Public
opinion data were collected mainly from the I Poll data bank, Polling the Nation, and the
Health Poll Search of the Kaiser Family Foundation. All survey results are based on
representative national samples of adults aged 18 or older. With very few exceptions, the
sample sizes of these surveys were at least 1,000 respondents. Shifts in public opinion
about infectious diseases were evaluated by analyzing exact and similarly worded
questions about issues related to HIV.
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Specifically, these questions assessed:

a) willingness to support harsh public health measures such as quarantine and to make
changes in daily behavior to curb the spread of disease; b) precautionary steps taken and
behavioral

changes

made

in

personal

lives

due

to

fear

of

the

disease; c) concerns about the spread of the disease and likelihood of contracting the
disease; and d) support for federal funding to improve the country's ability to respond to
new infectious diseases.
The data were analyzed using descriptive statistical methods. The z-test was used
to compare the proportion of subjects who responded positively or negatively in each
survey. Survey responses were grouped together to form positive or negative responses.
For example, survey responses such as “very worried” and “somewhat worried” or
“extremely likely” and “very likely” were grouped together. All analyses were carried out
24
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using Excel and SPSS/PASW. Z-test scores > the absolute value of 1.96 at the 95%
confidence interval were considered to be statistically significant.
Five survey questions were examined to determine if Americans were willing to
make changes in their behavior to avoid risk of infection with HIV/AIDS (Appendix
Table A6.3). The surveys were conducted between August 2002 and April 2006.
Participants were asked if they needed more information about how to use condoms, how
to talk with children about HIV, where to get tested for HIV, how to talk with a doctor or
health care provider about HIV, and how to talk with a partner about HIV. On average,
75% of respondents answered “no,” which is significantly higher than the percentage of
subjects choosing “yes.” The average percentage of subjects who thought they needed
more information about how to talk with children about HIV was approximately 39% and
that for where to get tested for HIV was about 28%. The percentage of respondents,
asking for more information about how to use condoms, and how to talk with doctors or
partners was rather low (about 14–19%).
Four sets of questions were examined to determine if Americans had undertaken
precautionary steps to prevent contracting HIV/AIDS (Appendix Table A6.4). These
surveys were conducted between February 2000 and April 2006. The first set of questions
asked whether the subjects had been tested for HIV. The questions were worded in
slightly different ways (i.e., if people had ever been tested, whether they had been tested
within the past 12 months or within the past 2 years). All surveys except the one
conducted between December 10, 2002 and January 19, 2003 showed that a significantly
higher percentage of respondents had never been tested for HIV (on average ~35%
answered “Yes”). In the survey conducted between December 10, 2002 and January 19,
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2003, a significantly higher percentage of respondents had been tested for HIV (~64%
answered “Yes”). The second question asked whether the subjects had ever talked with a
doctor or health care provider about HIV and AIDS. A similar trend was observed for this
question: A higher percentage of subjects answered “Yes” (50%) in the survey conducted
between December 10, 2002 and January 19, 2003, whereas in the three surveys
conducted between August 14 and October 26, 2000, March 15 and May 11, 2004, and
March 24 and April 18, 2006, a significantly higher percentage of subjects answered “no”
average, only ~35% answered “Yes”). The third question asked whether the respondents
and their partners ever had a conversation about whether to get tested for HIV/AIDS. In
the survey conducted between December 10, 2002 and January 19, 2003, 51% of
respondents answered “Yes” and 49% answered “No.” In the March 15–May 11, 2004
survey, a higher percentage of subjects answered “No” (~54%). The last question asked
participants whether they had ever talked about HIV or AIDS with (their) children. All
three surveys showed a significantly higher percentage of subjects responding positively.
This is indicative of the public’s concerns about HIV as far as children are concerned.
This response is consistent with responses to the second question in the “willingness to
change behavior” category, which asked parents if they needed more information about
talking with children about AIDS.
Ten sets of questions were evaluated to examine concern about the spread of the
disease and the perceived likelihood of being exposed to HIV/AIDS (Appendix Table
A6.5). The surveys were conducted between September 1997 and May 2007. The first set
of questions asked whether HIV was a more urgent problem or a less urgent problem for
the United States than it was a few years ago. The surveys were worded slightly
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differently. Respondents were asked if the problem was more urgent, a bigger problem,
or if the number of HIV infections had increased. On average, about 50% of subjects
agreed that HIV was a more urgent or a bigger problem. More respondents thought HIV
infections had increased than decreased in the survey conducted between March 24 and
April 18, 2006. A significantly higher percentage of subjects thought the HIV problem
was the same or a lesser problem in the survey conducted between April 23 and May 6,
2007.
The second question asked subjects if they thought the United States today was
making progress or losing ground as far as the problem of HIV was concerned. The first
survey was conducted from June 13 to June 23, 2002. No significant difference was
found between subjects who thought the country was making progress vs. not making
progress. When the same question was asked between March 15 and May 11, 2004,
October 4 and October 9, 2005, and March 24 and April 18, 2006, a significantly higher
percent of subjects did not think the United States was making progress. The third
question sought public opinion about the magnitude of the HIV problem. A significantly
higher percentage of subjects thought HIV was a very big or a moderately big problem. A
lesser percentage of subjects thought HIV was a small problem or not a problem at all.
The fourth question asked whether respondents were personally worried or
concerned about HIV. A significantly higher percentage of subjects chose “not too
concerned” or “not concerned at all” compared to the percentage of subjects who were
“very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” for the question asked at 10 different times.
On average, 32% of subjects chose “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned.” The fifth
question asked whether parents were concerned about their sons or daughters being
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infected with HIV. On average, 66% of subjects were very concerned or concerned or
thought that the HIV problem was a major problem for teens. The percentage of people
who were “very concerned” and “concerned” or thought HIV was a “major problem”
was significantly higher than the percentage of respondents who were “not concerned,”
“not concerned at all,” or considered it a “minor problem” and “not a problem at all.”
The sixth question asked Americans about the most urgent health problem facing
this nation today. On average, 19% stated that HIV was the most urgent health problem.
In the survey conducted in 2000, HIV was ranked second to cancer. In 2002, it was
ranked fourth in order of urgency. HIV was seen as the second most urgent health
problem in surveys in 2004 and 2005. In a 2006 survey, it was ranked as the third biggest
health problem facing the nation. The seventh question asked respondents if they viewed
HIV as a serious issue. On average, 95% of respondents thought HIV was a very serious
or somewhat serious issue.
The final three sets of questions sought public opinion about HIV in countries
outside the United States. The eighth question examined public opinion about the most
urgent health problem facing the world today. In 2000, HIV was viewed as the most
urgent health problem facing the world. In subsequent surveys conducted in 2002, 2004,
and 2006, it was ranked as the second most urgent problem facing the world. On average,
38% of subjects chose HIV as the most urgent health problem. The percentage of subjects
who chose HIV as the most urgent problem was highest in the survey conducted between
July 18 and July 21, 2002. In this survey, about half of respondents chose HIV as the
most urgent health problem among the major health problems listed. The ninth question
sought to determine if the public viewed HIV as an epidemic in countries outside the
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United States. On average, 69% of respondents viewed HIV as an epidemic, and this was
a statistically significant result. The last question asked the public whether they thought
the world was making progress or losing ground in the fight against HIV/AIDS. A
significantly higher percentage of subjects thought the world was at about the same place
or losing ground compared to the percentage of subjects who thought the world was
making progress on HIV.
Four sets of questions were examined to assess support for federal spending on
programs aimed at prevention and treatment of HIV (Appendix Table A6.6). These
surveys were conducted between September 1997 and April 2007. The first question
sought to compare the amount of money the federal government spends on HIV/AIDS to
the amount spent on other health problems, such as heart disease and cancer. On average,
39% of subjects thought the federal government spent too little money on HIV. The
second question asked about public opinion on federal funding for AIDS prevention and
treatment in general. On average, 48% of subjects thought that the federal government
spent too little. The percentage of people who supported more spending increased
steadily from 39% in 2002 to 52% in 2004 and to 63% in 2006.25 The third question
asked whether spending more money on HIV/AIDS prevention in the United States
would lead to meaningful progress in slowing the epidemic. A significantly higher
percentage of respondents (about 60%) in surveys conducted between March 15 and May
11, 2004 and March 24 and April 18, 2006 thought that spending money would lead to
meaningful progress, whereas in the survey conducted between October 4 and October 9,
25

Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Survey of Americans on HIV/AIDS,” May 2006.
Available online at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7513.pdf, last accessed August
11, 2011.
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2005, a significantly higher percentage (about 56%) of subjects thought spending money
“would not make much difference.” The fourth question assessed the importance that the
public attached to improving treatment and prevention of HIV and AIDS. The majority of
subjects (approximately 96%) thought it was important (“extremely important,” “very
important,” and “somewhat important”) for all surveys conducted between March 30 and
April 3, 2005, March 31 and April 4, 2006, and April 11 and April 15, 2007.

6.5. Relationship between Media Coverage and Public Opinion (Overall Samples)

In this part of the analysis, the relationship between the media coverage and
public opinion was examined through graphs and Pearson correlation analysis. I have
included the data from time period when both media coverage and public opinion data
were available and divided the common time period into monthly, weekly or quarterly
intervals, as appropriate. The mean ratios for the four frames from media coverage and
the mean percentage of positive responses were computed within each time section and
both mean values were plotted in the same graph with line chart (media coverage) and
scatter plot (public opinion). The key events in the HIV/AIDS time line were also plotted
in the graph to help interpret the trend of change in both media coverage and public
opinion both qualitatively and quantitatively. The Pearson correlation coefficient was
computed whenever appropriate in order to determine whether a significant correlation
between one of the media frames and public opinion exists. All analysis was done on
Excel and SPSS. All four measures of public opinion were examined in relation to media
coverage a) willingness to take precautionary measures, b) actual behavior changes made,
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c) perception of HIV/AIDS as threat, and d) support for federal funding on prevention
and treatment of HIV/AIDS.
Surveys were conducted to assess people’s willingness to undertake
precautionary measures or make behavioral changes as a way of preventing HIV/AIDS.
Respondents were questioned (Appendix Table A6.7) about whether they needed more
information about five issues (Q1: how to use condoms, Q2: how to talk with children
about HIV/AIDS; Q3: where to get tested for HIV; Q4: how to talk with a doctor or
health care provider; Q5: how to talk with a partner about HIV and AIDS). Surveys were
conducted between August 14 and October 26, 2000 and March 15 and May 11, 2004.
Additionally, Q3 and Q5 were repeated between March 24 and April 18, 2006. To assess
whether changes in media coverage of HIV had an impact on the percentage of people
who needed more information about these aspects of HIV, a plot of news coverage data
versus percentage of people requiring more information (i.e., those who answered “yes”)
was constructed. A semiannual interval was used in order to examine the change over
time in the two sets of data (See Appendix Table A6.7 and Figure 6.6).
The first question asked whether the public needed more information about how
to use condoms. The percentage of respondents who answered “yes” to this question did
not change from 2000 to 2004 (both 14%). The percentage of people who answered “yes”
to the other four questions was lower in 2004 compared to 2000. In particular, the
percentage of respondents needing more information about how to talk with children
about HIV/AIDS dropped from 44% to 33%. During the same period, the biomedical
ratio increased from 0.24 to 0.32 and the economic ratio increased from 0.15 to 0.27,
whereas the security and human rights ratios both declined (from 0.05 to 0.00 and from
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0.10 to 0.03, respectively). During the survey conducted between March 24 and April 18,
2006, both Q3 and Q5 had the highest percentage of “Yes” responses among the three
surveys. The percentage of people who answered “Yes” to the need for more information
on testing for HIV was rather low (< 20%) in the surveys. In contrast, Americans felt that
they needed more information about how to talk to children about HIV/AIDS. There was
also an increase in media reports that infections among teenagers was on the rise in the
United States between 2004, and 2007.26 The percentage of “yes” answers about how to
talk to a partner about the disease was low (< 20%) during the first two surveys, but it
increased to 31% during the third survey conducted in 2006.
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Sewell Chan, “Rise Seen in H.I.V. Infections among Young Men,” The New York
Times September11, 2007; Susan Levine, “D.C. Criticized for Not Treating AIDS as a
Citywide Health Crisis; Report Describes Problem as Epidemic, Response as Anemic,”
The Washington Post August10, 2005.
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Note: Q1.Do you need more information about how to use condoms to protect
against HIV? Q2.Do you need more information about how to talk with children about
HIV? Q3.Do you need more information about where to go to get tested for HIV? Q4.Do
you need more information about how to talk with your doctor or health care provider
about HIV? Q5. Do you need more information about how to talk with your partner about
HIV?
Figure 6.4: Change in Media Coverage over Time and Public Opinion about
Willingness to Change Behavior

A total of four questions were analyzed to examine actual behavioral changes
made by the American public to prevent infection from HIV (Appendix Table A6.8).
These questions asked respondents if they had ever been tested for HIV or talked about
HIV with their doctors, partners, or children. The highest percentage of “yes” answers to
the first three questions (been tested, talked to a doctor, or talked to a partner) occurred in
the survey conducted between December 10, 2002 and January 19, 2003. The fourth
question asked whether the respondents had ever talked to their children about HIV, and
the highest percentage of “yes” answered occurred in the survey conducted between
September 29 and October 23, 2003. The observed changes in public opinion do not seem
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to correspond strongly to any changes in media reports over time, as the media coverage
was relatively stable over the years. The public opinion data are too limited to reveal
correlations because the survey duration was rather long (e.g., February 7 to September 4,
2000) and the time interval between surveys was rather large (> 1 year). It is only
possible to examine the relationship between media coverage and public opinion if more
public opinion data collected over a shorter time interval (for example, every month or
quarter of the year) become available.

Note: Q1. Have you, yourself, ever been tested for HIV? Q2. Have you ever talked with
a doctor or health care provider about HIV and AIDS? Q3. Have you and your partner
ever had a conversation about whether to get tested for HIV/AIDS? Q4. Have you
personally ever personally talked about HIV or AIDS with (your) child or not?
Figure 6.5: Changes in Media Coverage over Time and Public Opinion about Actual
Behavioral Changes over Time

Ten questions were used to examine how concerned Americans were about HIV
(Appendix Table A6.9 and Figure 6.8). Question 3 was excluded from the correlation
analysis because only one survey was conducted in 1998 and no media data were
available for 1998. On average, about half of the respondents considered HIV an urgent
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problem for United States during the entire sampling period. The percentage of positive
responses does not appear to correspond to changes in the media frame, as the media
coverage was relatively stable over the sampling years.
The second question asked respondents if the United States was making progress
in controlling HIV or was losing ground. The question was repeated four times in June
13–June 23, 2002, March 15–May 11, 2004, October 4–October 9, 2005 and March 24–
April 18, 2006. The highest percentage of positive response (making progress) was found
during survey conducted in 2002 (49%), and then this percentage continuously remained
consistent, during the surveys conducted in 2004 (47%), 2005 (41%), and 2006 (40%).
During the same period of time, the biomedical ratio also dropped from 0.34 in the first
half of 2002, to 0.28 in the first half of 2004, to 0.23 in the second half of 2005, and
finally to 0.22 in the first half of 2006. At this time, the economic, security, and human
rights ratios increased or dropped multiple times. Correlation analysis showed a positive
significant correlation between the biomedical ratio and percentage of positive responses
to perceived progress on the disease. (r = 0.9621, p = 0.0379, Table 6.8).
The third question asked the respondents if they saw the spread of HIV and other
infectious diseases as a big or small problem. The question was asked twice during
August 19–September 8, 2002 and April 23–May 6, 2007. In the first survey, 83% of
respondents thought HIV was a very big or moderately big problem, and in the second
survey 81% of respondents thought HIV was a very big or moderately big problem.
During the same period of time, the security and human rights exhibited a very minor
change, but the biomedical ratio was higher and the economic ratio was lower during the
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second survey period. Because only two surveys were conducted within a time interval of
~5 five years, the data are too limited to safely draw any conclusion about the correlation.
The fourth question asked the respondents if they were personally concerned
about HIV. The survey was repeated between September 17 and October 19, 1997,
February 7 and September 4, 2000, August 14 and October 26, 2000, January 25 and
January 28, 2001, June 13 and June 23, 2002, November 3 and November 5, 2003, March
15 and May 11, 2004, March 15 and May 11, 2004, July 19 and July 21, 2004, and March
24 and April 18, 2006. On average, 32% of respondents indicated that they were very
concerned or somewhat concerned about HIV. The percentage of positive responses,
especially in surveys in 2000 and 2001 was significantly positively correlated with the
security ratio (r = 0.7410, p = 0.0354, Table 6.8).
The fifth question asked how concerned the respondents were about a son or
daughter becoming infected with HIV. The question was repeated in surveys
administered between August 14 and October 26, 2000, September 29 and October 23,
2003, March 15 and May 11, 2004, and March 24 and April 18, 2006. The highest
percentage of “very concerned” and “somewhat concerned” responses occurred during
the first survey conducted in 2000. On average, 66% of subjects chose “very concerned”
or “somewhat concerned” in this series of surveys.
The sixth question asked Americans what they perceived as the most urgent
health problem facing the United States today. The question was repeated in surveys
conducted between August 14 and October 26, 2000, June 13 and June 23, 2002, March
15 and May 11, 2004, October 4 and October 9, 2005, and March 24 and April 18, 2006.
The highest percentage of respondents choosing HIV as the most urgent problem
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occurred in the survey conducted in 2000. Although statistical analysis did not show any
significant correlation between public opinion and media coverage for the fifth and sixth
questions, framing of HIV in Africa as a threat to security in the United States by policy
makers and academia highlighted the urgency of the situation to the public in 2000. There
has however been a steady decline in public naming HIV/AIDS as the most urgent
problem facing United States. Data on HIV/AIDS by ethnicity and race has however
shown that Latinos and Black Americans are more likely than White Americans to see
HIV/AIDS as a more urgent health problem in the country.27
The seventh question asked respondents how serious a problem they thought
HIV/AIDS was in the United States. Despite perceptions of progress in treatment of HIV,
many Americans still recognize the seriousness of HIV as a disease. The question was
asked between July 13 and July 17, 2001, July 10 and July 11, 2002, July 19 and July 21,
2004, May 10 and May 16, 2004, and June 23 and June 28, 2005. In all of the surveys,
the percentage of positive responses was very high (94–96%). No significant correlation
was found between public opinion and any particular media frame for this question.
However, the high percentage of positive responses suggests that the high volume of
media coverage of economic, security, and human rights aspects of HIV highlighted the
seriousness of the issue.
The eighth question asked the respondents what they perceived as the most urgent
health problem facing the world today. The question was repeated from August 14 to
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October 26, 2000, June 13 to June 23, 2002, July 18 to July 21, 2002, March 15 to May
11, 2004, and March 24 to April 18, 2006. On average, 37% of subjects chose HIV as the
most urgent health problem. The highest percentage of respondents choosing HIV was
42% in the 2002 survey, and the lowest was 34% in the 2006 survey. Statistically, no
significant correlation was found between public opinion and any particular media frame
for this question. However, a significant amount of media coverage about the spread of
HIV/AIDS around the globe seemed to have influenced public opinion in the United
States.
The ninth question asked Americans if they viewed the HIV problem worldwide
as an epidemic or as a pandemic. The question was asked first between June 13 and June
23, 2002, and it was repeated in a survey conducted between March 15 and May 11,
2004. In 2002 and 2004, 67% and 70% of the respondents surveyed viewed HIV as an
epidemic. No significant correlation was found between public opinion and media
coverage for this question. The last question asked the public if they thought the world
today was making progress on controlling the spread of HIV. The question was repeated
in surveys conducted from June 13 to June 23, 2002, March 15 to May 11, 2004, and
March 24 to April 18, 2006. The percentage of positive responses (more urgent problem
in the world) increased significantly between 2000 and 2002. Conceptualizing of
HIV/AIDs as a security threat could have influenced the public in United States. In all
three surveys, only 35–38% of the respondents thought that the world was making
progress. More than 50% of respondents felt that the situation in the world was about the
same or not improving. No significant correlation was found between public opinion and
changes in media coverage for this question. Once again, however, the increased media
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coverage of HIV/AIDS around the world seems to have influenced public opinion about
the worsening HIV situation in the world.

Note: Q1.Do you think HIV is a more urgent problem or a less urgent problem, or is it the
same for this country, than it was a few years ago? Q2.Thinking about the way the
problem of HIV/AIDS affects the United States today; do you think the problem is about
the same as it has been, that the U.S. today is making progress in this area, or that the
U.S. today is losing ground? Q3.Please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a
moderately big problem, a small problem or not a problem at all, the spread of HIV/AIDS
and other infectious diseases. Q4. Bearing in mind the different ways people can be
infected with HIV--how concerned are you personally about becoming infected with
HIV? Q5.How concerned are you about a son or daughter becoming infected with HIV?
Q6.What do you think is the most urgent health problem facing this nation today? Q7.
How serious a problem would you say HIV/AIDS is? Q8. What do you think is the most
urgent health problem facing the world today? Q9 .Which one of the following two
statements comes closer to your views? The HIV/AIDS problem worldwide is best
described as 'an epidemic.' HIV/AIDS is a serious problem, but it is an exaggeration to
call it 'a pandemic.' Q10.Do you think the problem of HIV/AIDS is about the same as it
has been, that the world today is making progress in this area, or that the world today is
losing ground?
Figure 6.6: Changes in Media Coverage and Public Opinion about HIV as a Threat
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Table 6.6: Correlation Analysis Results for Media Coverage and Percentage of Positive
Responses
Correlation between
percentage of positive
responses vs. media
coverage (Pearson
correlation coefficients (pvalue))

Q2 (Is the United States
making progress on the
HIV problem?)

Q4 (How concerned are
you about the HIV
problem?)

0.9621
0.02756
(p=0.0379)
(p=0.9484)
0.48849
-0.33981
Economic
(p=0.5115)
(p=0.4102)
-0.48961
0.7410
Security
(p=0.5104)
(p=0.0354)
-0.0803
-0.34711
Human Rights
(p=0.9197)
(p=0.3996)
Note: Only questions with at least one significant correlation with media coverage are
shown.
Biomedical

Four sets of questions asked between 1999 and 2007 were examined to study
changes in public support for federal funding on programs aimed at treatment and
prevention of HIV (Appendix Table A6.10). The first two questions asked respondents if
they supported spending on HIV prevention and treatment. The third question asked if
respondents thought that spending more money on HIV would lead to meaningful
progress in slowing the epidemic. The fourth question asked respondents if improving
treatment and prevention of HIV and AIDS was important. The highest percentage of
positive responses for the first three questions occurred in the survey conducted during
the first half of 2006. The second highest percentage of positive responses for the first
and third questions occurred during the first half of 2004. The fourth question was
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repeated three times during the first half of 2005, 2006, and 2007. More than 96% of
responses were positive in all three surveys. This indicates that the general public favored
funding of HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention programs. Because the time interval
between surveys is rather large and the media coverage remained stable over the years,
there is no clear correlation between media coverage and opinion.

Note: Q1.Do you think federal spending on AIDS is too high, low or about right
compared to other diseases? Q2. Do you think the federal government spends too much
money on AIDS, too little money, or about the right amount? Q3.Do you think that
spending more money on HIV/AIDS prevention in the United States will lead to
meaningful progress in slowing the epidemic, or that spending more money won't make
much difference? Q4.Do you think improving treatment and prevention of HIV and
AIDS is important national priority?
Figure 6.7: Changes in Media Coverage over Time and Public Support for Funding

6.6. Relationship between Media Coverage and Public Opinion (Coverage of the United
States)
A similar correlation analysis was performed to examine the impact of media
coverage of HIV/AIDS within the United States on public opinion (Table 6.6). A separate
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analysis was conducted to assess whether media coverage that focused only on HIV
within the United States had a different impact on public opinion. This analysis was done
to test the hypothesis that the public in the United States is more concerned about any
infectious disease if it is shown to affect the United States and its people in many
different ways. 207 of the 565 articles focused on the impact of HIV on the United States.
Correlation analysis was conducted for question, assessing American perception
of threat from the disease. Only three questions showed a significant correlation.
Responses to Q3 (Appendix Table A6.5), which asked respondents, “Will spending more
money on HIV/AIDS prevention in the United States lead to meaningful progress in
slowing the epidemic?” were

positively correlated with the human rights ratio.

Responses to Q7 (Appendix Table A6.5), which asked the public, “How serious a
problem would you say HIV/AIDS is in the United States?” was negatively correlated
with the human rights ratio. This could be attributed to the fact that most stories that
addressed the rights issue in the United States were about the rights of black women and
homosexuals. Responses to Q 8 (Appendix Table A6.5), which asked Americans, “What
is the most urgent health problem facing the world today?” were positively correlated
with the economic ratio. This could be due to the fact that most of the stories with an
economic frame focused on developing countries.
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Table 6.7: Correlation Analysis for Changes in Media Coverage (United States) only and
Percentage of Positive Responses.
Q3.Do you think that
spending more money on
Q8. What do
HIV/AIDS prevention in
you think is
the United States will
the most
lead to meaningful
urgent health
progress in slowing the
problem
epidemic, or that
facing the
spending more money
world today?
won't make much
difference?
0.84957
–0.54918
0.03683
Biomedical
(p=0.0684)
(p=0.4508)
(p=0.9765)
–0.70965
0.97061
–0.08352
Economic
(p=0.1794
(p=0.0294)
(p=0.9468)
0.17678
0.57132
NA
Security
(p=0.7761
(p=0.4287)
NA
-0.92825
0.63864
0.99854
Human Rights
(p=0.0228)
(p=0.3614)
(p=0.0344)
Note: Questions repeated at least thrice were included in the analysis. NA: security ratio
Correlation
Q7: How serious
between % of
a problem would
positive responses
you say
vs. media
HIV/AIDS is as a
coverage (Pearson
public health
Correlation
problem in United
Coefficients (pStates?
value))

was zero

6.7. Discussion and Conclusion

This study assessed whether increased news coverage of HIV/AIDS influenced
Americans’ perception, awareness, and concern about the disease. The detailed analysis
of various surveys presented above confirms that the public is concerned about the
disease and sees it as a serious public health issue, both in the United States and around
the globe. One thing that has remained consistently high is the public’s support for
funding of treatment and prevention programs on HIV. Since 1997, the majority of the
American public feels that American domestic spending on fighting HIV/AIDS epidemic
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is too low. Even when asked if federal spending on HIV/AIDS was too low compared to
money spent on other diseases, the percentage of respondents who viewed it as too low
has never dipped below 50%.28 Between 2004 and 2006, the percentage saying that the
federal government spends too little money on HIV/AIDS in general increased from 52%
to 63%, and the share saying spending on HIV/AIDS is too low compared with other
diseases increased from 42% to 48% (Appendix Table A6.6). Americans are also
supportive of funding for HIV prevention and treatment overseas and at home. This study
also sought to understand whether certain ways of representing or “framing” the disease
evoked greater concern and led people to make behavioral changes in their personal lives
and support government funding on research on AIDS vaccine, treatment and prevention
programs on the disease domestically and globally. Two hypotheses were proposed in
this context. First, the frames represented prominently in the media will tend to mobilize
public support for policies associated with those frames. In this study the biomedical
frame was the dominant frame throughout the sampled period, followed by the economic
frame. Statistical analysis revealed a positive correlation between increased coverage of
biomedical news about HIV and perceived sense of progress in treatment of disease
(Table 6.6). This is in contrast to the findings on studies of SARS and avian flu. This can
be attributed to the fact that most biomedical coverage of HIV/AIDS since 1999 has
focused on discovery of ARVs and how they can increase the longevity of patients living
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with HIV.29 As news focused more and more on the growing epidemic in Asia, Eastern
Europe, and Africa, Americans at home felt more and more that AIDS was a less urgent
biomedical problem for them.30 The HIV/AIDS epidemic has hit African Americans and
Latinos much more than whites, and thus the former are more likely to view this disease
as an urgent problem. Survey data have shown, however, that while the share of African
Americans and Latinos who consider HIV/AIDS to be the most urgent health problem
facing the nation is higher than that for whites, the percentage of African Americans and
Latinos who believe HIV/AIDS is an urgent health problem has also declined over time.
This is despite the fact that CDC estimates that there are 50,000 new infections in the
United States and more than 50% of these are among Black men and women in United
States. 31 Blacks accounted for 57% of deaths due to HIV in 2007, whereas 13% of
Latinos died of AIDS in 2007. 32 Despite rising figures of HIV infections, even the
African Americans and Latino population in the United States see the nation as making
progress on AIDS.33 Advances in treatment of AIDS have greatly reduced AIDS related
mortality, and perinatal transmission, and people in United States now live with AIDS
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much longer than they did in 1980s.34 In fact there were reports of Americans resorting to
risky sexual behavior as they feared the disease even less.35 Thus, the biomedical frame
did not lead people to undertake significantly high behavioral changes. The concern
among parents of teenagers among all Americans has however, remained high.
The second hypothesis proposed that Americans will see security and human
rights frames as less relevant, compared to biomedical and economic frames (which will
be more dominant in news reports). This analysis, however, revealed a positive
correlation between the security frame and the level of personal concern about HIV/AIDS
among Americans (Table 6.6). Though security frame was not the dominant frame in the
overall sampled period, it was the dominant frame in 2000, and 2001, and all surveys on
AIDS in these years showed increased worry about the disease. This is a very important
finding, as it was the first time a disease was framed as a threat to national and
international security. Until 1999, AIDS was considered a “gay plague” that affected only
homosexuals in the United States.36 Framing HIV/AIDS as a security concern with grave
economic consequences had a tremendous impact on Americans. It showed the public
that in a global world, diseases in any other part of the world could impact Americans at
home. Thus, while not the most repeated frame, the security frame was understood as
relevant by the American public.
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To further test the second hypothesis, a separate correlation analysis was
conducted using public opinion data about AIDS and media stories that focused
exclusively on the impact of HIV/AIDS on the United States (Table 6.7). The analysis
showed a positive correlation between the economic frame and the perception among
Americans that HIV/AIDS was the most urgent problem facing the world. Stories with
an economic focus exhorted developed countries like the United States not to be
indifferent to AIDS, which was described as the greatest humanitarian crisis of all time.37
A number of stories debated President Bush’s “abstinence only” funding programs and
noted how they were unfair to many stigmatized minorities, including sex workers and
children orphaned by AIDS in developing countries.38 At the same time, several stories
discussed how the AIDS epidemic had the potential to impact Americans in the United
States. This also influenced Americans’ views on the urgency of the AIDS problem
worldwide.39
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The analysis also revealed a positive correlation between the human rights frame
and American support for spending more money on AIDS prevention to slow the
epidemic in the United States. While news stories that drew linkages between HIV/AIDS
and human rights in countries outside the United States were about medical patents and
access to HIV drugs, stories that discussed human rights and AIDS in the context of the
United States were more about rights of stigmatized minorities such as gays, drug
addicts, prisoners, homeless people, and black women infected with AIDS.40 Many news
stories discussed how the stigma surrounding AIDS prevented many people from getting
tested for the virus.41 This led to increased transmission of infection to newborn babies
and to men or women who did not know the HIV status of their partners. Emphasis was
given to preventive efforts such as supplying clean needles and syringes to drug addicts,
providing routine testing for pregnant women and gay and bisexual men, providing
greater availability of condoms, and providing sex education and abstinence programs for
teenagers.42 Several stories described the plight of rural communities that lacked medical
facilities to treat AIDS patients. 43 Also influencing public opinion were stories that

40

Avram Goldstein, “High Rate of Infection Found in Md. Prisons,” The Washington
Post, May 7, 2003; Lisa Frazier, “AIDS’s Somber Reminder; Quilt Holds Urgent
Message for African Americans,” The Washington Post, December 1, 1999.
41

David Brown, “U.S. Recommends Routine Testing For the AIDS Virus,” The
Washington Post, September22, 2006.Marc Santora, “City AIDS Report Highlights Risk
to Black Men and Women,” The New York Times, February4, 2006.
42

Ceci Connolly, “CDC Urges Routine HIV Testing; New Screening Procedures Aimed
Especially at Pregnant Women,” The Washington Post, April 18, 2003; Editorial,
“Modifying the State laws,” The New York Times, February 6, 2006; Editorial, “Playing
Games With AIDS,” The New York Times, September 26, 2006.
43

Steven Gray, “Outcasts in the Country,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2000.
206

discussed discrimination in the work places and providing housing for AIDS patients.44
New stories carried demands made by AIDS advocacy groups for health care and
scientific research on HIV treatment and prevention in the United States and abroad.45
Americans supported funding for prevention and treatment from HIV/AIDS, as they
understood (as reinforced in the human rights frame linked to HIV) that poverty,
inequality of incomes, stigmatization and discrimination against AIDS patients needed to
be addressed. Several AIDS activists like Jonathan Mann and his group further framed
the denial of these rights to HIV patients as an impediment to the realization of HIV
prevention strategies.46 Thus, the human rights frame had a considerable influence on
Americans when the frame emphasized the suffering due to AIDS of Americans. At the
same time, respondents believed that not all Americans were at risk of contracting the
disease. Perhaps for this reason, the study showed a negative correlation between the
human rights ratio and perceived seriousness of the disease among the American public.

44

Sewell Chan, “Metro Briefing New York: Albany: Sate Reverses Housing Decision
For Tenants With H.I.V.,” The New York Times, February 28, 2007.
45
Karlyn Barker , “98 Arrested in Capitol Hill AIDS Protest; Marchers Seek More Funds
for Care, Research,” The Washington Post, May 21, 2004.
46

Sofia Gruskin and Daniel Tarantola, Health and Human Rights in Perspectives on
Health and Human Rights edited Sofia Gruskin, Michael A. Grodin, George J. Annas,
Stephen P. Marks(Routledge, New York: 2005), 3-58

207

6.8. Limitations of the Study

The goal of this study was to analyze changes in media coverage about
HIV/AIDS and the correlation between such changes and the percentage of positive
responses over time in surveys about the disease. Correlations could not be established
accurately between some of the variables. This could be because the HIV issue is far
more complicated than a simple linear model can explain. The epidemiology and
transmission routes of HIV infection differ from those of the other infectious diseases
studied (SARS and avian flu). These differences make the general population feel far less
vulnerable to HIV infection and shape people’s attitudes about the disease. Unlike SARS
and avian flu, which took people around the globe by surprise, HIV/AIDS has been
around for more than 20 years, and a sense of apathy and complacency has arisen among
many people. The term “AIDS fatigue” has been coined to describe this phenomenon.
These factors mean that it is not so easy to determine the direct impact of media framing
on people’s concerns about HIV.
A second limitation of the study is that the secondary surveys available covered a
wide time interval (half a year to one year), which made it difficult to study short-term
changes in media coverage. If more surveys with a monthly or quarterly interval were
available, the correlation between media coverage and changes in public opinion could be
examined in more detail.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I investigated whether Americans’ attitudes and opinions about
infectious diseases were influenced by how the issue was framed. The content analysis of
news reports about SARS, avian flu, and HIV/AIDS highlighted an evolving debate over
how to understand the problem of infectious diseases. To examine potential framing
effects on public reactions to infectious diseases, I studied nationally representative
surveys about infectious diseases retrieved from survey data banks.
I posed two main questions in this dissertation: Which frame was the most
powerful and influential in shaping public opinion about global infectious diseases, and
what explains varying patterns of responses to framing of three different infectious
diseases? The two main hypotheses tested were as follows: 1) The frames that are
represented predominantly in the media will tend to mobilize public support for policies
associated with those frames, and 2) when economic and biomedical issues are dominant,
people will be more likely to support inconvenient policies such as quarantine and
support federal funding of programs aimed at combating infectious diseases because they
will see these issues as more personally relevant compared to security and human rights
frames.

7.1. Research Findings

My analysis produced three major findings. First, the biomedical frame was the
dominant frame in all three case studies, and the economic frame was the second most
represented frame. The human rights and security frames were less prominent in all the
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three case studies. Second, framing effects were present, although the degree of the
respondents’ opinion changes was not particularly large. Finally, different frames seemed
to evoke a differing pattern of responses about the three different infectious diseases.
The varying patterns of responses can be explained in several ways. In the case of
SARS, the biomedical frame dominated in terms of overall coverage during the sampling
period, but it was the economic frame (the second most represented frame) that was
positively correlated (r = 0.6542, Table 4.7) with levels of worry about the disease. There
are two plausible explanations for why the biomedical frame did not evoke a very
powerful response among Americans. First, while the media reported extensively on the
biomedical aspects of SARS, it also described how the United States public health system
was equipped and well prepared to control the disease following the incident of anthraxtainted mail in 2001.1 Second, through July 2003, 192 cases had been reported in the
United States, including 159 suspected and 33 probable cases.2 Of the 33 probable cases,
only 8 were confirmed in the laboratory as SARS. There were no reported cases of
SARS-related deaths in the United States. The economic coverage of SARS became more
prominent in the post-outbreak era as news stories focused on losses to various sectors of
the economy in an increasingly interconnected world. Stories that framed SARS as an
economic issue, focused on losses incurred not only by the travel and tourism industry
but also by other industries and corporations that had offshore and manufacturing units in
1
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September 27, 2009.
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Asia. 3 News stories also reported approximately $50 billion in losses to the global
economy, mainly from losses in tourism, trade, and the retail industry. 4 Other stories
reported on disease-related medical costs. The economic frame may not only have raised
the general level of concern among the American public, therefore, but may also have
done so in a way to which many Americans saw as personally relevant.
In the case of avian flu, the biomedical frame was dominant throughout the
sampled period. Around 50% of the news stories were on biomedical aspects of avian flu.
Statistically significant correlations were found between increased medical news
coverage and respondents’ level of worry about being exposed to avian flu. Between
2005 and 2007, media reports highlighted the spread of avian flu to countries around the
world and reported on cases of transmission to humans.5 Both The New York Times and
The Washington Post published many stories stating that avian flu killed 100% of
3
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infected domesticated chickens and depicting the deadly scenario that would occur if the
constantly evolving bird flu virus became capable of human-to-human transmission.
Several studies discussing the possibility that the virus would mutate into a flu that could
be transmitted among people were published and discussed in the media.6 The scientific
community and public health specialists were not the only ones highlighting concerns
over the spread of bird flu. The media reported extensively on the concerns of the
President of the United States and the United States Congress about avian flu.7 Thus, the
biomedical frame invoked a general public danger (relevant to all people). Moreover,
because there was no known cure for avian flu, all people were equally susceptible to it.
In this sense, media coverage of avian flu contrasts with that of SARS. In the latter case,
occurring shortly after the anthrax scare, coverage highlighted the extent of preparation to
manage the spread of the disease. In the case of avian flu, after 2005, confidence in such
preparations had apparently subsided, and the coverage tended to stress the dangers.
The study of HIV/AIDS revealed different results. As in the other cases, the
biomedical frame was the most common in media reports. Moreover, the correlation
between the biomedical frame and the perception of progress in fighting the disease was
high. One explanation for these results is that HIV/AIDS has been in the news since 1980.
In the 1980s, a great deal of research was conducted to identify the origins and
transmission routes of HIV. Over time, HIV/AIDS lost its reputation as a mystery illness
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for people in the United States. Since 1987, when antiretroviral treatment was approved
by the FDA and as widespread combination antiretroviral therapy was made more widely
available to people infected with HIV, the number of people dying from the disease has
declined substantially. A decade of surveys conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation
has shown a decreased sense of concern among people in the United States about the
disease. In 1987, two-thirds of Americans (68%) surveyed felt that HIV/AIDS was the
most urgent health problem facing the country. 8 The numbers have declined steadily
since then. In 1990, the share of people naming HIV/AIDS as the most urgent health
issue declined to 49%. In 2000, the percentage was 25%, and it decreased to 21% in 2004,
17% in 2005, and 7% in 2009. 9 Although these values are higher for the African
American community and the Latino community compared to the white community, they
also have declined over time, even though sections of these communities have been
severely affected by the disease. As news stories focused on scientific advancements in
the treatment of HIV and the availability of antiretrovirals to more and more people in the
United States, a sense of complacency took root. The decreased sense of urgency seems
to parallel a perceived sense of progress.10 People now view HIV more as a chronic and
manageable disease than as a death sentence, despite the fact that HIV still cannot be
cured.
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HIV/AIDS was presented as a security issue in new stories in 2000 and 2001, and
this is the time period when surveys revealed an increased concern about the disease
among Americans in general. The percentage of positive responses to questions on
personal concern about HIV/AIDS especially in surveys in 2000 and 2001 was positively
correlated with the increase in security coverage. According to polls conducted by Kaiser
Family Foundation (Table A6.5) in January 2001, nearly 26% of the surveyed population
was personally concerned about HIV, an increase from 19% in 2000, and 24% in 1997.
Until 1999, AIDS was considered by most Americans to be a “gay plague.”11 Framing
HIV/AIDS as a security concern with grave economic consequences probably triggered
increased concern about HIV/AIDS. It showed the public that in a global world, diseases
in any other part of the world could impact Americans at home. The HIV/AIDS
pandemic in Africa, which was spreading fast to other countries of the world where the
United States had strategic interests, was framed as a security threat to Americans at
home. As university researchers and national and international security agencies sounded
the alarm, the public responded with increased worry.
A separate correlation analysis of news stories discussing the impact of
HIV/AIDS specifically on the United States showed that, unlike the cases of SARS and
avian flu, framing HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue also evoked powerful responses.
Human rights activists in the United States took up the issue of civil and political rights
of homosexuals and protested against stigmatization, marginalization, and discrimination
of people infected with HIV/AIDS. They pressed the United States government to
11
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incorporate rights for HIV patients into domestic legislation. 12 Slowly, human rights
concerns became linked to the issue of free and non-discriminatory access to medicines
and treatment. In the United States, the demographic profile of people with HIV/AIDS
also changed over time. It no longer affected only white homosexual males but also
prisoners, injection drug users, African American and Latino women, and people living
in inner cities and poorer neighborhoods in America. Many news stories discussed how
stigma surrounding AIDS prevented many people from getting tested for AIDS.13 This
led to increased transmission of infection to newborn babies and to men or women who
did not know the HIV status of their partners. Several stories described the plight of rural
communities that lacked medical facilities to treat AIDS patients.14 These news stories
produced two contrasting effects. While, Americans sympathized with people suffering
from HIV/AIDS, and supported increased spending on HIV/AIDS prevention and
treatment; at the same time most people probably believed that AIDS is a disease caused
by certain behaviors and that the general population is not at risk of being infected. Media
coverage dealing with the impact of HIV/AIDS on human rights in the United States was,
therefore, positively correlated with Americans’ support for increased federal funding for
HIV/AIDS prevention in the United States, and showed a negative correlation between
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the human rights ratio and perceived seriousness of the disease among the American
public.15
The economic frame was positively correlated with the perception that HIV/AIDS
was the most urgent health problem in the world. After 2000, more than half of the news
stories on HIV/AIDS in the newspapers were about the spread of HIV in countries
outside the United States. A number of stories debated President Bush’s “abstinence
only” funding programs and suggested that they were unfair to stigmatized minorities,
including sex workers and children orphaned by AIDS in developing countries.16 News
stories emphasized not only the economic impact of the spread of the disease but also
how certain economic factors (e.g., poverty, illiteracy, and prostitution) in poor countries
were responsible for the spread of the disease. International organizations and
government agencies urged developed countries to make financial contributions to
prevent the spread of HIV and to provide treatment for poor people affected by the
disease. At the same time, several stories discussed how the AIDS epidemic had the
potential to impact Americans in the United States. This might have persuaded
Americans that HIV/AIDS was the most urgent health problem in the world.
The three diseases differ in terms of their origins, pattern of transmission,
consequences for human health, and potential to inflict damage. These differences may
account for different public health intervention strategies and elicit different responses
from people. HIV can be transmitted when specific body fluids of an infected person
15
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come into direct contact with mucous membranes, damaged tissue, or the blood stream
(e.g., through exchange of needles, tattoos, blood transfusion) of another person.17 What
makes HIV different from other infectious diseases is its cultural variation: Certain
subpopulations (homosexuals, drug addicts, and sex workers and their partners) have
been most affected by the disease.
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Public health officials distinguish such

"communicable" diseases from "contagious" diseases. 19 While many human-to-human
transmissible diseases may be categorized as communicable, diseases such as SARS and
avian flu are considered to be contagious because they can be transmitted much more
rapidly through close proximity and/or bodily contact. While anyone and everyone may
be at risk of being infected with a respiratory disease, only certain behavior and bodily
contacts can cause the HIV virus to be transmitted.
Nevertheless, across all three diseases, certain common framing effects emerged.
The biomedical frame was readily available and accessible to the public, as biomedical
issues were predominantly displayed and repeated in media reports. Except in the case of
SARS, this frame was generally associated with greater public worry and more support
for inconvenient public policies. The economic frame produced a similar effect. And the
human rights and security frames, in general, had less influence on public opinion,
perhaps because people found them less personally relevant or perhaps because they were
17
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more contested issues. In case of HIV/AIDS, however, security and human rights did
matter.

7.2. Implications of the Study

This dissertation uses a research design that studied framing effects (measured by
changes in responses to survey responses) when respondents were exposed to multiple
frames over a period of time. Unlike many previous experimental studies of framing
effects in which respondents were exposed to opposing frames in measured quantities,
this study sought to understand framing effects when respondents were exposed to
multiple frames in real world conditions. 20 Case studies of three infectious diseases
explored changes in framing in terms of the number of articles published and the ratios of
the four frames at quarterly, monthly, and weekly intervals. As hypothesized, some
frames seemed to invoke more worry and concern over the disease than others. Increased
prominence (frequency) of some frames also increased public anxiety. This finding
supports Shanto Iyengar's observation that repeated exposure to a frame, such as
frequently hearing a news story emphasizing economic losses increases the accessibility
of the frame and enhances its effect. 21 When any concept is recently or frequently
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repeated, it comes easily to one’s mind when making judgments on a policy.22 Other
frames, even if they were not the most frequently appearing frames, apparently prompted
concern over the disease because they were perceived to be more relevant or stronger
frames.23 In this fashion, the economic frame may have increased public anxiety about
SARS when coverage pertained specifically to the United States. The findings of this
study are generally consistent with those of Paul Brewer, David Wise, Paul Sniderman,
and Sean Theriault, who posited that framing results are not as robust when respondents
are exposed to dual or multiple frames (compared with single frames). On the other hand,
this study of infectious disease framing does not support the claim that exposure to
competing frames necessarily mitigates the impact of any one frame. As Rodger Payne
puts it:
No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded
and it would be virtually impossible to know in advance if an apparently
compelling frame in one situation would also prove persuasive when
applied to an analogous case 24
The analysis of the three case studies suggests that some frames are more powerful and
persuasive than others. The findings are also consistent, therefore, with the work of James
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Druckman and Dennis Chong, who stated that even when multiple frames are present,
some frames are likely to be more persuasive than others.
Most previous studies of the relationship between public opinion and foreign
policy have focused on issues of war, military intervention, international trade, and
foreign aid. These are all domains in which public opinion was not considered to be an
important determinant in the formulation of government policies. Yet scholars have
increasingly pointed out that the boundaries between domestic policy and international
policy have become blurred, particularly in an era of globalization. 25 A better
understanding of the consequences of issue framing thus has important implications that
spill across the boundaries separating domestic public health policy and foreign policy.
Issue framing is likely to be relevant to international agreements about surveillance,
border controls, immigration issues, and distribution of vaccines and antiviral drugs to
control transnational diseases. 26 Moreover, public support, compliance, and trust are
extremely important for the effectiveness of policies on naturally occurring infectious
disease and the threat of a bioterrorist attack on the country. In the case of an epidemic or
a bioterrorist attack, national governments may have to enforce inconvenient measures
such as quarantine and increased domestic surveillance. These measures might invite the
wrath of civil rights activists or other people unwilling to comply. For all of these
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reasons, it is important to know what kind of media messages or frames appeal most to
the public.
Curiously, security framing in stories about SARS and avian flu was less
prominent than one might have expected. Since the end of the Cold war, the debate about
new security threats has dominated the field of security studies. Some scholars have
argued for widening the field of security studies to include issues such as the environment
and infectious diseases. Others have been critical of widening the concept of security to
include non-traditional threats such as infectious diseases.27 The defining moment in this
debate was the declaration of HIV/AIDS as a threat to international security by the
United Nations Security Council in 2000. HIV/AIDS was framed as a comprehensive
threat to citizens, economies, the military, public health, social instability, peacekeeping
forces, and state institutions. Doing so was an effective means of mobilizing the
enormous resources and leadership of the United States government and international
organizations in dealing with this issue. Over the years, security became a contested
concept, as many schools of thought conceptualize security in a variety of ways.28 For
example, some AIDS activists were critical of conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a security
issue. They felt, “portraying the illness as an overwhelming ‘threat’ works against
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ongoing efforts to normalize social perceptions regarding HIV/AIDS.” 29 Some also
objected that framing certain infectious diseases as security threats would divert
resources overwhelmingly to research on those diseases at the expense of many other,
more lethal diseases that affect primarily the poorest countries of the world.30 A decade
after HIV/AIDS was securitized as a threat to national and international security, several
academic and policy studies have questioned whether linkages between HIV/AIDS and
state security may have been overdrawn. 31 While these debates played out mainly in
academia, the absence of a clear security framing effect suggests that the debate never
gained much public traction.
In any case, the security frame was not very prominent overall in stories about
SARS or avian flu. Few news reports drew linkages between SARS and threat to the state
and its institutions, although many stories discussed SARS as a serious threat in so far as
it spread rapidly, killed individuals, and caused economic disruption in some of the most
robust economies of the world. The security frame was somewhat more prominent in
news coverage about avian flu. Between June 2005 and May 2006, there were several
news reports framing avian flu as a security threat. The National Security Strategy of the
United States (2006) outlined threats from pandemic diseases such as avian flu, which
recognized no borders. President Bush reportedly considered using the military to enforce
29
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quarantine in the event of a pandemic.32 The security frame did not, however, have much
impact on public perception of threat from avian flu. Despite the big debate in the field of
security studies about expanding the notion of security to include non-traditional security
threats, the literature on non-traditional security threats published since the end of the
Cold War does not seem to be securitized in American public opinion.
One possibility is that an "overdose" of news coverage about other security threats,
particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, may have led to security fatigue on the part of
the American people.33 People in the United States seem to understand the importance of
global infectious disease as a biomedical and economic issue and to support surveillance,
vaccine research, and quarantine. A similar pattern may exist, moreover, in the
relationship of climate change and global warming to national security. 34 Despite
considerable research into the security implications of climate change and global
warming, which could involve mass climate-driven migration and increased instability in
states, public opinion surveys have repeatedly shown that the American public is not
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convinced that climate change is a serious threat to the United States.35 In a Gallup Poll
survey conducted in 2010, 48% of the population felt that threat from climate change was
exaggerated; this was an increase from 39% in 2009 and 31% in 1991 when the question
was first asked by Gallup Poll.36 Such observations have prompted considerable work on
what kind of frames could influence American public opinion and make issues such as
global warming and climate change more salient to Americans.37 For example, scholars
of environmental studies have suggested ways to frame climate change to illustrate a
more local and regional impact in order to make the frame personally relevant. Other
scholars have recommended framing climate change as a threat to human security to
address issue of human vulnerabilities and to raise concern among people about
environmental issues.38 This study suggests that although framing effects can be powerful,
even concerted efforts at policy framing, such as those to "securitize" non-traditional
security issues, can be very difficult to accomplish.

35

Security Council Holds First-Ever Debate on Impact of Climate Change on Peace,
Security, Hearing Over 50 Speakers. United Nations, April 17, 2007. Available online
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm, last accessed November
10, 2011.
36

Lydia Saad, Increased Numbers Think Global Warming is Exaggerated, March 11,
2009, Gall Up. Online available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/116590/IncreasedNumber-Think-Global-Warming-Exaggerated.aspx, last accessed November 9, 2011.
37

George Lakoff “Why it Matters How We Frame the Environment,” Environmental
Communication 4, 1(2010): 70-81.
Nicole Detraz, “Threats or Vulnerabilities? Assessing the Link between Climate
Change and Security,” Global Environmental Politics11, 3(2011):104-20.
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APPENDIX
The Appendix has tables that were useful in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. They could not
be included in the chapters, as they are lengthy and detailed. Nevertheless, they are
important to understanding the empirical analysis in this dissertation. The tables listed
below display changes in media coverage for all the three infectious diseases, at weekly,
monthly, and yearly intervals.
Appendix Tables A4.1-A4.2 discusses changes in media coverage about SARS
over time at monthly and weekly intervals between March15, 2003 and June30, 2004.
Appendix Tables A5.1 and A5.2 display changes in media coverage on avian flu at
monthly and quarterly intervals between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2007.
Appendix Tables A5.3, A5.4, A5.5 and A5.6 show weekly coverage of media frames in
2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively. Appendix TableA6.1 and A6.2 display Changes
in media coverage on HIV/AIDS over time at Semi Annual and Quarterly Intervals
between June30, 1999 and December 31, 2007.
Public Opinion polls were analyzed and studied in great details. The following
tables have details of survey questions and recorded responses.TablesA4.3, A4.4, A4.5
contain questions on public support for quarantine, actual behavioral changes made, and
recognition of SARS as threat respectively. Table A5.7 display a list of questions
regarding willingness to change behavior in response to news about avian flu. Table A5.8
has questions about actual behavioral changes made in response to news about avian flu.
TableA5.9 shows questions about recognition of avian flu as a threat table and Table A
5.10 lists all questions about support for funding for research on avian flu.
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Table A6.3 contains a list of questions regarding willingness to change behavior
in response to news about HIV/AIDS. Table A6.4 lists questions about actual behavioral
changes made in response to news about HIV/AIDS. Table A6.5 lists questions about
recognition of HIV/AIDS as a threat. Table A6.6 lists questions on support for federal
funding on HIV/AIDS. Figure A6.4: show changes in media coverage over time and
public opinion on support for funding. Figure A6.3 shows changes in media coverage
over time and public opinion HIV/AIDS as threat Figure A6.2 shows changes in media
coverage over and public opinion about actual behavioral changes FigureA6.1 shows
changes in media coverage over time and public opinion about willingness to change
Behavior. All the four figures show changes in media coverage in response to news
stories about impact of HIV/AIDS on United States.

Table A4.1: Changes in Media Coverage about SARS over Time
(Monthly Intervals)
Time Interval
3/16/03–
4/15/03
4/16/03–
5/15/03
5/16/03–
6/15/03
6/16/03–
7/15/03
7/16/03–
8/15/03
8/16/03–
9/15/03
9/16/03–

No. of
Medical Economic Security
Articles Ratio
Ratio
Ratio

Human
Rights
Ratio

37

0.48

0.12

0.03

0.02

88

0.35

0.16

0.07

0.04

42

0.39

0.11

0.02

0.04

12

0.23

0.34

0.00

0.00

10

0.11

0.43

0.01

0.00

9

0.32

0.12

0.00

0.00

5

0.29

0.10

0.05

0.01
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10/15/03
10/16/03–
2
0.52
0.11
0.05
0.00
1/15/03
11/16/03–
9
0.46
0.07
0.01
0.00
2/15/03
12/16/03–
2
0.47
0.00
0.00
0.00
1/15/04
1/16/04–
2
0.15
0.11
0.00
0.00
2/15/04
3/16/04–
4
0.48
0.06
0.03
0.02
4/15/04
4/16/04–
1
0.42
0.00
0.08
0.00
5/15/04
5/16/04–
1
0.47
0.00
0.00
0.00
6/15/04
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as the
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number
of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio for each frame in a
given monthly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for all
news articles published in the monthly interval.

Table A4.2: Changes in Media Coverage about SARS over Time
(Weekly Intervals)
Time Interval
3/16/03–3/22/03
3/23/03–3/29/03
3/30/03–4/5/03
4/6/03-4/12/03
4/13/03–4/19/03
4/20/03–4/26/03
4/27/03–5/3/03
5/4/03–5/10/03
5/11/03–5/17/03
5/18/03–5/24/03
5/25/03–5/31/03
6/1/03–6/7/03
6/8/03–6/14/03
6/15/03–6/21/03

No. of
Articles
4
4
9
11
15
27
25
21
14
18
8
5
6
2

Medical
Ratio
0.46
0.60
0.37
0.43
0.52
0.40
0.27
0.33
0.33
0.39
0.44
0.40
0.43
0.13

Economic Security
Ratio
Ratio
0.01
0.00
0.18
0.19
0.09
0.18
0.19
0.14
0.11
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.31
0.59
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0.02
0.03
0.06
0.02
0.03
0.07
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.02
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.00

Human
Rights
Ratio
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00

6/22/03–6/28/03
4
0.29
0.18
0.00
0.00
6/29/03–7/5/03
3
0.17
0.12
0.01
0.00
7/6/03–7/12/03
2
0.32
0.58
0.00
0.00
7/13/03–7/19/03
4
0.18
0.23
0.00
0.00
7/20/03–7/26/03
1
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
7/27/03–8/2/03
3
0.15
0.29
0.04
0.00
8/3/03–8/9/03
1
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
8/10/03–8/16/03
2
0.07
0.55
0.00
0.00
8/17/03–8/23/03
3
0.30
0.07
0.00
0.00
8/24/03–8/30/03
1
0.00
0.50
0.00
0.00
9/7/03–9/13/03
3
0.50
0.01
0.01
0.00
9/21/02–9/27/03
1
0.45
0.00
0.00
0.00
10/12/03–10/18/03 2
0.13
0.17
0.00
0.00
10/19/03–10/27/03 1
0.00
0.33
0.00
0.00
10/28/03–11/3/03 2
0.36
0.03
0.09
0.03
11/11/03–11/17/03 1
0.49
0.14
0.04
0.00
11/18/03–11/25/03 1
0.60
0.05
0.04
0.00
12/10/03–12/16/03 1
0.45
0.17
0.07
0.00
12/17/03–12/23/03 3
0.59
0.02
0.00
0.00
12/31/03–1/6/04
2
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
1/7/04–1/13/04
2
0.32
0.27
0.04
0.01
1/14/04–1/20/04
3
0.34
0.00
0.00
0.00
1/28/04–2/3/04
2
0.30
0.09
0.00
0.00
3/12/04–3/18/04
1
0.29
0.04
0.00
0.00
4/25/04–5/1/04
2
0.51
0.03
0.02
0.00
5/2/04–5/8/04
2
0.44
0.08
0.04
0.05
5/23/04–5/29/04
1
0.42
0.00
0.08
0.00
6/20/04–6/26/04
1
0.47
0.00
0.00
0.00
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as the
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number of
sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio for each frame in a given
weekly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for all news articles
published in the weekly interval.
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Table A4.3: Questions Regarding Willingness to Change Behavior in Response to
News about SARS
Q1. Suppose you were exposed to someone who had SARS but you didn't know if
you had the disease. Would you be willing to be quarantined in your home for10
ten days in order to prevent spreading the disease?
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
April 11–15, 2003
May 2–6, 2003
Yes
92%
93%
No
7%
5%
Don't know
1%
2%
Q2. Suppose you were exposed to someone who had SARS but you didn't know if
you had the disease. Would you be willing to be quarantined for 2 or 3 weeks in a
health care facility to prevent spreading the disease?
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
April 11–15, 2003
May 2–6, 2003
Yes
94%
95%
No
4%
3%
Don't know
2%
2%
Q3. Recently, President George W. Bush signed an executive order adding SARS
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) to the list of diseases for which people can be
quarantined. Do you think this order threatens your personal rights and freedoms?
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
April 11–15, 2003
May 2–6, 2003
No
85%
83%
Yes
13%
13%
Don't know
2%
2%
Q4. Having heard about SARS, would you say you are much more likely to seek
medical help, a little more likely to seek help, or it has not affected whether you
would seek help if you or a family member got flu-like symptoms?
Survey date (Associated Press/ICR)
April 21–24, 2003
Much more likely
39%
A little more likely
30%
Would have no effect
29%
Don't Know
2%
Note: A significantly higher percentage of subjects was willing to be quarantined at home
or in a health care facility, thought adding SARS to the list of disease for which people
can be quarantined did not threaten their personal rights and freedoms, and was more
likely see help when they/their family member got flu-like symptoms according to z test
results (z score > 1.96 or < –1.96).
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Table A4.4: Questions about Actual Behavioral Changes Made in Response to News
about SARS
Q1. Have you avoided international air travel (that is airline travel outside the
United States) in the past 12 months because of SARS?
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
April 11–15, 2003
May 2–6, 2003
Yes
17%
9%
No
82%
91%
Don't know
1%
0%
Q2. Have you avoided people you think may have recently visited Asia?
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
Yes
No
Don't know
Q3. Have you avoided Asian restaurants
or stores?

April 11–15, 2003
16%
82%
2%

April 11–15, 2003
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
Yes
14%
No
86%
Don't know
0%
Q4. Have you used a disinfectant at home or at work to protect
against SARS?

May 2–6, 2003
11%
87%
3%

May 2–6, 2003
9%
90%
0%

April 11–15, 2003
May 2–6, 2003
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
Yes
21%
16%
No
78%
83%
Don't know
0%
0%
Q5. Have you talked with your doctor about health issues related to SARS?
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
Yes
No
Don't know
Q6.Have you avoided public events?

April 11–15, 2003

May 2–6, 2003

5%
94%
0%

6%
93%
0%

April 11–15, 2003
May 2–6, 2003
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
Yes
10%
7%
No
89%
92%
Don't know
0%
0%
Q7. Have you consulted a website for information about how to protect yourself
against SARS?
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April 11–15, 2003
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
Yes
9%
No
90%
Don't know
0%
Q8. Have you or someone in the family purchased a face mask?

May 2–6, 2003
8%
91%
0%

April 11–15, 2003
May 2–6, 2003
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
Yes
3%
3%
No
96%
96%
Don't know
1%
0%
Q9. Have you carried something to clean any object you think might have come in
contact with someone who has SARS?
April 11–15, 2003
May 2–6, 2003
Survey date (Harvard/ICR)
Yes
9%
6%
No
90%
94%
Don't know
1%
0%
Note: A significantly higher percentage of subjects did not avoid international air travel,
did not avoid people they thought may have recently visited Asia, did not avoid Asian
restaurants or stores, did not use a disinfectant at home or work to protect against SARS,
did not consult with their doctor about health issues related to SARS, did not avoid public
events, did not consult a website, did not purchase a face mask, and did not carry
something to clean any objects they thought might have come in contact with someone
who has SARS according to z test results (z score > 1.96 or < –1.96).
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Table A4.5: Questions about Recognition of SARS as a Threat
Q1. How worried are you that you or someone in your family will be exposed to
SARS? Data are from CNN/USA TODAY/GALLUP (04/05/03–04/06/03, 04/14/03–
04/16/03, 04/22/03–04/23/03) and Pew Research Centre/Princeton Survey Research
Associates (04/30/03–05/04/03)
April
April 5– April 14–
22–23,
6, 2003
16, 2003
2003

April 30–
May
4,
2003

Survey
date
Very
worried
10%
10%
11%
9%
Somewhat
worried
27%
22%
32%
28%
Not
too
worried
39%
43%
36%
29%
Not
worried at
all
24%
24%
21%
34%
No opinion 0%
1%
0%
0%
Q2. How worried are you that you or someone in your family will be exposed to
SARS? Data are from Pew Research Centre/Princeton Survey Research Associates
(04/30/03), CBS News/The New York Times (05/09/03–05/12/03), Stony Brook
Centre For Survey Research (05/01/03–05/20/03), Gallup (11/03/03–11/05/03)
April 30–
May 1–
May 9–12,
Novemb
May
4,
20,
2003
er 3–5,
2003
2003
2003

Survey
date
Very
worried
12%
8%
8%
15%
Somewha
t
worrie
d
23%
27%
27%
30%
Not too
worried
31%
35%
35%
26%
Not
worried
at all
32%
30%
29%
29%
No
opinion
2%
1%
1%
0%
Q3. How concerned are you that you or a family member will get SARS in the next 3
months? Data are from Harvard ICR (12/12/03–12/16/03, 10/29 /04–11/9/04)
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December
12–16,
2003

October 29–
November
9, 2004

Survey
date
Very
concerne
d
16%
10%
Somewha
t
worrie
d
14%
11%
Not too
worried
28%
25%
Not
worried
at all
42%
47%
No
opinion
1%
7%
Q4. Do you think that SARS is very likely to affect you or someone in your
immediate family in the next 12 months? Data are from the Harvard School of Public
Health Project on Public and Biological Security/ICR
January
April 11– April 25– May 2– July 18–
August 25–
Survey
7–11,
15, 2003
30, 2003
6, 2003 22, 2003
29, 2004
date
2004
Very
likely
5%
3%
3%
2%
4%
2%
Somewh
at likely 20%
11%
13%
4%
4%
5%
Not too
likely
42%
33%
37%
29%
33%
31%
Not
likely at
all
31%
46%
44%
62%
57%
56%
No
opinion
2%
7%
3%
3%
3%
6%
Note: A significantly higher percentage of subjects did not worry about being exposed to
SARS, did not have concern that they or a family member would get SARS in the next 3
months, and did not think SARS was very likely to affect them or someone in their
immediate family according to z test results (z score > 1.96 or < –1.96).

242

Table A5.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time (Quarterly Intervals)
Time Interval
Human
No. of Biomedical Economic
Security
(Months,
Rights
Articles
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Year)
Ratio
1–3, 2004
17
0.26
0.31
0.05
0.01
4–6, 2004
1
0.20
0.24
0.16
0.00
7–9, 2004
6
0.43
0.11
0.01
0.00
10–12, 2004
4
0.41
0.18
0.01
0.00
1–3, 2005
5
0.56
0.06
0.01
0.01
4–6, 2005
8
0.44
0.19
0.13
0.00
7–9, 2005
7
0.54
0.21
0.06
0.00
10–12, 2005
35
0.33
0.22
0.08
0.02
1–3, 2006
36
0.38
0.19
0.04
0.01
4–6, 2006
17
0.43
0.14
0.01
0.01
7–9, 2006
7
0.69
0.02
0.01
0.00
10–12, 2006
4
0.26
0.16
0.16
0.04
1–3, 2007
8
0.68
0.14
0.00
0.03
4–6, 2007
1
0.90
0.00
0.00
0.00
7–9, 2007
3
0.24
0.18
0.00
0.00
10–12, 2007
2
0.88
0.50
0.00
0.00
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as
the number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total
number of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio for each
frame in a given quarterly interval was calculated as the average of the
ratios for all news articles published in the quarterly interval.
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Table A5.2: Changes in Media Coverage over Time (Monthly Intervals)
Time
Interval

No. of
Articles

Medical
Ratio

Economic
Ratio

Security
Ratio

Jan, 2004
Feb, 2004
Mar, 2004
Apr, 2004
Jul, 2004
Aug, 2004
Sep, 2004
Oct, 2004
Nov, 2004
Dec, 2004
Jan, 2005
Feb, 2005
Mar, 2005
Apr, 2005
June,
2005
Jul, 2005
Aug, 2005
Sep, 2005
Oct, 2005
Nov, 2005
Dec, 2005
Jan, 2006
Feb, 2006
Mar, 2006
Apr, 2006
May,
2006
June,
2006
Jul, 2006
Aug, 2006
Sep, 2006
Nov, 2006
Dec, 2006
Jan, 2007
Feb, 2007
Apr, 2007
Jul, 2007

7
8
2
1
2
1
3
1
1
2
1
3
1
3

0.37
0.20
0.09
0.20
0.50
0.25
0.44
0.66
0.26
0.36
0.33
0.69
0.41
0.47

0.10
0.45
0.46
0.24
0.04
0.03
0.19
0.16
0.05
0.25
0.00
0.07
0.09
0.20

0.03
0.08
0.02
0.16
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.02

Human
Rights
Ratio
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.01

5

0.42

0.18

0.20

0.00

2
3
2
15
12
8
11
13
12
6

0.33
0.65
0.59
0.38
0.28
0.29
0.36
0.38
0.40
0.38

0.00
0.42
0.10
0.23
0.29
0.10
0.14
0.25
0.15
0.16

0.10
0.02
0.06
0.10
0.05
0.07
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00

6

0.41

0.11

0.02

0.01

5

0.52

0.16

0.02

0.00

2
4
1
2
2
1
7
1
1

0.51
0.73
0.90
0.29
0.23
1.00
0.63
0.90
0.14

0.00
0.04
0.00
0.11
0.21
0.00
0.16
0.00
0.43

0.00
0.01
0.00
0.15
0.17
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.00
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Aug, 2007
1
0.33
0.00
0.00
0.00
Sep, 2007
1
0.23
0.12
0.00
0.00
Nov, 2007
1
0.75
0.00
0.00
0.00
Dec, 2007
1
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as
the number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total
number of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio for each
frame in a given monthly interval was calculated as the average of the
ratios for all news articles published in the monthly interval.
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Table A5.3: Media Coverage: Weekly Average of the Four Media Frames in 2004
Time Interval

No. of
Articl
es
2
3
3
2
3
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2

Medical
Ratio

Economi Securit
c Ratio y Ratio

Human
Rights
Ratio
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

1/14/04–1/20/04
0.54
0.03
0.00
1/21/04–1/27/04
0.41
0.02
0.03
1/28/04–2/3/04
0.19
0.32
0.06
2/4/04–2/10/04
0.03
0.56
0.08
2/11/04–2/17/04
0.03
0.55
0.14
2/18/04–2/24/04
0.50
0.13
0.00
2/25/04–3/2/04
0.67
0.33
0.00
3/10/04–3/16/04
0.09
0.46
0.02
4/7/04–4/13/04
0.20
0.24
0.16
7/7/04–7/13/04
0.50
0.08
0.04
7/28/04–8/3/04
0.50
0.00
0.00
8/18/04–8/24/04
0.25
0.03
0.00
9/1/04–9/7/04
0.23
0.03
0.00
9/29/04–10/5/04
0.55
0.27
0.00
10/13/04–
1
0.66
0.16
0.00
0.00
10/19/04
11/3/04–11/9/04
1
0.26
0.05
0.02
0.00
12/22/04–
1
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
12/28/04
12/29/04–
1
0.50
0.50
0.00
0.00
12/31/04
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as the
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number
of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio of each frame in a given
weekly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for all news
articles published in the weekly interval.
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Table A5.4: Media Coverage: Weekly Average of the Four Media Frames in 2005
No. of
Medical
Economic Security
Human
Time Interval
Articles
Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
Rights Ratio
1/12/05–1/18/05
1
0.33
0
0
0
2/9/05–2/15/05
1
0.23
0.03
0.06
0
2/23/05–3/1/05
2
0.92
0.08
0
0
3/16/05–3/22/05
1
0.41
0.09
0
0.07
4/6/05–4/12/05
2
0.43
0.17
0.03
0.01
4/27/05–5/3/05
1
0.53
0.27
0
0
6/1/05–6/7/05
1
0
0.08
0.75
0
6/15/05–6/21/05
2
0.46
0.09
0.12
0
6/22/05–6/28/05
2
0.59
0.32
0
0
7/20/05–7/26/05
2
0.33
0
0.1
0
8/3/05–8/9/05
2
0.48
0.14
0.03
0
8/10/05–8/16/05
1
1
1
0
0
9/14/05–9/20/05
2
0.59
0.1
0.06
0
10/5/05–10/11/05
4
0.37
0.17
0.14
0.02
10/12/05–10/18/05
5
0.44
0.2
0.14
0.02
10/19/05–10/25/05
3
0.25
0.28
0.08
0.05
10/26/05–11/1/05
3
0.44
0.33
0
0
11/2/05–11/8/05
4
0.25
0.3
0.08
0.02
11/9/05–11/15/05
1
0.04
0.72
0
0
11/16/05–11/22/05
3
0.4
0.11
0.01
0
11/23/05–11/29/05
4
0.28
0.31
0.07
0.08
12/7/05–12/13/05
4
0.28
0.16
0.1
0.03
12/14/05–12/20/05
1
0.33
0
0
0
12/21/05–12/27/05
2
0.38
0.06
0.08
0
12/28/05–1/3/06
1
0.06
0
0.02
0
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as
the number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total
number of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio of each frame
in a given weekly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for
all news articles published in the weekly interval.
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Table A5.5: Media Coverage: Weekly Average of the Four Media Frames in 2006
No. of
Econo
Human
Medica
Security
Time Interval
Articl
mic
Rights
l Ratio
Ratio
es
Ratio
Ratio
1/4/06–1/10/06
4
0.36
0.06
0.01
0.01
1/11/06–1/17/06
2
0.69
0.01
0.00
0.00
1/18/06–1/24/06
4
0.20
0.31
0.09
0.00
2/1/06–2/7/06
3
0.20
0.17
0.05
0.00
2/8/06–2/14/06
3
0.57
0.09
0.00
0.01
2/15/06–2/21/06
4
0.19
0.39
0.03
0.01
2/22/06–2/28/06
3
0.51
0.34
0.04
0.06
3/1/06–3/7/06
3
0.32
0.33
0.06
0.00
3/8/06–3/14/06
3
0.44
0.00
0.00
0.00
3/15/06–3/21/06
1
0.33
0.33
0.00
0.00
3/22/06–3/28/06
4
0.60
0.09
0.07
0.00
3/29/06–4/4/06
2
0.25
0.06
0.02
0.01
4/5/06–4/11/06
2
0.56
0.00
0.00
0.00
4/12/06–4/18/06
2
0.19
0.37
0.00
0.00
4/19/06–4/25/06
1
0.64
0.09
0.00
0.00
4/26/06–5/2/06
1
0.14
0.13
0.00
0.00
5/10/06–5/16/06
4
0.44
0.07
0.03
0.02
5/24/06–5/30/06
2
0.35
0.21
0.00
0.00
5/31/06–6/6/06
1
0.69
0.00
0.00
0.00
6/7/06–6/13/06
1
0.91
0.36
0.00
0.00
6/21/06–6/27/06
2
0.46
0.00
0.03
0.00
6/28/06–7/4/06
2
0.29
0.22
0.03
0.00
7/12/06–7/18/06
1
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
8/2/06–8/8/06
2
0.93
0.00
0.03
0.00
8/16/06–8/22/06
1
0.79
0.14
0.00
0.00
8/30/06–9/5/06
1
0.27
0.00
0.00
0.00
9/6/06–9/12/06
1
0.90
0.00
0.00
0.00
11/15/06–11/21/06
1
0.00
0.22
0.29
0.17
11/22/06–11/28/06
1
0.57
0.00
0.00
0.00
12/6/06–12/12/06
1
0.38
0.00
0.00
0.00
12/13/06–12/19/06
1
0.08
0.42
0.33
0.00
Note: The ratio of each frame for a given news article was calculated as the
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number
of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio of each frame in a given
weekly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for all news
articles published in the weekly interval.
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Table A5.6: Media Coverage: Weekly Average of the Four Media Frames in 2007
No. of
Human
Medica Economic Security
Time Interval
Articl
Rights
l Ratio
Ratio
Ratio
es
Ratio
1/10/07–1/16/07
1
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1/31/07–2/6/07
2
0.46
0.02
0.00
0.00
2/7/07–2/13/07
2
0.55
0.30
0.00
0.05
2/14/07–2/20/07
1
0.58
0.47
0.00
0.11
2/28/07–3/6/07
2
0.90
0.00
0.00
0.00
4/18/07–4/24/07
1
0.90
0.00
0.00
0.00
7/11/07–7/17/07
1
0.14
0.43
0.00
0.00
8/1/07–8/7/07
1
0.33
0.00
0.00
0.00
9/19/07–9/25/07
1
0.23
0.12
0.00
0.00
11/21/07–11/27/07
1
0.75
0.00
0.00
0.00
12/12/07–12/18/07
1
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
Note: The ratio of each frame for a given news article was calculated as the
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number
of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio of each frame in a given
weekly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for all news
articles published in the weekly interval.
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Table A5.7: Questions Regarding Willingness to Change Behavior in Response to News
about Avian Flu
Q1. Do you agree that quarantining is important to limit the spread of avian flu? Data are
from Wall Street Journal Online/Harris Interactive (08/03/05–08/05/05)(04/25/06–
04/27/06), Fox Broadcasting Company (10/10/05–10/11/05), Harvard/ICR (01/17/06–
01/25/06), Associated Press/IPSOS (04/18/06–04/20/06).
Aug 3-5,
Apr 25-27,
Survey date
2005
2006
Absolutely
25.0%
30.0%
essential
Very important
40.0%
38.0%
Somewhat
27.0%
25.0%
important
Not important
6.0%
4.0%
Not at all
2.0%
2.0%
important
Oct 11-12, Jan 17- 25, Jan17-25,
Jan17-25,
Jan17-25,
Survey date
2005
2006
2006
2006
2006
65.0%
78.0%
83.0%
96.0%
75.0%
Yes
21.0%
14.0%
14.0%
4.0%
24.0%
No
13.0%
9.0%
3.0%
1.0%
1.0%
Don't know
April 18- Apr
18-20,
Survey date
20, 2006
2006
79.0%
82.0%
Favor
Oppose
19.0%
17.0%
2.0%
1.0%
Not sure
Q2. Would you do any of the following if a human case of the avian or bird flu was
reported in your state? Data are from Harvard/ICR Q1: Avoid public event,, Q2: Get
Tamiflu or other antiviral drugs Q3: Wash hands more frequently Q4: Warn others about
avian or bird flu Q5: Reduce or avoid travel Data are from Harvard/ICR.
Question
1
2
3
4
5
Jan
17- Jan 17- 25, Jan 17- 25, Jan 17- 25, Jan 17- 25,
Survey date
25, 2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
71.0%
68.0%
90.0%
94.0%
75.0%
Yes
28.0%
30.0%
9.0%
4.0%
24.0%
No
1.0%
3.0%
0.0%
1.0%
1.0%
Don't know
Q3.Would you do any of the following if a human case of the avian or bird flu were
reported in your state? Data are from Harvard/ICR.
Q7: Avoid Q8:
Warn
traveling
people about Q9: Consult Q10:
Talk
to that part traveling to a website with
your Q11: Wear
of
the these parts of for
doctor about a
face
world
the world
information health issues
mask
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Jan
17- Jan 17- 25, Jan 17- 25, Jan 17- 25, Jan 17- 25,
Survey date
25, 2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
81.0%
94.0%
79.0%
84.0%
52.0%
Yes
16.0%
5.0%
20.0%
15.0%
46.0%
No
3.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
2.0%
Don't know
Q4.Would you do or support any of the following if a human case of the avian or bird
flu were reported in your state? Data are from Harvard/ICR (01/17/06–01/25/06),
Associated Press/IPSOS (04/18/06–04/20/06)( 04/18/06-04/20/06)(04/18/06-04/20/06).
Q15:Offering
Q12: Stock
people
up
on Q14:Closing
experimental
Q16: Closing the
things
schools
vaccines
borders
Jan 17- 25, Apr 18- 20,
Apr 18-20, 2006
Apr 8-20, 2006
Survey date
2006
2006
85.0%
69.0%
65.0%
74.0%
Yes
14.0%
29.0%
34.0%
25.0%
No
1.0%
2.0%
1.0%
1.0%
Don't know
Would you do any of the following if a human case of the avian or bird flu were reported
in your state? Data are from Wall Street Journal Online /Harris Interactive (04/25/06–
04/27/06)( 04/25/06–04/27/06)
Q16: Stockpile
critical medical
Q17: Stockpile
supplies
antiviral drugs
Apr 25-27, 2006
Apr 25-27, 2006
Survey date
Absolutely
25.0%
29.0%
essential
Very
34.0%
37.0%
important
Somewhat
31.0%
28.0%
important
Not
7.0%
5.0%
important
Not at all
2.0%
2.0%
important
Note: A significantly higher percentage of subjects was willing to be quarantined or
thought quarantining is important and were willing to take actions (all actions listed in
Q2–Q10 and Q12–17) according to z test results (z score > 1.96). No significance was
found for Q11.
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Table A5.8: Questions about Actual Behavioral Changes Made in Response to News
about Avian Flu
Q1. Have you talked with your doctor about the use of Tamiflu or other antiviral drugs
for the treatment of avian or bird flu? Data are from Harvard/ICR
Survey date
Jan 17- 25, 2006
Yes
4.0%
No
96.0%
Don't know
0.0%
Q2. Have you decreased the amount of chicken or turkey you eat because of concern
about bird flu? Data are from Fox News/ODI
Feb 28-Mar 3,
Survey date
2006
Yes
10.0%
No
88.0%
Don't know
2.0%
Q3. Have you taken any steps to prevent contracting bird flu? Data are from Fox
News/ODI (02/28/06–03/03/06), Associated Press/IPSOS Public Affairs (03/18/06–
03/20/06)
Feb 28-Mar 3,
Apr 18-20, 2006
Survey date
2006
Yes
15.0%
9.0%
No
82.0%
91.0%
Don't know
3.0%
0.0%
Q4. Have you taken any of the following steps to prepare for a possible outbreak of bird
flu among humans? Data are from Associated Press/IPSOS Public Affairs (04/18/06–
04/20/06), Wall Street Journal Online /Harris Interactive (04/18/06–04/20/06)
Survey date
Apr 18-20, 2006 Apr 18-20, 2006
Stockpiling food and water
67.0%
7.0%
44.0%
3.0%
Made plans to work from home
Made plans to keep children home
33.0%
Asked your doctor for prescriptions for
22.0%
Tamiflu or other antiviral drugs
Looked for information
18.0%
Talked about pandemic
18.0%
Adjusted travel plans
6.0%
Prepared plan if pandemic happens
5.0%
Changed eating habits
3.0%
None of these
68.0%
Note: A significantly higher percentage of subjects did not take actual steps (e.g., asked
doctor about Tamiflu, decreased the amount of chicken or turkey eaten, stockpiled food
and water, worked at home, avoided travel, etc) to prepare for a possible outbreak of bird
flu according to z test results (z score > 1.96 or < –1.96).
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Table A5.9: Questions about Recognition of Avian Flu as a Threat
Q1. Are you worried that you or someone in your family will be the victim of the bird flu
virus? (Survey by Cable News Network, USA Today. Data are from conducted by Gallup
Organization (10/21/05–10/23/05), CNN/USA Today (12/09/05–12/11/05), Harvard/ICR
(01/17/06–01/25/06), CNN/USA Today (03/10/06–03/10/06).
Oct 21Jan17- Mar
23,
Dec 9-11, 2005
25,
10-12,
Survey date
2005
2006
2006
Worried
24.0%
20.0%
21.0% 29.0%
Not
Worried/Not
75.0%
78.0%
78.0% 70.0%
concerned
No opinion
1.0%
2.0%
1.0%
1.0%
Q2. How worried /concerned are you that you or someone in your family will be exposed
to the bird flu? Data are from Pew/Princeton Survey Research Associates (11/3/05–
11/6/05), Harvard/ICR (01/17/06–01/25/06), ABC News (03/02/06–03/05/06),
Associated Press/IPSOS (04/03/06–04/05/06).
Apr 3Nov 3- Jan17-25, 2006
Mar2- 5,
Survey date
6, 2005
5, 2006 2006
Worried (concerned) a
great deal
Worried
(concerned)
somewhat
Not
too
worried
(concerned)
Not concerned
Not worried (concerned) at
all
No opinion/don't know
Survey date
Most concerned
Worried (concerned) a
great
deal/a
lot/Very
worried (concerned)
Worried
(concerned)
somewhat
Not
too
worried
(concerned)
Not concerned
Not worried (concerned) at
all

11.0%

4.0%

13.0%

11.0%

27.0%

13.0%

28.0%

23.0%

38.0%

3.0%

36.0%

37.0%

23.0%

29.0%

Jun 721,
2006

Jan 1822,
2007
9.0%

78.0%
23.0%
1.0%
Apr 1820,
2006

1.0%
May 2 -14, 2006

11.0%

13.0%

12.0%

16.0%

23.0%

31.0%

19.0%

35.0%

37.0%

29.0%

24.0%

22.0%

29.0%

26.0%

43.0%

18.0%
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No opinion/don't know
1.0%
1.0%
Q3. How likely do you think it is that the bird flu virus will strike the United States? Data
are from CNN/USA Today (10/21/05–10/23/05), CNN/USA Today (12/09/05–12/11/05),
ABC News (03/02/06–03/05/06), Wall Street Journal Online /Harris Interactive
(04/25/06–04/27/06), AOL/IPSOS (12/31/06).
Oct 21- Dec 9-11, 2005
Mar 2- Apr
Dec.
23,
5, 2006 25-27, 31,
Survey date
2005
2006
2006
Very likely (concerned)
16.0%
30.0% 20.0% 12.0%
Somewhat
likely
46.0%
47.0% 44.0% 38.0%
(concerned)
Not too likely (concerned) 29.0%
16.0% 24.0% 36.0%
Not likely (concerned) at
7.0%
5.0%
7.0%
12.0%
all
No
opinion/Don't
2.0%
2.0%
1.0%
6.0%
2.0%
know/Not sure
Will not strike
14.0%
Minor outbreak
63.0%
Major outbreak
13.0%
Crisis
8.0%
Q4. How concerned are you that the United States will be part of an avian flu pandemic?
Data are from Wall Street Journal Online/Harris Interactive (Polling the Nation)
(08/03/05–08/05/05) and (04/25/06–04/27/06).
Aug 3- Apr 25-27, 2006
Survey date
5, 2005
Very concerned
12.0%
20.0%
Somewhat concerned
39.0%
44.0%
Not very concerned
33.0%
24.0%
Not at all concerned
8.0%
7.0%
Don't know
9.0%
6.0%
Q5. How concerned are you about a pandemic outbreak of avian or bird flu in many
countries at the same time? Data are from Harvard/ICR (01/17/06–1/25/06) and
(O6/07/06–06/21/06)
Jan 17- Jun 7-21, 2006
25,
Survey date
2006
Very concerned
20.0%
16.0%
Somewhat concerned
42.0%
35.0%
Not very concerned
24.0%
29.0%
Not at all concerned
13.0%
19.0%
Don't know
Q6. How concerned are you about the spread of bird flu in the United States? Data are
from Fox News/ODI (10/11/05–10/12/05) (01/10/06–01/11/06), Harvard/ICR (01/17/06–
01/25/06), Fox News/ODI (02/28/06–03/03/06), ABC News(03/02/06–03/05/06)
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Oct 11- Jan 10-11,
Jan 17-25, Mar 2-5, Feb 2812,
2006
2006
2006
Mar 3,
Survey date
2005
2006
Very concerned
30.0%
26.0%
15.0%
23.0%
26.0%
Somewhat concerned
33.0%
31.0%
42.0%
38.0%
40.0%
Not very concerned
21.0%
28.0%
27.0%
25.0%
24.0%
Not at all concerned
11.0%
15.0%
14.0%
12.0%
10.0%
Don't know
5.0%
2.0%
1.0%
1.0%
Q7. How likely do you think it is that there will be cases/more cases of avian or bird flu
among…. in the United States during the next 12 months? Data are from Harvard/ICR
b.
Among
a. Among wild chickens or other c.
Among
birds
farm-raised
humans
poultry
Jan
17-25, Jan 17-25, 2006
Jan
17-25,
Survey date
2006
2006
Very likely
12.0%
9.0%
6.0%
Somewhat likely
46.0%
34.0%
28.0%
Not too likely
27.0%
40.0%
42.0%
Not at all likely
11.0%
13.0%
22.0%
Don't know
3.0%
4.0%
3.0%
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Table A5.10: Questions about Support for Funding for Research on Avian Flu
Q1. How important will it be to invest government dollars in the development and
production of avian flu vaccines? Data are from Wall Street Journal Online /Harris
Interactive (08/03/05–08/05/06)
Survey date
Aug 3-5, 2005
Apr 25-27, 2006
Absolutely essential
24.0%
30.0%
Very important
37.0%
35.0%
Somewhat important
31.0%
28.0%
Not very important
5.0%
4.0%
Not at all important
3.0%
3.0%
Q2.Are you worried that the United States may not be doing enough to prevent
contagious diseases such as SARS, lethal flu, and mad cow disease that come from other
countries. Data are from the Public Agenda Foundation (06/01/05–06/13/05)(01/10/06–
01/22/06)
Survey date
Jun 1-13, 2005
Jan 10-22, 2006
Worry a lot
23.0%
22.0%
Worry somewhat
37.0%
41.0%
Don't worry
39.0%
36.0%
Don't know
1.0%
1.0%
Q3.Do you think the United States is spending too much, too little, or about the right
amount of money to protect the country against the avian or bird flu? Data are from
Harvard/ICR (01/7/06–01/25/06), Trust for America's Health. Methodology: Greenberg
Quinlan Rosner Research (01/18/06–01/22/07)
Survey date
Jan 17- 25, 2006
Jan18- 22, 2007
Too much/Much more
6.0%
20.0%
Somewhat more
26.0%
Little more
18.0%
Too little
36.0%
About the right/Right amount
36.0%
32.0%
now
Spend less
2.0%
Don't know
22.0%
3.0%
Q4. Do you think it is important to improve the country's ability to respond to new
infectious diseases such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and avian flu?
Data are from Harvard/ICR
Mar 31-Apr 4,
Mar 31-Apr 4,
Apri11-15,
Survey date
2006(Sample A)
2006(Sample B)
2007
Extremely important
46.0%
47.0%
43.0%
Very important
41.0%
41.0%
42.0%
Somewhat important
11.0%
11.0%
12.0%
Not an important thing to do
1.0%
1.0%
3.0%
Don't know
1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
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Table A6.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time HIV/AIDS (Semi Annual)
Time
Interval
6-12, 1999
1-6, 2000
7-12,2000
1-6, 2001
7-12,2001
1-6, 2002
7-12,2002
1-6, 2003
7-12,2003
1-6, 2004
7-12,2004
1-6, 2005
7-12,2005
1-6, 2006
7-12,2006
1-6, 2007

Number
of
Articles
30
25
32
58
35
32
32
40
36
28
28
34
27
38
31
33

Medical
Ratio
0.24
0.25
0.26
0.25
0.27
0.34
0.17
0.27
0.26
0.28
0.25
0.27
0.23
0.22
0.30
0.22

Economic
Ratio
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.29
0.20
0.19
0.29
0.20
0.29
0.22
0.17
0.14
0.20
0.17
0.17
0.16

Security
Ratio
0.00
0.07
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00

Human
Rights Ratio
0.16
0.07
0.08
0.10
0.06
0.04
0.11
0.11
0.08
0.13
0.15
0.07
0.04
0.11
0.13
0.10

Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as the
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number
of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio for each frame in the
given time interval (semiannual) was calculated as the average of the ratios
for all news articles published in the monthly interval.
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Table A6.2: Changes in Media Coverage over Time HIV/AIDS (Quarterly Interval)

Time Interval
4-6,1999
7-9,1999
10-12,1999
1-3, 2000
4-6,2000
7-9,2000
10-12,2000
1-3, 2001
4-6,2001
7-9,2001
10-12,2001
1-3, 2002
4-6,2002
7-9,2002
10-12,2002
1-3, 2003
4-6,2003
7-9,2003
10-12,2003
1-3, 2004
4-6,2004
7-9,2004
10-12,2004
1-3, 2005
4-6,2005
7-9,2005
10-12,2005
1-3, 2006
4-6,2006
7-9,2006
10-12,2006
1-3,2007
4-6,2007

Number
of
Biomedical
Articles
Ratio
5
0.05
13
0.38
12
0.17
11
0.32
14
0.20
19
0.24
13
0.29
18
0.30
40
0.23
17
0.33
18
0.22
15
0.42
17
0.26
14
0.21
18
0.15
25
0.25
15
0.32
16
0.30
20
0.23
14
0.32
14
0.25
14
0.19
14
0.31
18
0.37
16
0.17
12
0.14
15
0.30
15
0.21
23
0.24
15
0.30
16
0.30
15
0.21
18
0.24

Economic
Ratio
0.22
0.11
0.10
0.11
0.16
0.15
0.17
0.20
0.33
0.21
0.18
0.16
0.23
0.26
0.31
0.22
0.15
0.24
0.33
0.27
0.17
0.24
0.11
0.08
0.21
0.18
0.21
0.14
0.18
0.18
0.16
0.12
0.19

Security
Ratio
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.15
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.04
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Human Right
Ratio
0.16
0.13
0.20
0.05
0.08
0.10
0.06
0.09
0.10
0.03
0.09
0.03
0.05
0.18
0.06
0.12
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.03
0.22
0.09
0.20
0.08
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.12
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.11
0.08

Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as the number of
times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number of sentences in that
news article, and the mean ratio for each frame in a given quarterly interval was
calculated as the average of the ratios for all news articles published in the quarterly
interval.
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Table A6.3: Questions Regarding Willingness to Change Behavior in Response to News
about HIV/AIDS
Q1. Do you need more information about how to use condoms to
protect against HIV and AIDS? (Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research
Associates)
August 14 - October 26,
March 15-May
Survey date
2000
11, 2004
Yes
14%
14%
No
86%
85%
Don't know
0%
1%
Q2. Do you need more information about how to talk with children
about HIV and AIDS? (Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research
Associates)
August 14 - October 26,
March 15-May
Survey date
2000
11, 2004
Yes
44%
33%
No
56%
66%
Don't know
0%
1%
Q3. Do you need more information about where to go to get tested
for HIV?( Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates)
August 14 - October 26,
March 15-May
Survey date
2000
11, 2004
Yes
26%
23%
No
73%
76%
Don't know
0%
1%
Q4. Do you need more information about how to talk with your
doctor or health care provider about HIV and AIDS?( Kaiser/
Princeton Survey Research Associates)
August 14 - October 26,
March 15-May
Survey date
2000
11, 2004
Yes
19%
18%
No
81%
81%
Don't know
0%
1%
Q5. Do you need more information about how to talk with your
partner about HIV and AIDS?( Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research
Associates)
August 14 - October 26,
March 15-May
Survey date
2000
11, 2004
Yes
19%
17%
No
80%
82%
Don't know
1%
1%
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March 24 - April
18, 2006
35%
64%
1%

March 24-April
18, 2006
31%
67%
2%

Table A6.4: Questions about Actual Behavioral Changes Made in Response to News
about HIV/AIDS
Q1a. Have you, yourself, ever been tested for HIV the virus that causes AIDS? (If yes,
ask, Was that in the past 12 months, or not?)
Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates
August 14 March 15 -May March 24 -April
Survey date
October 26, 2000
11, 2004
18, 2006
Yes, tested within
past 12 months
17%
20%
18%
Yes, tested, but not in
the past 12 months
26%
28%
29%
No, never tested
55%
50%
52%
Don't know or
refused
2%
2%
1%
Q1b. Have you, yourself, ever been tested for HIV?
Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates ( 08/14 - 10/26/2000, 03/15 - 05/11/2004)
National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago (03/10/-08/07/2006)
December 10 March 15-May
March 10 Survey date
January 19, 2003
11, 2004
August 7, 2006
Yes
64%
48%
38%
No
34%
50%
62%
Don't Know
1%
2%
0%
Q1c. Now thinking about any medical tests you may have had in the last two years, have
you had a test for HIV the virus? (Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates).
July 6March 28 - July
September 26,
29, 2001
2004
Yes
33%
23%
No
64%
76%
Don't Know
3%
1%
Q2. Have you ever talked with a doctor or health care provider about HIV and AIDS?
(Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates).
August 14 December 10
March 15 March 24 October 26,
- January 19,
May 11,
April 18,
Survey date
2000
2003
2004
2006
Yes
30%
50%
38%
38%
No
70%
50%
62%
61%
Don't know
0%
0%
1%
Q3. Have you and your partner ever had a conversation about whether to get tested for
HIV/AIDS? (Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates)
December 10 March 15-May
January 19,
11, 2004
Survey date
2003
Yes
51%
45%
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No
49%
54%
Don't know
0%
0%
Q4. Have you personally ever personally talked about HIV or AIDS with (your) child or
not?
Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates (02/07/-09/04/2000, 12/07/-01/18/2001),
NPR/Harvard/ Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates (09/29/-10/23/2003)
December
September
February 7 7 - January 29 - October
September 4, 2000
Survey date
18, 2001
23, 2003
Yes
76%
55%
87%
No
24%
44%
13%
Don't know
0%
1%
0%
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Table A6.5: Questions about Recognition of HIV/AIDS as a Threat
Q1a. Do you think HIV is a more urgent problem or a less urgent problem, or is it the
same for this country, than it was a few years ago?( Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research
Associates)
February 7August 14-October 26,
Survey date
September 4, 2000
2000
More Urgent
49%
49%
Less urgent
15%
13%
About the same
34%
35%
Don't know/refused
2%
3%
Q1b. Do you think the number of new HIV infections per year in the US (United States)
has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same? Associated Press/IPSOS Public
Affairs (07/19/-07/21/2004), Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates (03/24/04/18/2006)
July 19-July 21,
March 24-April 18,
Survey date
2004
2006
More people
(Increased)
52%
57%
Fewer people
(decreased)
20%
12%
About the same
25%
25%
Don't know/refused
3%
6%
Q1c. Do you think HIV/AIDS is a bigger or a smaller problem now than it was 5 years
ago, or is the problem of HIV/AIDS about the same as it was 5 years ago? (
Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research Associates)
April 23-May 6,
Survey date
2007
Bigger problem
42%
Smaller problem
15%
About the same
39%
Don't know/refused
5%
Q2. Thinking about the way the problem of HIV/AIDS affects the United States today;
do you think the problem is about the same as it has been, that the U.S. today is making
progress in this area, or that the U.S. today is losing ground? Harvard/Washington
Post(06/13/-06/23/2002), Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research associates(03/15/05/11/2004, 10/04/-10/09/2005, 03/24/-04/18/2006)
October 4June 13-June
March 15 March 24October 9,
23, 2002
May 11, 2004
April 18, 2006
Survey date
2005
Making progress
49%
47%
41%
40%
about the same
20%
13%
26%
22%
Losing ground
26%
36%
24%
29%
Don't know/refused
6%
5%
9%
10%
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Q3. Please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small
problem or not a problem at all.)...The spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases.
(Pew/ Princeton Survey Research Associates)
August 19April 23-May 6, 2007
Survey date
September 8, 2002
Very big problem
42%
39%
Moderate big problem
41%
42%
Small problem
13%
15%
Not a problem at all
1%
1%
Don't know/refused
2%
2%
Q4. Bearing in mind the different ways people can be infected with HIV--how concerned
are you personally about becoming infected with HIV? Are you very concerned,
somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not at all concerned? Kaiser/Princeton
Survey Research Associates (09/10-10/19/1997, 02/07-09/04/2000, 08/14/-10/26/2000,
01/25/-01/28/2001, 03/15/-05/11/2004, 03/24/-04/18/2006) Harvard/Washington
Post(06/13/-06/23/2002), Gallup(11/03/-11/05/2003), Associated Press(07/19/07/21/2004)
September 17 February 7- August 14 January 25 October 19,
September 4, October 26,
January 28,
Survey date
1997
2000
2000
2001
Very
concerned/worried
24%
21%
19%
26%
Somewhat
concerned/worried
17%
23%
18%
15%
Not too
concerned/worried
21%
18%
22%
22%
Not concerned at all
38%
38%
39%
26%
Don't know/refused
1%
November 3June 13-June
July 19-July
November 5, March 15 23, 2002
21, 2004
Survey date
2003
May 11, 2004
Very
concerned/worried
18%
7%
17%
10%
Somewhat
concerned/worried
15%
9%
14%
12%
Not too
concerned/worried
21%
18%
25%
26%
Not concerned at all
45%
66%
44%
52%
Don't know/refused
1%
January 26March 24March 8,
April 18, 2006
Survey date
2009
Very
concerned/worried
15%
13%
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Somewhat
concerned/worried
14%
12%
Not too
concerned/worried
22%
23%
Not concerned at all
49%
50%
Don't know/refused
1%
Q5.How concerned are you about a son or daughter becoming infected with HIV? Are
you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not at all concerned?
Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research Associates(08/14/-10/26/2000, 03/15/-05/11/2004,
03/24/-04/18/2006)
August 14 March 15-May March 24-April
Survey date
October 26, 2000
11, 2004
18, 2006
Very
concerned/worried
44%
36%
32%
Somewhat
concerned/worried
27%
32%
28%
Not too
concerned/worried
15%
17%
21%
Not concerned at all
14%
14%
19%
Don't know/refused
1%
1%
Q5b.How big a problem you think HIV/AIDS is for teens in
general(NPR/Harvard/Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates)
September 29Survey date
October 23, 2003
Major problem
65%
Minor Problem
31%
Not a problem at all
2%
Don't know/refused
3%
Q6.What do you think is the most urgent health problem facing this nation today?
Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research Associates(08/14/-10/26/2000, 03/15/-05/11/2004,
10/04/-10/09/2005,03/24/-04/18/2006)Kaiser/ Harvard/ Washington Post(06/13/06/23/2002)
March 15 October 4 August14 June 13 - June
May 11,
October 9,
October26, 2000
23, 2002
Survey date
2004
2005
HIV
26%
17%
21%
16%
March 24 - April
Survey date
18, 2006
HIV
17%
Q7. How serious a problem would you say HIV/AIDS is? Would you say it is a very
serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, not too serious of a problem, or not a
problem at all?
Survey date
Very serious problem

July 13 - July 17, 2001
82%

264

July 19-July 21, 2004
61%

Somewhat serious
problem
14%
33%
Not too serious a
problem/Not very
serious
2%
4%
Not a problem at all
1%
2%
Don't know/refused
1%
Survey date
July 10-July 11, 2002
Very serious
problems
68%
Fairly serious
problem
17%
Just somewhat of a
problem
9%
Not really a problem
4%
Not sure
2%
Survey date
May 10-May 16, 2004 June 23-June 28, 2005
Extremely serious
35%
44%
Very serious
44%
37%
Somewhat serious
16%
15%
Less serious
4%
3%
No opinion/Don't
know
1%
2%
Q8. What do you think is the most urgent health problem facing the world today?
Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research Associates(08/14-10/26/2000, 07/18/07/21/2002,03/15/-05/11/2004,03/14/-04/18/2006) Harvard/ Washington Post( 06/13/06/23/2002)
August 14 June 13 - June 23,
July 18 - July
Survey date
October 26, 2000
2002
21, 2002
HIV
37%
33%
50%
March 15 - May 11, March 24 - April 18,
Survey date
2004
2006
HIV
36%
34%
Q9 .Which one of the following two statements comes closer to your views? The
HIV/AIDS problem worldwide is best described as 'an epidemic.' HIV/AIDS is a serious
problem, but it is an exaggeration to call it 'a pandemic.' Kaiser Family Foundation,
Washington Post, Harvard University (06/13-06/23/2002), Kaiser/ Princeton Survey
Research Associates(03/15/-05/11/2004)
June 13 - June 23,
March 15 - May 11,
Survey date
2002
2004
Best described as 'an
epidemic'
67%
70%
An exaggeration to
call it 'an epidemic'
28%
26%
Don't know/Refused
5%
4%
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Q10.Do you think the problem of HIV/AIDS is about the same as it has been, that the
world today is making progress in this area, or that the world today is losing ground?
Kaiser Family Foundation, Washington Post, Harvard University(06/13/-06/23/2002),
Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates(03/15/-05/11/2004, 03/24/-04/18/2006)
June 13 - June 23,
March 15 - May
March 24 Survey date
2002
11, 2004
April 18, 2006
Making progress
35%
38%
36%
about the same
15%
9%
16%
Losing ground
45%
49%
40%
Don't know/refused
5%
4%
8%
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Table A6.6: Questions on Support for Federal Funding on HIV/AIDS
Q1.Do you think federal spending on AIDS is too high, low or about right compared to
other diseases? Kaiser/Princeton Survey Associates(09/17/-10/19/97,02/07-09/04/2000,
08/14/-10/26/2000, 06/13/-06/23/2002,03/15-05/11/2004, 10/04/-10/09/2005,03/24/04/18/2006)
September 17, February 7August 14June 13October 19,
September 4,
October 26,
June 23,
Survey date
1997
2000
2000
2002
Too high/too much
11%
9%
8%
11%
Too low/too little
40%
40%
43%
29%
About right
5%
39%
30%
42%
Don't know or refused
14%
12%
19%
18%
October 4March 24March 15-May
October 9,
April 18,
11, 2004
Survey date
2005
2006
Too high/too much
6%
13%
7%
Too low/too little
42%
29%
48%
About right
40%
43%
24%
Don't know or refused
12%
16%
21%
Q2. Do you think the federal government spends too much money on AIDS, too little
money, or about the right amount? Kaiser/Princeton Survey Associates (08/1410/26/2000, 06/13-06/23/2002, 03/15-05/11/2004, 10/04-10/09/2005, 03/24/-04/18/2006)
Time/ABC News (05/10-05/16/2004)
August 14March 15May 10June 13-June
October 26,
May 11,
May 16,
23, 2002
Survey date
2000
2004
2004
Too high/too much
5%
5%
5%
5%
Too low/too little
55%
39%
52%
53%
About right
25%
39%
36%
38%
Don't know or refused
15%
15%
8%
4%
October 4March 24October 9,
April 18,
Survey date
2005
2006
Too high/too much
9%
7%
Too low/too little
42%
63%
About right
33%
17%
Don't know or refused
16%
14%
Q3.Do you think that spending more money on HIV/AIDS prevention in the United
States will lead to meaningful progress in slowing the epidemic, or that spending more
money won't make much difference? Kaiser/Princeton Survey Associates ( 03/15/03/11/2004, 10/04/-10/05/2005, 03/24/-04/18/2006, 03/24/-04/18/2006)
October 4March 24March 24March 15-May
October 9,
April 18,
April 18,
11, 2004
Survey date
2005
2006
2006
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Lead to meaningful
progress
Won't make much
difference
Depends
Don't know or refused

57%

44%

62%

59%

34%
3%
7%
March 24-April
18, 2006

48%
3%
5%

30%
5%
4%

31%
3%
7%

March 30-April
3, 2005

March 31April 4, 2006

March 31April 4, 2006

42%
40%
14%
2%

49%
38%
10%
1%

50%
39%
10%
2%

April 11April 15,
2007
52%
35%
9%
2%

1%

1%

0%

1%

Survey date
Lead to meaningful
progress
62%
Won't make much
difference
32%
Depends
5%
Don't know or refused
4%
Q4.Do you think improving treatment and prevention of
HIV and AIDS is important national priority ?Harvard,
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation/ICR( 03/3004/03/2005, 03/31/-04/04/2006, 03/31/-04/04/2006,
04/11/-04/15/2007)
Survey date
Extremely important
Very important
Somewhat important
Not important
Shouldn't be on
nation's health agenda
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FigureA6.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time and Public Opinion about
Willingness to Change Behavior (Coverage on United States)
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Figure A6.2: Changes in Media Coverage over and Public Opinion about Actual
Behavioral Changes (Coverage on United States)
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Figure A6. 3: Changes in Media Coverage over Time and Public Opinion about HIV as
Threat (Coverage on United States)
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Figure A6. 4: Changes in Media Coverage over Time and Public Opinion on Support for
Funding (Coverage on United States)
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